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soPHicAL  Classic 


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GERMAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  CLASSICS 


ENGLISH  READERS  MD  STUDENTS. 


EDITED   BT 


GEORGE   S.   MORRIS 


KAI^T^S    ETHICS. 


'^ 


I 


GRIGGS'S 

PHILOSOPHICAL  CLASSICS. 

Under  tlio  editorial  supervision  of  Prof.  G.  S.  Morris. 

De^mtcd  to  a  Critical  Exposition  of  the  Master- 
pieces of  German  Thought. 


Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Season.  By  Prof.  G. 
S.  Morris,  Ph.D.,  of  the  University  of  Michigan. 
$1.2.5. 

Schelling's    Transcendental   Idealism.      By 

Prof.  .loHN  Watson,  LL.D.,  of  (^iicuu'i-  I'liiversity, 
Kingston,  Canada.    S1-~'T- 

Fichte's  Science  of  Knowledge.  By  Prof.  C. 
C.  EvERKTT.  U.D  ,  of  Harvard  I'liiversity.     $1.35. 

Hegel's  -ffisthetics.  By  Prof.  J.  S,  Kedney, 
S.T.D.,  of  tlie  Seabury  Divinity  School.    %\:Si. 

Kant's  Ethics.  By  President  Noah  Porter,  D.D., 
LL.D.,  of  Yale  College.    $1.25. 

OTHER  VOLUMES  IN  PREPARATION. 


A  handy  series  of  the  great  German  thinkers ;  of 
much  interest  and  great  convenience  to  scholars  and 
to  the  more  general  reader.— Cmcjwwa^i  Com.  Gazette. 

This  series  offers  an  exceedingly  valuable  compen- 
dium of  German  philosophic  thought,  valuable  in  any 
tongue,  and  especially  so  iu  the  English,  in  which 
there  is  nothing  to  compare  with  it.— Gfiicago  Times. 

These  excellent  books,  as  remarkable  for  ability  as 
for  clearness,  will  do  much  to  clear  the  way  and  make 
the  mastery  of  the  German  systems  a  comparatively 
easy  task.— xVeii'  York  Examiner. 


KANT'S    ETHICS. 


A   CRITICAL  EXPOSITION. 


By    NOAH    PORTER, 

PRESIDENT   OF  TALE   COLLEGE. 


CHICACiO: 
C.    GRIGGS    AND    COMPANY. 

1886. 


Copyright,  1886. 
By  S.  C.  GRIGGS  AND  COMPANY 


I     KKIGHT    &■■  LEONARD  .  t 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA.  SAN  DIEGO 


3  1822  02711  9890 


THIS  VOLr:ME  IS  INSCRIBED 


PRESIDENT  MAKK  HOPKINS,  D.D.,  LLD., 


IN   GRATEFUL   RECOGNITION   OF   HIS   EMINENT   SERVICES  TO 


ETHICAL    SCIENCE, 


CHRISTIAN    EDUCATION. 


PEEFAOE. 


r  I  IHE  essay  now  given  to  the  public  has  been 
-*-  promised  for  several  months,  but  was  written 
for  the  most  part  as  a  vacation  exercise  during  the 
last  summer.  Its  theme  is  Kant's  Theory  of  Ethics, 
as  contrasted  with  his  practical  teachings,  so  far  as 
the  former  is  distinctive  of  his  school.  For  this  rea- 
son it  is  chiefly  concerned  with  the  two  treatises  in 
which  this  theory  is  explained  and  defended,  viz.: 
Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  1785; 
Kritik  der  Praktischen  Vernunft,  1788. 

As  its  title  imports,  this  treatise  is  both  expository 
and  critical.  In  expounding  Kant's  ethical  theory  to 
English  readers,  the  writer  has  thought  it  best  to 
state  this  theory  very  largely  in  Kant's  own  lan- 
guage, with  such  comments  as  might  be  required 
to  make  it  intelligible.  He  has  done  this  for  two 
reasons,  that  he  might  be  entirely  just  to  Kant  him- 
self, and  that  he  might  aid  the  unpractised  student  in 
the  somewhat  discouraging  task  of  interpreting  the 
German  philosopher.     For  both  these  reasons  he  has 


Vlii  PREFACE. 

often  retained  Kant's  peculiar  and  frequently  highly- 
technical  phraseology  in  order  that,  by  mere  repe- 
tition, it  might  become  familiar,  while  yet  he  has 
sought  to  give  its  meaning  in  current  English,  that 
the  student  might  acquire  facility  in  interpreting  the 
Kantian  dialect  by  its  English  equivalents.  He  does 
not  assert  that  in  every  case  he  has  been  successful  in 
the  last-named  attempt.  The  English  text,  which 
he  has  invariably  used,  is  that  of  the  generally  ap- 
proved translation  of  Professor  Abbott,  of  Trinity 
College,  Dublin.* 

The  critical  remarks  of  the  author  are  usually 
given  as  a  running  commentary  upon  the  text  with 
the  important  exception  of  §§  21-33,  in  which  the 
exposition  covers  §§  21-26  and  the  criticism  §§  27-33. 
These  comments  suppose  some  familiarity  with  eth- 
ical theories,  and  the  criticisms  and  schools  to  which 
they  have  given  rise,  although  the  writer  has  scru- 
pulously avoided  all  personal  and  partisan  ref- 
erences, and  endeavored  to  confine  himself  to  his 
appropriate  functions  as  the  expounder  and  critic  of 
his  author. 

Besides  the  expository   and   critical   matter  thus 

*  Kant's  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  and  other  works  on  the 
Theory  of  Ethics.  Translated  by  Thomas  Kingsmill  Abbott.  M.  A., 
etc.    London  ;  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1879. 


PREFACE.  IX 

described  the  reader  will  find  a  brief  general  intro- 
duction, together  with  a  summary  or  condensed 
review  of  the  distinctive  positions  taken  by  Kant 
upon  the  most  important  topics  as  compared  with 
those  of  other  —  principally  English — writers,  and 
some  brief  strictures  upon  Kant  by  a  few  German 
critics. 

The  preparation  of  this  essay  has  cost  the  writer 
some  Labor,  but  the  labor  has  brought  its  own 
rewai"d.  He  trusts  that  the  result  will  be  useful  as 
an  aid  to  those  students  who  are  interested  in  the 
study  of  ethical  theories,  and  who  appreciate  the 
practical  significance  of  such  theories  at  the  present 

time. 

N.  P. 
Yale  College,  Dec.  1,  1885. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Plan  and  reasons  for  the  treatise       ....  1 
Relation  of  the  Kantian   Ethics  to  the  Meta- 
physics       2 

Not  necessary  to  expound   the   Metaphysics  at 

length 3 

Salient  features  of  the  same 3 

Kant"s  important  services  to  modern  thought    .  5 

Especially  upon  Theology  and  Ethics      ...  6 

Their  effect  upon  Faith  in  the  Supernatural      .  7 
Influence    upon    speculation    and    literature  in 

England  and  America 8 

Difficulties  in  criticisingf  the  same     ....  11 


CHAPTER  I. 

PRINCIPAL    ETHICAL    TREATISES. 

Titles  of  Ethical  Treatises 13 

The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 14 

The  Prolegomena 15 


xii  COKTENTS. 

Relation  to  Ethics l(i 

Critique  of  Pare  Reason  —  Fundamental  ques- 
tion of 18 

Phenomena  vs.  Things  in  themselves       ...  19 

Noumena .  20 

Limits  of  human  knowledge         21 

Disappointment 22 

Promised  deliverance 22 

Elements  of  Kant's  Constructive  Ethics         .      .  23 

Three  important  questions  proposed  by  Kant    .  25 

Plausibility  of  his  solution ,26 

Obligation  to  consistency 28 

This  solution  preliminary  and  imperfect      .      .  29 

Principles  relative  and  absolute .31 

Fundamental  principles  of  Ethics  readily  un- 
derstood and  assented  to 38 

In  speculative    principles,  Kant  claims  only  a 

relative  authority 34 

Danger  of  confounding  speculative  and  ethical 

principles 36 

We   proceed   next   to   the   examination   of  his 

formal  motives   .....,.»..  37 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE    FUNDAMENTAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    THE    METAPHYSICS 
OF    MORALS. 

The  Metaphysics  of  Morals  tentative  only     .  38 

A  Metaphysics  of  Morals  possible       o      »      o      .  39 


CONTENTS.  XIU 

Preliminary  sketch  of  the  author's  system    .      .  41 

Division  of  topics  in  the  Grundlegung    .      .      -  42 

Import  of  his  opening  sentence    .....  43 

Kant's  interpretation  of  the  "  Good-will  "     .      .  45 

(1)  An  act  from  inclination,  not  an  act  of 
duty 4-") 

(2)  The  maxim,  not  the  end,  determining 
moral  worth .4(3 

(o)  Respect  for  the  law  essential  to  duty    .  4(i 

The  content  or  import  of  the  moral  law        .      ,  47 
Kant's    scepticism     in    respect    to    speculative 

truth 49 

Criticism  of  Kant's  first  sentence        ....  50 

Diverse  meanings  of  "  Good-will "     .      .      .      ,  51 
Kant's   defective    conception   of   his  opponents' 

doctrines 54 

Kant's  limited   and    low   conception   of   hapi)i- 

ness 55 

Gratification  of  the  Reason 5(3 

Kant's  defective  conception  of  duty  and  obliga- 
tion       .  57 

Other  oversights  of  Kant  .......  58 

Kant's  second  error 60 

Third  mistake.      Respect  for  the  law  a  sensibil- 
ity             ....  61 

Conceded  to  be  an  "  obscure  feeling  "       -      .      .  61 
Criterion  of  an  act  of  duty     ...                   .62 

Second  section  of  Kant's  treatise        .      .  64 
Kant's  first  position,  that  every  ideal  must  be 

actual .      o      .  64 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

Whence  is  the  moral  ideal  derived  ?     Kant  and 

his  critics 66 

Kant  overlooks  the  sensibility  as  an  element  of 

the  ideal 67 

Right  action  defined  in  the  most  general  way 

as  reasonable  action 69 

A  perfect  will  excludes  obligation      ....  70 

The  categorical  and  hypothetical  imperative     .  71 

Kant's  defective  conception  of  happiness  .  .  73 
Kant  adopts  the  criterion  of  consequences  as  a 

practical  rule 76 

Relation    of  the    moral  ideal  to  the  actual,  in 

man 79 

A  life  according  to  nature 82 

He  analyzes  human  nature  before  he  is  aware  83 

Discovers  ends  of  action  and  personality  .  .  84 
But  does  not  formally  abandon  the  categorical 

imperative 87 

And  yet  he  practically  shifts  his  ground  .  .  88 
Rationality  does   not    exclude  relations   to  the 

sensibility 90 

Kant's  views  of  the  will  indefinite     ....  92 

The  personal  Ego  overlooked 94 

Transition  from  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals  to 

the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason    ....  95 

Kant  returns  to  the  will  and  moral  freedom      .  97 

The  man  noumenal  and  man  phenomenal     .      .  100 

Kant's  "  Freedom  "  still  more  exactl}^  defined  .  102 
Kant  concedes  that  the  moral   law  affects    the 

sensibilities '=      .  104 


CONTENTS.  XV 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON. 

Preface  and  Introduction        ....      =      .   108 
Practical,  not  pure  and  practical        ....   109 
The  practical  reason  supplies  an  a  priori  ele- 
ment   110 

Reply  to  a  criticism Ill 

Twofold  function  ascribed  to  the  will     .      .      .   113 
Vacillating  and  uncertain  classification  of   the 

psychical  powers 115 

^    Kant's  indefinite  conceptions  of  the  will       .      .116 
Knowledge  of  every  sort  begins  with  judgments, 

not  concepts r      .      .   118 

Principles  of  practical  reason  defined      »      .      .   119 
Every  motive  must  address  the  reason    .      ,      .   120 

Empirical  principles  defined 121 

Material  practical  principles  defined        .      .      .   123 
Practical  principles  formal,  and  not  material    .   124 
Two  problems  proposed     ......      =    125 

Autonomy  and  heteronomy  of  the  will  .      .      .   127 

Ill-desert  analyzed 128 

The  contrast  stated  between  the  pure  and  the 

practical  reason .129 

How  can  we  apply  the  commands  of  the  prac- 
tical reason  to  the  world  of  sense  .      .      .      .loo 
The  object  and  effect  of  the  practical  reason      »   134 
The  typic  of  the  pure  practical  reason    .      .      <.   137 
The  motives  of  the  pure  practical  reason     .      .   139 


XV]  CONTENTS. 

Obligation  and  respect  for  the  law    ....  140 
Acting  according  to  duty,  and  from  a  sense  of 

duty 142 

Import  of  a  command  to  love 143 

Apostrophe  to  Duty 145 

Personality  here  recognized  for  the  first  time    .  146 
Reasons  why  the  practical  reason  admits  a  sin- 
gle systematic  form  only     ......  148 

Appeal  to  the  universal  consciousness     .      .      .  149 
Difference     between     physical     and     psychical 

causes 151 

Relations  of  man,  the  nounienon,  to  time  and 

space 154 

Dynamical  and  mathematical  categories        .      .  154 
The  dialectic  of  the  practical  reason        .      .      .156 
Anticipation  of  moral  satisfaction  not  moral     .  158 
Self-contentment  conceded  to  be  ethically  legit- 
imate         160 

The  primacy  of  the  practical  above  the  specula- 
tive reason 162 

How  far  have  they  a  common  root    ....  163 

Argument  for  immortality 164 

This   argument   assumes   design   as  objectively 

true 166 

Argument  for  God's  existence 166 

Difference  between  rational  and  moral  ends       .  168 

New  argument  attempted 170 

Can  the  practical  be  independent  of  the  specu- 
lative reason 172 

DifiFerenee  between  a  hypothesis  and  a  postulate  174 


CONTENTS.  Xvii 

Kant's  argument  reduced  to  —  what       .      .      .  175 

Methodology  of  the  practical  reason        .      .      .  176 

The  starry  heavens  and  the  moral  law    .      .      .  177 

Practical  needs  are  supreme  and  isolated     .      .  179 

<^  Comments  on  the  conclusion 180 


CHAPTER   IV. 

A    CRITICAL    SUMMARY    OF    KANt's    ETHICAL    THEORV. 

The  practical  reason  briefly  described     .      .      .   184 

Whence  its  authority 186 

How  related  to  Butler's  Principle  of  Reflection    186 

Kant's  objective  rule  of  duty 190 

Good    and    ill- desert   according    to    Kant    and 

Butler .   191 

Kant's  doctrine  of  freedom  .....=  193 
Freedom  of  the  Ego  noumenon  .....  195 
Relation  of  Kant's  Ethics  to  speculative  truth  .  198 
Ethical  grounds  for  Belief  in  Immortality  .  »  199 
Further  remai'ks  upon  the  Categorical  Impera- 
tive          .      ,      .      o   201 

Personality  essential  to  obligation     ....   202 
Sense  of  authority  complex  and  derived  .   204 

The  two  explanations  contrasted  .      .      .      .      =   205 
Kant's  explanation  of  the  moral  law       %      .      ?  .201 — 
Kant's    view    of    conformity    to    man's    moral 

nature 209 

Further  criticism  of  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  will  210 


XV  CONTEN"TS. 

Kant's  late  and  inadequate  recognition  of  pur- 
pose          ,      .  212 

Kant's  failure  to  do  justice  to  personality     .      .  214 
His  depreciation  of  the  emotions  and  the  sensi- 
bility          216 

The  intellectual  application  of  Kant's  Ethics     .  220 

Authority  of  experience  in  ethical  questions     .  221 

Kant's  Ethics  and  the  Christian,  contrasted        .  224 

Relations  to  Theistic  and  Christian  truth     .      ,  226 


CHAPTER    V. 

BRIEF    NOTICES    FROM    A    FEW    OF    KANt's    GERMAN 
CRITICS. 

Introductory o      .  232 

Schiller's  comments  on  Kant's  Ethics      .      .      .  233 

Schleiermacher  and  Lotze        ......  239 

Trendelenburg's  strictures  on  Kant  .      .      o      .  243 


IJSTTRODUCTORY. 


§  1.     The  title  of  this  treatise  describes  its  pur- 
pose.    It  proposes,  first  to  interpret  and 

Plan  and 

then  to  criticise  the  principal  features  of  Reasons  for 
Kant's  ethical  system.  Ft  proposes  the 
one  in  order  to  effect  the  other.  This  method  is 
appropriate  to  the  examination  of  every  philosoph- 
ical writer  and  every  philosophical  system;  and  so 
emphatically,  that  a  skilful  interpretation  is  often 
of  itself  the  most  satisfactory  criticism,  as  it  is  al- 
ways the  most  effective  preparation  for  the  same. 
This  is  preeminently  true  of  every  division  of  the 
Kantian  philosophy,  of  those  even  which  seem  to  be 
the  least  speculative.  It  might  seem  at  first  thought 
that  the  Kantian  Ethics,  like  ethics  in  general  or 
the  principles  of  any  individual  ethical  system, 
must  be  so  far  independent  of  any  special  meta- 
physical theories  as  to  involve  no  special  difficulty  of 
either  interpretation  or  criticism.  This  is  only  true 
of  a  few  of  Kant's  leading  positions,  when  inter- 
preted   in  their   practical  spirit  and  enforced  with 


2  IXTRODUCTOKY. 

a  certain  imaginative  fervor.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
Relation  of  is  most  obvious  that  whatever  is  espe- 
tiu- Kantian      ^j^jj     ^^^  characteristically  Kantian  in 

Ethics  to  the  ■'  •' 

Metaphysics^,  ethics  is  either  founded  on  the  Kantian 
Metaphysics,  or  else  is  applied  in  its  service.  Not 
unfrequently  Kant's  ethical  positions  seem  to  be 
assumed,  almost  to  be  devised,  either  to  support  or 
to  supplement  some  cardinal  point  in  his  philosophy. 
Whatever  in  the  Ethics  is  peculiar  in  scientific  form 
or  principle,  in  terminology  or  logical  cohei'ence, 
will  be  found  to  be  ultimately  connected  with  the 
Kantian  Metaphysics.  It  follows  that  the  student 
will  find  it  impossible  to  understand  or  to  criticise 
the  Ethics  of  Kant  unless  he  constantly  keeps  in  mind 
or  often  refers  to  the  leading  principles  of  his  phil- 
osophy, either  as  furnishing  the  foundations  on 
which  the  Ethics  rest  or  as  responsible  for  the  defects 
which  they  seek  to  supplement.  Unless  we  are 
greatly  mistaken,  his  ethical  system  is  made  to  fulfil 
both  functions,  paradoxical  as  this  may  seem,  being 
used  at  one  time  as  the  foundation  and  at  another  as 
the  complement  of  his  metaphysics  —  now  as  the  base 
which  supports  the  pillars  of  the  springing  arch,  and 
then  as  the  keystone  which  crowns  and  holds  it 
together.  It  cannot  be  denied,  we  think,  that  the 
place  which  ethics  occupy  in  Kant's  theory  of  knowl- 


INTRODUCTORY,  3 

edge  is  unique  and  almost  paradoxical,  and  that 
consequently  his  system  is  invested  with  a  special 
fascination  for  the  careful  student  of  modern  specu- 
lation. 

§  2.  The  reader  will  not  infer  that  the  author 
proposes  first  to  interpret  Kant's  entire  Not  Necessary 
speculative  system  in  order  that  he  mav  '°  ^f,^"""^ 

I  J  "    the  Metaphys- 

explain  or  criticise  his  Ethics.  To  do  so  ics  at  Length. 
would  be  entirely  gratuitous,  after  this  work  has 
been  done  so  well  by  the  editor  of  the  present 
series  and  by  other  writers.  But  he  could  not  avoid 
the  distinct  recognition  of  the  relations  of  the  one  to 
the  other,  so  far  as  this  is  required,  in  order  to  make 
the  Ethics  intelligible  in  both  their  weakness  and 
strength.  He  could  not  but  notice  that  the  two  are 
constantly  and  often  inextricably  intertwined  to- 
gether. The  peculiar  and  oftentimes  the  strongly 
marked  terminology  of  both  ethics  and  philosophy 
makes  it  still  more  necessary  to  study  the  one  by  the 
light  of  the  other.  There  is  no  use  in  disguising  the 
fact  that  Kant's  terminology  is  always  technical  in 
the  extreme,  and  sometimes  absolutely  barbarous. 
Indeed,  few  writers,  ancient  or  modern. 

Salient 

of  such  marked  ability,  who  have  had  so  Features  of 

,  ,  1    •       i  11  •         n  the  Same. 

reasonable  a  claim  to  ask  a  hearing  from 

their  generation,  have  so  completely  cut  themselves 


4  INTKODUCTORY. 

off  from  the  generations  of  philosophers  who  went 
before  them  by  the  adoption  of  an  artificial  and 
novel  diction  as  Immanuel  Kant  has  done.  By 
this  alone  he  could  not  but  separate  himself  from 
the  earlier  thinking  of  his  own  youth  and  early 
manhood,  as  also  from  the  thinking  of  his  own  gen- 
eration, and  at  the  same  time  load  himself  with 
the  Herculean  task  of  constructing  and  forcing 
upon  his  readers  a  peculiar  and  artificial  termi- 
nology of  his  own.  No  writer  of  modern  times,  at 
least  no  one  who  has  written  so  voluminously  and  so 
ably  as  Kant,  has  made  so  few  references  or  allusions 
to  the  great  philosophic  thinkers  of  other  times  and 
to  their  opinions.  That  he  had  thought  earnestly 
upon  the  same  themes  which  had  occupied  their  at- 
tention is  abundantly  evident;  but  for  some  reason 
or  other  he  seems  to  have  scorned  to  put  himself  en 
rapport  with  these  great  thinkers,  or  to  hold  with 
them  any  intimate  relations  of  either  indebtedness 
or  repudiation.  Whether  it  was  owing  to  the  depth 
of  the  dogmatic  slumber  in  which  Wolf  had  over- 
whelmed his  spirit,  or  the  suddenness  and  complete- 
ness of  his  awakening  by  Hume,  or  the  delirious 
intoxication  and  delight  with  which  his  own  im- 
agined discoveries  seemed  to  inspire  him,  whatever 
was  the  cause  or  the  occasion,  it  is  certain  that  he 


INTRODUCTORY,  5 

spake  to  his  generation  in  a  strange  philosophical 
dialect  which  it  has  been  difficult  for  many  of  his  in- 
terpreters to  master,  and  which  some  have  rashly  but 
not  unnaturally  concluded  was  scarcely  worth  the 
mastering.  But  notwithstanding  the  uncouthness 
of  the  dialect  which  Kant  employed,  he  compelled 
his  generation  to  listen  to  his  words  and  to  attempt 
to  solve  the  problems  which  he  proposed.  Many 
professed  not  to  understand  his  meaning,  and  many 
complained  with  reason  of  the  strangeness  and 
harshness  of  his  terminology,  but  those  who  listened 
could  not  escape  the  obligation  to  answer  those  of 
his  questions  which  they  could  not  fail  to  understand. 
§  3.  Another  excellent  thing  he  accomplished  : 
He  made  the  men  of  his  time  under-  Kant's  impor- 
stand  that  certain  of  the  questions  which  tan»;^Services 

■^  to  Modern 

he  propounded  must  be  answered  after  Thought. 
a  way  to  which  they  had  not  been  accustomed 
befoi'e.*  As  the  result  of  his  teachings  and  argu- 
ments, Speculative  Science  discovered  new  necessi- 
ties, even  though  she  felt  herself  unable  to  satisfy 
them.     First  of  all,  Philosophy  was  forced  to  confess 

*  Daher  wird  man,  wo  es  sich  um  die  Principien,  die  eigentliche 
Anfgabe  der  Philosophie,  handelt,  nie  vor  Kant  vorbeigehen  diirfen. 
Mag  man  in  der  Lusting  des  Problems  von  Kant  abweichen  miissen, 
man  wird  immer  von  Kant  lernen,  wie  man  es  zuniichst  anfzufassen 
und  anzufassen.    A.  Trendelenburg,  Hist.  Beitr.  zur  Philos.,  iii,  172. 


6  INTRODUCTORY. 

that  she  could  not  ignore  Theology.  Religions  un- 
Pispeciaiiy  belief  was  taught  that  the  shallows  in 
Theoio'^y  which  it  had  been  content  to  wade  were 
and  Ethics.  bordered  b}"  a  deep  and  boundless  sea. 
As  Faith  was  driven  from  one  of  its  fancied  strong- 
holds to  another,  it  was  seemingly  to  seek  and  to 
find  its  refuge  only  in  ethical  convictions  and 
ethical  authorit}'.  Whatever  impression  was  made 
by  Kant's  speculative  system,  its  ethical  tone  was 
felt  to  be  lofty  and  commanding  in  its  every 
strain.  Wherever  the  Kantian  philosophy  was 
accepted,  a  noble  and  high-toned  Stoicism  took  the 
place  of  the  prevalent  sensual  and  self-indulgent 
Epicureanism.  Self-sacrifice  and  self-control  were 
honored,  and  self-indulgence  was  put  to  shame. 
The  old  and  sterner  German  virtues  came  to  the 
front,  which  had  been  systematically  dishonoi'ed  by 
the  corrupting  sensualism  of  Voltaire  in  the  youth- 
ful court  of  the  Great  Frederick,  and  the  scarcely 
less  debauching  sentimentalism  of  Rousseau.  The 
new  German  literature,  certainly  the  better  part  of 
it,  such  as  was  represented  by  Schiller  and  his 
school,  was  animated  by  a  genuine,  if  it  was  an 
oversti-ained  and  romantic,  ethical  fervor.  It  is 
almost  universally  acknowledged,  and  cannot  be 
denied,  that  it  was  in  the  Kantian  school  that  the 


INTROnrCTORY.  7 

seeds  were  sown  of  those  better  aspirations  of  patri- 
otism and  self-control,  of  heroism  and  of  faith, 
which  were  first  so  nobly  tested  in  the  war  of  the 
liberation  and  which  in  our  own  time  triumphed  so 
conspicuously  in  the  resuscitation  of  Germany  and 
its  final  consolidation  in  the  New  German  Empire. 

The  influence  of  the  Kantian  Ethics  upon  faith 
in  the  supernatural  and  in  the  Christian  Their  Effect 
verities   seemed    at    first    less    favorable  "''°" 

in  the 

than  upon  faith  in  human  duty  and  supernatural, 
patriotic  self-sacrifice.  This  may  be  largely  ascribed 
to  the  weakness  of  theology  itself,  which  required 
a  radical  disintegration  before  it  could  rise  to  a 
newer  and  better  life.  Whatever  may  have  been 
true  of  the  immediate  effects  of  the  Critical  Phil- 
osophy, it  cannot  be  denied  that  so  soon  as  super- 
natural Christianity  rallied  from  its  shallow  nat- 
uralism, as  it  did  in  fact  at  the  call  of  many 
earnest  thinkers,  it  assumed  a  loftier  ethical  tone 
and  proposed  to  itself  a  more  positive  and  elevated 
spiritual  ideal  than  ever  before.  It  was  doubtless 
true  that  Kant  was  forced  by  the  logic  of  his  own 
ethical  system  to  dispense  with  and  openly  to  dis- 
honor the  supernatural  and  the  personal  as  of  com- 
paratively little  consequence  in  the  Christian  his- 
tory, and   as   even  a  corrupting  element  :   but  the 


8  INTRODUCTORY. 

final  eflfect  of  his  teachings,  whether  by  action  or 
reaction,  has  invested  its  supernatural  facts  to  those 
who  received  them  with  a  profounder  spiritual  sig- 
nificance and  clothed  them  with  new  spiritual  power. 
It  may  be  conceded  that  for  one  or  two  generations 
the  Kantian  Ethics  have  been  used  as  a  weapon  of 
effective  assault  upon  historic  Christianity  in  Ger- 
many, England,  and  America,  while  yet  it  may  be 
asserted  with  undoubted  truth,  that  his  earnest  and 
practical  ethical  spirit  has  animated  the  defenders 
of  historic  Christianity  with  higher  and  nobler  con- 
ceptions of  its  spiritual  import  and  enabled  them 
the  better  to  understand  and  defend  it  as  both  the 
necessity  and  the  strength  of  modern  thought. 

§  4.     It  will  not  fail  to  occur  to  many  of  my  read- 
,  ^  ers  that  the  Kantian   Ethics   became  a 

Influenceupon 

Speculation      significant  power  in  English  thought  and 

and  Literature 

in  England  feeling  long  before  the  Kantian  Meta- 
physics had  begun  to  be  appreciated  or 
understood.  The  eloquent  Coleridge  is  usually  cred- 
ited with  having  been  the  earliest  effective  exponent 
of  both.  Some  literary  critics  would  find  in  the 
awakened  interest  in  the  romantic  school  of  Ger- 
man poetry,  the  first  effect  of  the  Kantian  impulse. 
Even  if  this  were  so,  Coleridge  was  foremost  even  in 
responding  to  this  awakening  power  and  finding  in 


IN-TBODUCTORY.  9 

it  a  more  profound  and  wide-reaching  significance. 
If,  however,  we  limit  ourselves  to  ethics  proper 
we  can  find  no  writer  who  so  distinctly  and  fer- 
vently insisted  as  did  Coleridge  on  the  need  of  a 
better  speculative  system  than  that  which  had  been 
accepted  in  England,  and  who  also  taught  that  Kant 
provided  for  this  better  system  in  his  distinction  be- 
tween the  Reason  and  the  Understanding.  The 
voice  of  Coleridge  was  indeed  the  voice  of  one  cry- 
ing in  the  wilderness,  bewildering  indeed  at  times, 
even  when  inspiring,  as  is  the  voice  of  every 
prophet,  but  it  was  loud  and  clear  in  its  denuncia- 
tion of  the  ethics  taught  in  the  English  Universities 
and  embodied  in  Paley's  popular  text-book.  The 
present  readers  of  Coleridge's  criticisms  of  Paley 
and  his  expositions  of  Kant,  find  the  last  seriously 
defective  in  scientific  exactness,  representing  Jacobi 
rather  than  Kant;  but  if  they  have  attained  to  even 
a  slight  measure  of  the  historic  sense  they  cannot 
fail  to  acknowledge  the  signal  service  which  he  ren- 
dered in  defending  the  nobler  features  of  the  system 
taught  by  Jacobi's  great  master.  Carlyle.  as  a  rep- 
resentative of  Kant,  was  somewhat  later  than  Cole- 
ridge, and  far  less  philosophical  than  he  in  his  pre- 
tensions and  his  achievements,  though  perhaps  he  was 
equally  fervent  in  his  practical  aims.     It  is  of  little 


10  INTRODUCTORY. 

consequence  which  of  the  two  was  the  more  efficient 
in  introducing  the  new  Ethics  to  the  English  public, 
or  how  large  was  the  share  which  James  Marsh, 
George  Ripley,  and  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  might 
claim  in  furthering  the  same  general  movement  in 
America.  Most  intelligent  readers  know  that  what 
after  Kant  was  called  the  Transcendental  Ethics 
attracted  the  attention  and  enlisted  the  sympathy 
of  a  large  following  in  both  England  and  the  United 
States,  and  made  itself  felt  in  their  literature  and 
their  criticism,  in  their  politics,  and  their  theology. 
This  movement  led  many  to  new  theories  of  man's 
moral  nature,  to  new  definitions  and  principles  in 
speculative  ethics,  and  was  followed  by  the  most 
important  consequences  in  their  modes  of  thinking 
and  feeling  in  respect  to  the  most  vital  questions 
of  speculative  and  practical  interest. 

We  may  say  indeed  that  the  Kantian  Ethics  when 
conceived  in  this  somewhat  indefinite  signification 
has  had  a  far  more  positive  and  wide-spread  influ- 
ence in  both  England  and  America  than  the  Kantian 
Metaphysics.  The  latter  has,  indeed,  of  late,  through 
translations  and  comments,  received  much  attention 
from  speculative  thinkers  for  its  own  sake  and  as 
a  preparation  for  and  transition  stage  to  the  later 
schools    of   German    speculation.     The    former,  the 


INTRODUCTORY.  11 

Ethics,  has  not  so  frequently  been  fonnaliy  ex- 
pounded or  carefully  criticised,  while  yet  it  has 
been  accepted  by  very  many  in  a  positive  but  rather 
indiscriminating  w^ay,  as  being  in  its  distinctive 
features  eminently  worthy  of  confidence  and  the 
noblest  work  of  its  eminent  defender.  The  Kantian 
Ethics  as  a  speculative  system  or  as  related  to  the 
Kantian  metaphysics  has  rarely,  if  ever,  been  the 
subject  of  careful  and  thorough  criticism  by  any 
English  writer.  For  this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  it 
is  at  present  the  more  inviting  theme  for  both  critic 
and  reader. 

The  treatment  of  this  subject  is  not  without  its 
difficulties.     Some    of    these    difficulties 

Ditticiilties 

have    already    been    suggested.     Others  in  Criticising 

.,,  1,1  1  1  the  Same. 

Will  make  themselves  known  as  we  pro- 
ceed. Kant  is  a  writer  whom  it  is  not  always  easy 
to  interpret  to  an  English  reader,  even  if  his  philo- 
sophical position,  his  terminology,  and  his  German 
style  presented  no  peculiar  embarrassments.  His 
system,  if  he  can  be  said  to  have  a  system,  is  by  no 
means  so  coherent  or  so  closely  stated  as  his  uncrit- 
ical admirers  contend,  and  as  some  of  his  commen- 
tators insist.  Let  us  expect,  then,  that  serious  diffi- 
culties in  understanding  and  criticising  him  will  be 
manifest  as   we  proceed,   and   let   the   expectation 


12  IXTRODUCTORY. 

arouse  us  to  resolute  effort.  Of  one  thing  the  earnest 
student  may  be  confident,  and  that  is  that  the  ques- 
tions which  Kant  proposes  are  invested  with  an 
interest  and  importance  which  cannot  easily  be  over- 
estimated. Whether  or  not  these  questions  are  all 
rightly  handled,  or  whether  the  solutions  for  which 
Kant  contends  are  satisfactory  or  disappointing  — 
they  are  all  discussed  in  a  manly  temper,  and  with 
an  effort  at  thoroughness  which  puts  to  shame  every 
solicitation  of  indolence  and  every  incitement  of  pas- 
sion or  partisanship. 


KANT'S  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PRINCIPAL  ETHICAL  TREATISES  — THEIR 
GENERAL   CHARACTERISTICS. 

§  5.  Kant's  ethical  system  may  be  found  in  the 
following  treatises,  which  were  published 

Titles  of 

in  the  order  and  at  the  times  which  are  Ethical 

.     ,.      ,111  Treatises. 

indicated  below. 

1.  Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  1785, 
usually  translated  as  The  Fundamental  Principles 
of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals. 

2.  Kritik  der  Praktischen  Vernunft,  1788,  Cri- 
tique of  the  Practical  Reason. 

3.  Die  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  1797,  The  Meta- 
physics of  Morals  (in  two  parts,  respectively  of 
Rights,  and  Duties). 

In  order  to  appreciate  fully  the  relations  of  these 
treatises  to  Kant's  speculative  system,  the  reader 
should  scrutinize  them  in  connection  not  only  with 
one  another,  but  with  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason, 
with  which  he   astonished  the  world  in  1781,  and 

13 


14  kant's  ethics. 

also  with  his  Prolegomena  to  Every  Possible  Future 
System  of  Metaphysics,  which  was  published  two 
years  after,  i.e.,  two  years  before  his  first  treatise 
upon  Ethics.  The  treatise  entitled  The  Critique  of 
the  Faculty  of  Judgment  (Die  Kritik  der  Urtheils- 
Kraft)  also  contains  some  special  ethical  matter. 
In  all  these  treatises  Kant  endeavors  to  be  consistent 
with  himself,  aiming  in  each  to  be  true  to  the 
fundamental  principles  which  he  had  laid  down  in 
respect  to  the  sources,  the  authority,  and  the  im- 
port of  every  description  of  knowledge.  In  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  published  four  years  before 
his  first  ethical  treatise,  he  says  very  little  of  morals, 
although  it  is  evident  from  the  little  that  he  does 
say  that  he  had  anticipated  very  distinctly  the  difii- 
cult  questions  which  would  be  forced  upon  his  atten- 
tion by  the  logic  of  his  philosophical  theory;  that  he 
faced  them  resolutely,  and  to  some  extent  anticipated 
the  solutions  which  he  subsequently  expanded  and 
defended  in  his  formal  treatises  on  Ethics  proper. 
§  6.  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  it  hardly 
need  be  said  to  those  who  have  read  a 

The  Critique 

of  Pure  few    pages,    is    painfully    thought    and 

often  painfully  expressed,  apparently  to 
the  writer  and  certainly  to  the  reader.  It  is  charac- 
teristic  of  this  volume   that  in  it  Kant  seems  to 


PRINCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  15 

be  a  seeker,  rather  than  a  finder,  of"  trutli  in  liis 
aims  and  his  processes;  that  at  many  points  and 
turns  he  seems  more  or  less  uncertain  of  his  own 
position,  and  to  take  unwearied  pains  —  not  always 
successfully — both  in  thinking  himself  clear  and  in 
expressing  his  meaning  clearly  to  others.  The 
probable  and  even  possible  inferences  which  might 
be  derived  from  his  doctrines  by  his  inquirers  and 
antagonists  seem  to  intrude  upon  his  attention  at 
every  step,  and  he  is  constantly  tempted  to  pause 
and  turn  aside  from  his  onward  course  to  explain  or 
overcome  these  objections  and  difficulties. 

§  7.  In  the  Pi'olegomena,  written  two  years  after- 
ward, he  writes  in  a  different  tone — rpj^^ 
assuming  and  maintaining  a  different  Prolegomena, 
attitude.  Throughout  this  work  his  air  is  that  of 
a  combatant  who  is  sure  of  his  position  and  con- 
fident of  victory.  He  writes  like  the  discoverer 
of  an  "  open  sesame"  to  all  future  metaphysics  of 
whatever  sort,  which  he  has  only  need  to  shout 
and  at  once  every  secret  metaphysical  door  will 
fly  open.  Instead  of  inquiring,  he  propounds;  in- 
.stead  of  arguing,  he  explains.  The  very  title  of 
his  treatise  indicates  his  position  and  his  feelings,  it 
being  a  triumphant  proclamation  of  what  had  been 
found   by   himself   to  be  necessary   for   all    future 


1(>  kaxt's  ethics. 

metaphysicians  by  the  experiences  and  failures  of 
those  who  have  gone  before.  The  style  and  diction 
are  in  full  sympathy  with  this  new  attitude.  The 
writer  is  simple,  cheerful,  and  almost  defiant  in  his 
tone.  His  opinions  are  propounded,  not  inferred. 
He  does  not  delay  to  answer  objections:  he  scarcely 
notices  them.  He  simply  lays  down  the  law,  as  one 
who  is  justified  in  speaking  with  authority. 

The  Prolegomena  is  confined  to  speculative  meta- 
Relation  to  physics,  and  leaves  all  ethical  questions 
Ethics.  untouched.     But  the  Critique  had   fur- 

nislied  some  distinct  anticipations  of  Kant's  ethical 
system.  To  these  he  was  impelled  by  the  desire  to  set 
aside  the  objections  which  might  be  urged  against  his 
speculative  conclusions  so  far  as  these  had  been 
reached,  viz.:  that  speculative  knowledge,  as  such,  is 
only  trustworthy  or  valuable  so  far  as  it  can  explain 
the  possibility  of  experience:  urging  that  if  it  be 
true  that  neither  the  Soul,  nor  the  Kosmos,  nor  God 
can  be  reached  by  the  pure  reason,  then  it  follows 
that  ethics  must  be  the  final  arbiter  which  alone 
can  give  us  solid  reality  of  any  sort,  especially  con- 
cerning the  Soul  in  its  relations  to  the  future  life 
and  the  Supi'eme. 

The  way  in  which  ethics  can  render  this  service  is 
explained    by  Kant  at   some    length   in   the  second 


FHIXCIPAL    ETHICAL   TKEATISES.  17 

chapter  of  the  Transcendentale  Methodenlehre, 
Zweites  Hauptstiick,  in  which  he  outlines  the  ethi- 
cal system  whicli  lie  developed  four  and  seven  years 
afterward  in  the  classical  ethical  treatises  already 
named  {cf.%%  5,  11,  12). 

This  preliminary  outline  deserves  a  brief  notice, 
if  for  no  other  reason,  because  it  serves  to  explain 
the  original  transition  or  connecting  bridge  which 
was  designed  in  the  mind  of  Kant  to  transfer  his 
readers  from  his  speculative  to  his  ethical  theory. 
It  may  l)e  compared  to  the  rough  outline  or  hast}^ 
sketch  of  what  afterward  became  an  elaborate 
drawing,  or,  more  exactly,  to  the  germ  of  what 
afterward  grew  into  a  fully  developed  gi-owth.  We 
prefer  to  explain  these  relations  here,  in  order  that 
the  intimate  dependence  of  the  two  parts  of  Kant's 
system  may  be  made  more  clear.  We  do  not  care  to 
decide  which  of  these  theories  was  first  developed, 
or  was  first  suggested  to  his  own  mind.  We  very 
well  know  which  was  first  drawn  out  in  the  detail 
of  explanation  and  defence,  lint  inasmuch  as  we 
find  this  ethical  germ  snugly  imliedded  in  this  spec- 
ulative environment,  we  shall  find  it  convenient  first 
to  explain  this  environment,  that  we  may  analyze  the 
germ  itself,  and   follow  its  subsequent  development. 

§  8.     It   is  well  known  that    the    question    with 


18  kant's  ethics. 

Critique  of  which  Kant  sets  off  in  his  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason     p^^.^     jieASon    is     this  :     Are     synthetic 

Fundamental  •' 

Question  of.  Jiidf/nteiifs  (i  pHori  possible?  Are  there 
such  judgments,  and  how  are  the}'  to  be  accounted 
for?  The  first  of  these  questions  is,  in  Kant's  view, 
answered  in  the  asking.  No  one  will  deny  that  there 
must  be  such  judgments.  Otherwise  there  could  be 
no  science,  no  mathematics,  no  logic,  no  physics,  and 
no  psychology.*  Every  one  of  these  sciences  may 
be  traced  back  to  certain  comprehensive  judgments 
which  are  synthetic,  i.e.,  to  propositions  of  which 
the  predicate  is  not  contained  in  nor  implied  by 
the  subject,  but  in  which  it  is  affirmed  of  or  super- 
added to  it  by  a  direct  and  intuitive  affirmation. 
As  such  an  affirmation  enlarges  one's  knowledge,  it  is 
called  si/iitJietir,  in  contrast  to  one  which  merely  an- 
alyzes or  expands  the  import  already  affirmed  of  its 
subject,  and  as  it  does  this  by  a  direct  assent  of  the 
intellect  without  the  intermediation  of  reasoning,  it 
is  called  a  priori.  Examples  of  such  knowledge  are: 
Two  right  lines  cinniot  inclose  a  space.  All  bodies 
are  extended.     Evenj  event  is  caused.     Psi/chical  phe- 

*  The  advocates  of  the  doctrine  (hat  ethics  furnislies  the  foundation 
for  speculative  truth  of  every  kind  might  tiud  in  tliis  argument  tlie 
justification  of  their  position  thus:  inasmucli  as  without  science  man 
cannot  live  a  human  life  —  llie  life  worthy  of  a  man,  to  which  his  higher 
aspirations,  faith,  and  convictions  c()ini)el  liim —  it  follows  that  these 
synthetic  speculative  judgments  must  be  true. 


PRINCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  19 

nomena  are  experienced  hi  siicressio)/.  The  possibili- 
ty of  such  propositions  is  still  further  explained  by 
ultimate  data,  which  are  given  by  and  to  the  pure 
reason,  in  connection  with  the  operations  of  intui- 
tion, as  these  are  exemplified  in  the  outer  and  inner 
sense  and  in  the  higher  processes  of  reasoning. 
These  data  are  the  forms  of  Sense,  which  are  Space 
and  Time,  the  Categories  of  the  Understanding,  and 
the  three  Ideas  of  the  Reason,  viz.:  the  Soul,  the 
Kosraos,  and  God.  Without  these  a  priori  relations 
and  the  concepts  and  propositions  that  depend  on 
them,  Kant  argues  at  length  there  can  be  no  ra- 
tional knowledge.  In  every  description  and  degree 
of  knowledge,  even  in  the  lowest,  more  or  fewer  of 
these  a  priori  elements  are  recognized  or  implied. 

§  9.     It  is  also  to  be  noticed  as  a  capital  feature 
of  Kant's  system  that  the  materials  of 

Phenomena 

knowledge,  i.e.,  its  a  posteriori  elements  vs.  Things  in 

.  T  he  ni  Strives 

given  by  experience,  as  contradistin- 
guished from  those  relations  which  are  given 
a  priori,  are  assumed  to  he  pheiiomeHa — spiritual 
or  corporeal  —  but  are  not  things  at  all,  i.e.,  not 
things  in  tJieniselres.  When  we  face  the  sense- 
world,  we  do  not  discern  things  or  realities,  but  only 
phenomena,  as  sights,  feels,  and  smells,  etc.  So  in 
the  spirit  world  we  are  conscious  only  of  sensations, 


20  KANT'8    ETH10!5. 

imaginations,  and  thoughts,  but  not  of  oitrsclres  as 
seeinof,  hearing,  reineiahering,  or  imagining.  Wliat 
men  are  accustomed  to  conceive  as  realities  by  emi- 
nence, i.e.,  the  realities  of  the  material  world,  and 
mayhap  in  the  view  of  some,  the  realities  of  spirit  — 
these  are  only  phenomena  as  contrasted  with  things 
in  themselves,  i.e.,  solid  realities.  These  phenomena 
we  connect  in  groups,  by  sense-forms  and  thought- 
categories,  calling  a  group  of  sense-phenomena  a 
tree,  a  house,  or  a  horse,  uniting  them  as  substance 
and  attribute,  as  cause  and  eifect,  etc.,  but  never 
at  all  reaching  things  in  themselves,  Dinge  an  sick. 
These  remain  ever  beyond  our  reach,  ever  eluding 
our  grasp.  The  nearest  semblance  of  real  oneness 
which  we  can  come  to  is  some  unity  of  apperception 
which  we  can  revive  or  modify  after  an  order  or 
scheme  of  the  imagination  derived  from  time  and 
space  relations. 

In    contrast  with    these    sense-objects   and  sense- 
groups    of    phenomena  we  grasp    after 

°  Noumena. 

Noumena,  i.e.,  intelligible  realities,  as 
possible  and  actual.  We  come  nearest  to  these 
when  we  seem  to  be  conscious  of  our  own  Ego  or 
self,  but  even  then  we  find  that  what  we  seize  is 
but  an  illusion  —  an  illusion  of  thought  or  a 
figure  of  speech.      However    imposing  and   compli- 


PRINCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  21 

cated  these  may  seem  to  be,  they  are  only  plic- 
)ioiii('Ha,  suggesting,  it  may  be,  the  iioiniiriKt.  the 
tilings  which  can  never  be  reached.  When,  however, 
we  rise  to  the  highest  forms  of  knowledge,  other  a 
priori  elements  present  themselves  and  seem  to  be 
required  to  make  possible  our  highest  moods  of  ex- 
perience, possible  or  rational.  These  are  the  so- 
called  Ideas  of  the  Reason,  viz.:  the  Soul,  the  orderly 
Kosmos,  and  the  Self-existent,  or  the  Absolute:  God! 
Without  each  and  all  of  these  a  priori  elements,  we 
can  neither  employ  nor  apply  the  lessons  of  expe- 
rience, we  can  attain  neither  speculative  knowledge 
nor  practical  wisdom.  And  yet,  for  all  this,  we 
have  no  scientific  authority  for  believing  any  of 
these  objects  of  thought  to  be  real,  although  we  can- 
not avoid  reasoning  and  acting  as  if  they  were  so. 

i;  10.     This  is  a  brief  statement  of  Kant's  specu- 
lative system  and  the  position  into  which 

Limits  of 

it  brings  man  in  respect  to  his  con-  Human 
fidence  in  the  speculative  reason.  Phe- 
nomena are  known  and  knowable,  and  only  phe- 
nomena, phenomena  external  and  internal  —  never 
things  in  themselves.  Noumena  are  neither  knowa- 
ble nor  known.  Phenomena  are  connected  with  one 
another  by  I'elations  a  priori  of  space  and  time,  also 
by  the   relations   of  thought,  making  complete  the 


22  kant\s  ethics. 

semblances  but  never  revealing  the  realities  of  either 
things  or  spirits.  Both  these  again  can  be  con- 
nected, i.e.,  regulated  by  the  ideas  suggested  by  the 
mental  and  material  universe,  both  being  dependent 
on  and  united  by.  the  uncreated  God.  while  yet  these 
ideas  are  vouched  for  by  no  absolute  and  <i  priori 
certainty. 

It  hardly  need  be  said  that  this  outcome  of 
Di  a  D  int-  Kent's  Critique  is,  so  far,  the  exact 
ment.  opposite  of   what   would    be   anticipated 

from  the  purposes  and  promises  with  wiiich  he 
began.  It  would  seem  from  the  confidence  of 
his  promises  at  the  outset,  that  he  was  about  to 
introduce  us  to  a  wide  range  of  spiritual  knowledge, 
knowledge  which  should  be  equally  clear  and  posi- 
tive on  the  spiritual  and  on  the  material  side.  Al- 
lured by  these  promises,  we  yield  ourselves  submis- 
sively and  confidently  to  his  guidance,  following 
him  step  by  step  ;  but  at  each  step  our  footing  be- 
comes less  firm,  the  path  itself  sinks  deeper  and 
deeper,  and  at  the  end  we  hardly  know  whether  it  is 
treacherous  marsh  or  iridescent  cloud-land  on  which 
we  seem  now  to  tread  and  then  to  fly.  But  just  as 
we  are  overwhelmed  in  the  mire  of  uncertainty  or 
n      .    .         are  entangled  most  hopelessly  in  the  net- 

Promised  °  i  » 

Deliverance,     work  of  a  priori  relations,  to  which  we 


PRINCIPAL    ETIIICAJ.   TREATISES.  23 

cling  for  deliverance,  to  tind  that  they  do  nothing 
but  hold  themselves  together,  we  are  hailed  by  our 
guide  with  words  of  cheer  in  the  Kanon  of  Pure 
Reason.  Under  this  title  he  ventures  to  assure  us 
that  his  ethical  system  will  remove  all  the  difficulties 
in  which  criticism  had  involved  us,  that  it  will  bring 
light  and  solidity  and  certainty  both  to  our  knowl- 
edge and  our  faith,  that  it  will  give  back  to  us 
material  things  and  spiritual  entities,  God  and 
Immortality,  all  of  which  had  seemed  to  take  their 
flight  at  his  conjuring  wand  —  in  other  words,  that 
tlie  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  will  by  the  authority 
of  its  simple  imperative  deliver  us  from  the  sjDirit  of 
doubt  with  which  the  criticism  of  the  speculative 
reason  had  overwhelmed  us. 

i;  11.     The    elements  of  this  would-be   construc- 
tive ethics  are  briefly  as  follows:      Fii'st  Elements  of 
of  all.  our  teacher  advises  us  that  it  is  ^^"*^    ,. 

Constructive 

of  comparatively  little  consequence  what  Ethics, 
our  speculative  views  may  be,  even  in  respect  to 
the  most  important  subjects.  We  ought  not  to 
be  seriously  disturbed  by  speculative  criticism  of 
any  sort,  inasmuch  as  after  all  our  chief  concern  is 
with  what  we  should  he  and  do,  not  with  what  we 
can  kiioir.  The  questions  which  we  need  most  to 
settle  are  practical  questions,  and  concern  the  free- 


24  KA^■TV    KTIIICS. 

dom  of  the  will,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the 
existence  of  God.  inasmuch  as  these  atfect  what  we 
can  do  in  the  exercise  of  our  freedom.  As  this  free- 
dom is  intelligent,  its  impulses  must  be  stimulated 
and  directed  by  enlightened  reflection  on  the  motives 
which  impel  it  to  action.  Hence,  if  there  be  free- 
dom there  must  be  knowledge  of  what  is  profitable 
and  useful  and  desirable,  not  of  what  merely  seems 
to  be.  but  of  what  (icfiialh/  Is.  It  also  implies  the 
knowledge  of  what  ought  to  be  done  —  consequently 
that  which  if  it  ought,  inai/  be  done.  Both  these 
descriptions  of  motives  are  Jairs  or  imperatives,  either 
the  imperative  of  interest,  saying:  If  you  will  gain 
this  or  that,  do  so  or  so;  or  the  imperative  of  free- 
dom, telling  us  what  ought  to  be  done,  and  therefore 
implying  that  it  can  be  done,  in  the  exercise  of  man's 
highest  prerogative.  That  is.  so  far  as  the  direction 
of  conduct  is  concerned,  it  is  of  no  consequence 
whether  what  seems  to  be  actually  is  what  it  ap- 
pears to  be.  or  whether  we  can  know  what  it  is,  or 
whether  anything  is,  m  the  sense  of  reality,  pro- 
vided we  are  confronted  with  the  imperative.  Do  this 
or  tJiat. 

With  the  mutual  relations  of  these  two  kinds  of 
law  we  have  nothing  to  do,  so  long  as  the  law  of 
duty  unconditionally  presents  what  ive  oax/ld  to  do. 


PRINCIPAL    ETHI(A]>   TREATISES.  '40 

Xor  is  it  of  any  consequence  whether  they  are  or 
are  not  reconcilable,  or  whether  they  have  any  com- 
mon root.  The  prescription  of  reason  still  remains 
supreme.  Do  flxft  ichir/i  is  rif/lif. 

^  12.     In  respect  to  our  highest  good,  however,  or 
the    sintiiiuim    boHiiin,    the    question     of  Ti,ree  impor- 
the    mutual    relations    of   what    is    and  ^f "  Q^e^^^io"^ 

1  ropof  e«  by 

ought    to    be,    is    most    important.     The  Kam. 
satisfactory  answer  to    this    turns    upon    the    three 
inquiries:    What  am  I  knoir'f     Wlmt  oii(/lif  I  to  do? 
]VJt((t  tiiai/  I  hope  fofi:' 

TJie  first  of  these  questions  had  been  partially  but 
unsatisfactorily  answered  in  the  terms:  I  can  know 
only  phenomena,  not  nouinena  or  things  m  them- 
selves. I  can  also  know  their  relations  in  some 
sense,  provided  it  be  not  what  might  be  called  their 
nature  or  essence.  TJie  second,  being  practical,  can- 
not be  answered  in  terms  of  intellectual  knowledge, 
inasmuch  as  intellectual  knowledge  only  gives  us  an 
acquaintance  with  phenomena,  but  never  with  reali- 
ties or  things  in  themselves.  The  third,  however, 
is  both  practical  and  theoretical,  and  in  fact  is 
answered  thus:  You  can  know  that  the  something 
which  you  hope  for  will  be,  because  it  ought  to  be. 
You  can  know  there  is  a  God  and  a  future  life, 
because  both  must  be,  in  order  that  virtue  may  be 


26  rant's  ethics. 

rewarded  and  vice  may  be  punished;  or,  in  other 
words,  that  what  ought  to  be  must  be.  In  other 
words,  tlie  problem  of  knowledge,  which,  as  a  prob- 
lem of  the  speculative  reason,  has  hitherto  been  un- 
solved, and  baffled  all  our  attempts  to  explain  it,  is 
settled  by  the  impei-ative  demands  of  the  practical 
reason.  The  comprehensive  principle  which  is  the 
basis  of  all  practical  knowledge,  and  indirectly  of 
all  knowledge  whatever,  is  the  principle  that  the 
virtuous  ought  to  be  happy.  They  cannot  be  happy 
unless  there  is  another  life.  They  cannot  be  happy 
unless  God  exists  to  reward  them  and  to  punish  the 
bad ;  or,  more  comprehensively,  unless  certain  sem- 
blances or  phenomena  of  things  are  conformed  to 
things  as  they  are,  i.e.,  to  things  in  themselves. 

§  13.  Whatever  on  second  thought  we  may  think 
Plausibility  of  ^^  ^^^^^  argument,  it  cannot  be  denied 
His  Solution.    ^Ij^i-  ^^  ^j.^^  yjg^y  -^  gggi^^j.  plausible,  and 

for  the  reason  that  it  recognizes  moral  relations 
a.s  2) I'ctcti call  1/  supreme  —  and  if  ethical  relations  are 
practically  supreme,  they  are  not  only  themselves 
speculatively  true,  but  they  impart  authority  and 
validity  to  certain  relations  and  things  which  are 
purely  speculative.  When  tried  by  the  criterion 
of  the  realities  of  common  sense,  w^hich  holds  to 
the    possibility    of  the    knowledge   of  nouinena,  at 


PRINCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  37 

least  in  the  world  of  spirit,  which  recognizes  a 
community  of  relations  between  the  intellectual 
and  the  ethical  universe,  common  sense  asserts 
that  the  ethical  and  the  emotional  stand  high- 
est of  all  rational  considerations  as  grounds  of 
truth  and  evidences  of  realit3\  But  when  viewed 
against  the  background  of  the  Kantian  scepticism, 
which  limits  all  knowledge  to  phenomena,  and. 
after  denying  the  capacity  of  reason  to  discover  the 
objective  truth  which  it  yet  asserts  must  be  as- 
sumed, comes  in  to  help  reason  out  of  the  ditch  into 
which  it  had  plunged  it,  by  requiring  it  to  abandon 
its  own  appropriate  functions,  the  argument  is  not 
likely  to  be  so  readily  welcomed  as  a  helper.  The 
blow  which  first  strikes  a  man  to  the  earth,  if  it  is  a 
blow  of  dishonor,  is  far  more  likely  to  be  remem- 
bered and  resented  than  the  helping  hand  which  is 
subsequently  moved  in  condescending  pity  to  lift 
him  up.  Unsophisticated  and  logical  common  sense 
suggests  the  thought  that  if  the  mind  be  as  limited 
in  the  range  and  authority  of  its  knowledge  as 
Kant  has  written  a  long  book  to  persuade  us  is  true, 
then  we  can  know  only  the  relations  of  phenomena, 
in  ever\'  form  or  method  of  reasoning,  the  specula- 
tive and  practical  alike.  Likewise  when  I  reason 
that  T  shall  live  another  life  because  I  ought  to  be 


28  rant's  hthkjs. 

rewarded  or  punished,  and  shall  find  a  God  living  to 
deal  with  me  iiccordiiig  to  my  deserts,  then  I  have 
already  assumed  tlx'  i-cality  of  two  uoiimeiia  at 
least,  if  not  Ihe  reality  of  three;  certainly  that  of  the 
conscious  Ego  and  God  the  rewarder,  and,  it  would 
seem,  of  the  Kosmos,  as  a  permanent  noumenon, 
with  its  changing  phenomena  of  a  here  and  a 
hereafter. 

i;  14.  I)i»nl)l  less  Kant  easily  persuaded  l)imself, 
oiiiiKiitioii  t..  "^^  ^^^  many  of  his  readers,  that  he  re- 
CoiiHisteiicy.  li^ves  himself  from  this  a[)parent  in- 
consistency by  his  view  of  the  superior  character 
of  ethical  relations.  But  he  cannot  thereby  evade 
the  obligation-  to  be  consistent  with  himself.  He 
tells  us,  indeed,  thnt  the  practical  reason  not 
only  affirms  certnin  relations  of  conduct,  by  syn- 
thetic judgments  h  priori,  but  that  it  also  en- 
forces them  in  the  f(jriiis  of  command.  He  asserts, 
moreover,  that  these  commands  involve  relations  of 
merit  and  demerit,  and  that  these  i-o([uire  a  being 
who  is  able  and  willing  to  enforce  them.  Hut  he 
forgets  altogethei'  to  recognize  the  truth  that  in  all 
these  assertions  he  lias  overstepped  the  limits  within 
which  he  had  entrenclKid  hiinsell:  Ihat  every  one  of 
these  ethical  demands  supposes  noumcna  in  the  form 
of  personal  beings  —  that  only  the  Ego  as  an  exist- 


PKIXCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  20 

ing  being,  and  not  at  all  as  a  phenomenon,  can 
respond  to  a  command  or  apprehend  merit  or  a  pos- 
sible iiii mortality,  and  that  all  the  plausibility  that 
his  argument  gains  when  regarded  as  a  proof  for  the 
Ego,  or  a  future  life,  or  an  existing  God.  is  derived 
from  the  dexterity,  or,  rather,  we  should  say.  the 
unconsciousness,  with  which  at  the  critical  or  turn- 
ing points  of  his  argument  Kant  adroitly  substitutes 
the  noumenal  for  the  phenomenal,  and  interchanges 
the  relations  which  are  appropriate  to  each.  That 
moral  relations  and  moral  interests  may  be  the  most 
convincing  of  all  in  respect  to  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  the  soul,  and  that  the  moral  constitution  of 
the  soul  may  be  the  one  transparent  medium 
through  wliich  we  gain  and  keep  our  faith  in  the 
moral  pei'fection  and  righteous  government  of  God. 
are  both  most  important  truths.  These  truths  lend 
color  and  plausibility  to  Kant's  ethical  remedy 
against  the  scepticism  he  had  created:  but  they 
cannot  in  the  least  justify  or  alleviate  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  scepticism  with  which  he  had  pi-eviously 
cut  the  nerve  of  our  confidence  in  every  description 
of  truth,  whether  rational  or  ethical, 
ii  1").     It  should  be   remem])ered   that 

This  Soliilion 

this  exposition  and  defence   which    Kant  Pi-ciiminaiy 
has    furnished    of   his    ethical    theorv   is  ' 


30  rant's  ethics. 

merely  an  anticipation  of  what  he  subsequently 
expounded  at  lengtli  in  his  two  principal  treatises. 
As  we  have  already  stated,  the  attitude  which  he 
assumed  with  respect  to  his  ethical  system  became 
more  positive  and  assured  after  the  publication  of 
the  first  Critique.  His  statements  became  more  and 
more  dogmatic,  his  defences  more  assured,  and  his 
illustrations  more  complete.  He  never,  however, 
parts  with  his  intellectual  dignity,  or  loses  aught  of 
the  most  complete  self-respect  or  reverence  for  his 
own  pei'sonal  uprightness. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  occupied  with  these  ethical 
anticipations  only,  as  we  find  them  in  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason.  It  was  four  years  after  its  publi- 
cation that  he  took  a  more  positive  attitude,  and 
gave  to  the  world  the  Fundamental  Principles  of  the 
Metaphysics  of  Morals.  Die  Grundlegung  zur  Meta- 
physik  der  Bitten.  ITS-").  In  this  treatise  he  proposes 
to  himself  the  task  of  positively  determining  what 
are  the  ultimate  grounds  or  fundamental  ejements 
of  moral  science,  as  preliminary  to  the  Critique 
of  Practical  Reason.  So  far  as  the  titles  of  these 
two  works  would  indicate  a  ditference  in  them  as 
objects  or  products  of  thought,  the  first  would  be 
an  analytic  search  for  the  principles  of  the  science 
of  dutv.   and  the  second  a  critical   examination  of 


PRINCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  31 

those  functions  of  the  same  reason  which  originate 
and  sustain  these  principles  or  conclusions.  The 
second  treatise,  which  in  a  sense  was  a  supplement, 
or  completion,  of  the  first,  was  published  in  1788, 
three  years  later. 

§  16.  In  scrutinizing  these  treatises,  we  need  to 
be  reminded,  first,  that  it  is  not  easy  Kanfs 
under  any  circumstances  to  thread  our  j^""thVaiui 
way  through  the  mazes  of  Kant's  anal-  Absolute, 
yses  and  argumentations.  Especially  is  this  true 
of  his  ethical  writings,  for  the  reason  that  man}^  of 
the  underlying  practical  truths  which  give  color 
and  dignity  to  his  discussions  are  so  elevated  and 
weighty,  and  in  their  applied  signification  seem 
so  axiomatic  and  self-evident.  Whether  or  not  they 
are  scientifically  exact,  they  are  unquestionably  in 
some  practical  signification  clothed  with  the  highest 
authority.  Hence,  in  reading  Kant's  ethical  writ- 
ings, we  are  often  exposed  to  the  danger,  and  this 
is  often  serious,  of  confounding  popular  with  scien- 
tific propositions,  and  of  attaching  a  metaphysical 
import  and  philosophical  authority  to  distinctions  and 
propositions  that  are  simply  practical,  and  popular. 
To  avoid  this  danger,  the  following  observations  ma}' 
not  be  out  of  place. 

A   sharp    distinction   should    be    made    and    held 


32  Kant's  ethics. 

between  those  metaphysical  principles*  which  are 
relatively  and  those  which  are  absolutely  primitive 
and  fundamental,  i.e.,  between  those  propositions 
which  are  axiomatic  to  one  science  and  a  group  of 
sciences,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  which,  on  the 
other,  are  fundamental  to  all  the  sciences  and  to 
scientific  thinking  as  such.  For  example,  it  will  not 
be  questioned  that  a  few  physical  sciences  rest  upon 
certain  principles  which  are  peculiar  to  themselves, 
and  yet  are  common  to  them  all.  The  relations 
being  common,  the  concepts  and  principles  are  com- 
mon. When  grouped  together,  they  constitute  the 
metaphysics  which  is  common  and  fundamental 
alike  to  all  the  physical  sciences,  as  mechanics, 
optics,  chemistry,  etc.  Similarly,  each  individual 
science  has  its  own  metaphysics,  and  we  speak  briefly 
and  confidently  of  the  metaphysics  of  mathematics, 
of  chemistry,  etc.  Similarly,  we  speak  of  the  meta- 
physics of  the  organic  or  vital  sciences  in  common, 
and  of  the  metaphysics  of  plant  and  animal  life  in 
special.  Similarly,  it  may  be  supposed  that  there 
may  be  special  and  general  metaphysics  of  all  spirit- 
ual beings  in  common,  and  of  the  intellectual,  emo- 
tional, and  voluntary  activities  in  particular. 

*Por  variety  in  the  signififatioii  of  Principles  see  Porter:   Iliunan 
Intellect,  §  514. 


PKlJSrCIPAL    ETHICAL   TKEATISES.  33 

§  17.     We    observe   here   that    the   special    meta- 
physical    principles    which     are     funda-  Fnndamentai 

Principles 

mental  to  ethics  have  the  very  peculiar  of  Ethics 
attraction   of   beino-   easilv   apprehended ''^"'^^'^^'"'^*"'" 

"  .'11  gtood  and 

by,  and,  so  to  speak,  accessible  to,  all  Assented  to. 
men.  They  commend  themselves  to  the  assenting 
convictions  of  all.  More  than  all,  they  appeal  to 
the  emotions  of  mankind,  and  to  the  emotions 
which  are  the  strongest  and  most  tender.  They 
are  clothed  with  the  most  sacred  authority,  and 
evoke  the  noblest  and  the  most  disinterested  of 
the  affections.  For  these  reasons  it  often  happens 
that  men  who  deny  all  other  axioms,  because  per- 
haps they  cannot  understand  them  for  the  general 
or  abstract  language  in  which  they  are  phrased, 
cannot  withhold  their  assent  to  the  axioms  of  eth- 
ical truth,  and,  for  the  simple  reason  that  these 
are  the  only  principles  with  which  they  are  familiar 
and  which  they  can  understand,  are  ready  to  ac- 
cept them  as  the  only  truths  which  are  invested 
with  self-evident  certainty.  Hence,  should  the  de- 
mand be  made  upon  them  in  view  of  the  obscurity 
or  the  uncertainty  of  all  other  fundamental  truths, 
to  accept  ethical  truths  as  the  possible  foundations  of 
all  the  rest,  the  demand  finds  a  comparatively  ready 

response.      Every  other  special  mpta[)hysics  is  to  their 
3 


34  •  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

mind  more  or  less  abstract  and  unfamiliar,  whether 
it  be  the  metaphysics  of  mathematics,  or  chem- 
istry, or  physics,  etc.  The  same  is  true  of  general 
metaphysics,  i.e.,  the  metaphysics  of  everything 
that  is  knowable,  whether  subdivided  into  spirit  and 
matter,  or  generalized  as  being,  finite  and  infinite. 
B);t  the  special  axioms  of  duty,  the  truths  and  laws 
which  are  suggested  on  all  occasions  and  enforced  by 
universal  experience,  these  are  so  clear,  so  severe, 
and  so  true  that  no  man  can  question  them.  What- 
ever else  a  man  may  question,  he  will  never  question 
these  "truths  which  wake  to  perish  never."'  It  is 
not  surprising  that  the  mind  which  is  shaken  by 
every  other  scepticism  should  not  only  rest  upon 
ethical  truths  as  unshaken,  but  should  also  accept 
these  as  giving  authority  to  truth  of  ever}^  kind,  and 
as  being  themselves  the  cornerstones  of  all  knowl- 
edge and  the  tests  of  all  our  other  faiths,  whether  in 
man,  or  nature,  or  God. 

§  18.    We  should  never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 

,  ,    .     the  speculative  metaphysics   of  Kant,  as 

In  Speculative  ^  ^ 

Principles        presented  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 

Kant  Claims 

Oniya  Relative  SOU,  not  onlv  failed  to  procure  assent  to 

ion  y.        itself    as    thoroughly    trustworthy,    but 

formally  renounced  for  itself  any  other  than  a  partial 

and  relative  supremacy.     While  its  able  expounder 


PRIXCIPAL    ETHICAL   TREATISES.  35 

contended  for  the  necessity  of  assuming  certain  fun- 
damental principles  of  the  speculative  reason  as  the  a 
priori  conditions  of  all  knowledge,  he  as  deliberately 
and  scientifically  contends  that  this  necessity  is 
simply  subjective  and  carries  with  it  no  objective 
reality.  The  forms  and  categories  and  ideas  which 
enter  into  the  very  structure  of  all  scientific  knowl- 
edge, are  held  by  him  to  be  simply  necessary  to  make 
experience  possible  and  science  trustworthy.  The 
a  priori  or  metaphysical  elements  are  necessary, 
otherwise  common  experience  and  reasoned  science 
would  be  impossible.  But  as  to  whether  these  sub- 
jective elements  have  also  any  objective  reality,  he 
teaches  us  that  we  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny.  It 
is  not  surprising  that  under  the  pressure  of  this 
necessity  he  should  have  reverted  to  the  sacred  rela- 
tions of  dut}'  as  the  sheet  anchor  of  both  science 
and  faith,  that  in  this  desperate  need  the  practical 
axioms  of  prudence  and  duty  should  take  occasion 
to  assert  their  superior  attractiveness  and  authority, 
nor  that  the  appeal  should  also  be  made  to  them 
as  competent  to  clear  up  whatever  else  seemed  ob- 
scure, and  to  restore  the  faith  in  scientific  truth 
I? 

which  had  been  deliberately  undermined.  In  other 
words,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  axioms  of  a 
special    science    should    have   been    generalized    so 


36  rant's  ethics. 

broadly  as  to  serve  as  a  speculative  basis  lor  the 
entire  truth  of  the  sciences  in  general,  and  that  the 
fundamental  truths  of  ethics  should  be  accepted  as 
fundamental,  not  only  to  the  successful  conduct  of 
life,  but  to  every  description  of  knowledge  whatever. 
§  19.  The  reasons  why  such  a  transfer  and  con- 
fusion    of    in'inciples     and    of    thoucrht 

Danger  of  Con-  '■  '■  ^ 

founding  would   be   plausible,    have  already   been 

Speculative 

and  Ethical  e.xplained.  That  Kant  had  sought  to 
""^'^"''''  prove  the  objective  untrustworthiness 
of  any  and  every  form  of  purely  speculative  meta- 
physics, has  been  made  sufficiently  clear.  As  we 
have  already  explained,  it  is  no  part  of  our  duty  to 
discuss  at  any  length  the  question  whether  these 
attempts  to  weaken  our  confidence  in  this  trust- 
worthiness were  successful.  That  inquiry  must  be 
transferred  to  the  critical  examination  of  his  specu- 
lative system.  Nor  have  we  as  yet  attempted  to 
show  that  his  effort  to  substitute  an  ethical  for  a 
rational  metaphysics  was  a  failure.  We  have  only 
suggested  certain  reasons  why  ethical  or  practical 
principles  might  readily  be  accepted  by  many  stu- 
dents and  readers  as  fundamental.for  all  knowledge, 
when  there  was  no  occasion  to  resort  to  them,  on 
the  one  hand,  nor  any  demonstrated  capacity  in 
them  to  meet  the  demand,  on    the  other.     It   was 


PRINCIPAL    P:THICAL   TREATISES.  37 

Kant  who  attempted  to  show  that  they  could   meet 
the    supiK)sed  exicjenev.     It  is  our   first  „,   „ 

1  '  o         .  \\  Q  Proceed 

duty   to    inquire    whether    he    was    sue- ^ext  to  the 

Examination 

cessful.  But  all  this  is  preliminary  to  of  His  Formal 
our  formal  examination  of  Kant's  ethi-  ^ 
cal  system  as  a  whole.  This  examination,  we  may 
expect,  will  develop  the  weakness  and  strength  of 
his  exposition  of  his  views  upon  every  point.  Our 
critical  comments,  thus  far,  have  been  confined  to 
the  brief  anticipations  of  his  ethical  theory  which  we 
find  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.* 

The  detailed  exposition  of  Kant's  ethical  system  is 
found  in  the  two  treatises  already  referred  to.  We 
begin  with  the  first. 

*  Transceudentale  Methodenlclire,  2tes  Hauptstiick. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE 
METAPHYSICS  OF  MORALS.  * 

§  20.    This  treatise  does  not  profess  to  be  a  com- 
The  Metaphys-  plete  discussion  of  all  the   metaphysical 

ics  of  Morals  ...  i  •    i  n       i  i    ^      ^ 

Tentative  principles  which  are  rundamental  to 
*-*"'y-  practical    and     scientific    ethics.       It    is 

rather  a  statement  of  its  more  important  prob- 
lems, i.e.,  such  as  are  preliminary  to  a  critical  ex- 
amination of  the  practical  reason  or  the  so-called 
moral  faculty,  and  to  a  completed  and  ration- 
alized system  of  duties  and  precepts  as  a  final 
result.  The  treatise  also  supposes  the  reader  to  be 
acquainted  with  the  author's  speculative  system  as 
expounded  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  and  the 
distinctions  which  that  treatise  labors  to  establish. 
The  writer  had  certainly  a  right  to  assume  that 
the  doctrines  which  he  had  so  elaborately  ex- 
pounded in  his  magnum  opus  had  by  this  time 
become  familiar  to  every  reader  of  the  later  trea- 
tise, and  he  does  not  hesitate  to  proceed  upon  this 
assumption.  In  this  way  we  explain  and  excuse  the 
brevity  and  the  abruptness  of  some  portions  of  this 

*  Grnndlegung  ziir  Metaphysik  der  .Sitten. 
38 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  30 

his  first  ethical  essay,  and  the  apparent  obscurity  of 
some  of  its  allusions. 

§  21.  In  the  preface  Kant  directs  the  attention 
of  the  reader  to  the  fact  that  all  knowl- 

A  Metaphysics 

edge   is  either /'or/^(f/i  or  material  —  the  o^'^^ora.i^ 

Possible. 

formal  concerning  itself  with  the  uni- 
versal laws  or  relations  of  thought,  without  re- 
spect to  its  objects,  while  the  material  respects  the 
varying  properties  of  existing  things  as  either  phys- 
ical, i.e.,  necessar}'',  or  spiritual,  i.e.,  free.  He  also 
notices  that  the  laws  which  respect  either  may  re- 
spect events  as  they  are  or  as  they  ought  to  be;  thus 
giving  the  distinction  between  physics  and  ethics. 
Then  again,  we  call  philosophy  empirical  so  far  as  it 
is  based  on  experience,  and  metaphysical  when  it 
rests  on  a  priori  principles.  Consequently,  physics 
and  ethics  may  be  either  empirical  or  pure,  so  far 
as  they  rest  upon  either. 

These  distinctions  being  established,  the  writer 
proposes  the  question  whether  it  is  possible  to  estab- 
lish a  system  of  ethics  that  shall  be  a  purely  rational 
science,  and  as  such  "  perfectly  cleared  of  every- 
thing which  is  only  empirical  and  which  belongs  to 
anthi'opology."*     To    this    he    replies,  that    such    a 

*  We  notice  here  once  for  all  that  the  doctrine  which  Kant  so 
often  refers  to  and  so  often  rejects  under  this  title,  was  the  current 


40  K ant's  ethics. 

[ihilosophy  is  possible  "  is  evident  from  the  common 
idea  of  duty  and  of  the  moral  law/'  For  example, 
the  precept,  "  Thou  shalt  not  lie,"'  is  not  valid  for 
man  alone  as  man.  but  also  for  other  rational 
beings,  and  consequently  its  basis  is  not  to  be  sought 
in  man's  human  nature,  nor  in  his  circumstances. 
"  but  a  priori  simply  in  the  conceptions  of  the  pure 
reason.  *  *  *  Though  this  or  any  other  precept 
which  is  founded  on  mere  experience  may  be  in  cer- 
tain respects  universal,  yet  so  far  as  it  rests  on  an 
empirical  basis,  even  only  as  to  its  motive,  such  a 
precept,  though  it  may  be  called  a  practical  rule, 
can  never  be  called  a  moral  law  *  *  *  Moral 
philosophy  when  applied  to  man  does  not  borrow 
the  least  thing  from  the  knowledge  of  man  himself 
{i.e.,  from  anthropology)  but  gives  laws  (/  priori  to 
him  as  a  rational  being.  *  *  *  a  metaphysics  of 
moi'als  is  therefore  indispensably  necessary,  not 
merely  for  speculative  reasons,  *  *  *  but  also 
because  morals  themselves  are  liable  to  all  sorts  of 
corruption  so  long  as  we  are  without  that  clue  and 

theory  received  from  the  aucient  schools,  that  a  life  of  virtue  or 
moral  excellence  is  "a  life  according  to  nature,"  human  nature  being 
understood  by  this  term.  It  is  singular  that  Kant  should  have  over- 
looked the  possible  reply  to  his  oft-repeated  strictures;  that  it  was 
human  nature  g?/a-rational,  that  was  intended,  and  that  the  ideal  of 
aspiration  and  the  norm  of  judgment  was  never  the  emotional  or 
the  passionate,  or,  as  Kant  would  <:all  it,  the  empirical,  in  man. 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  41 

supreme  canon  by  which  to  estimate  them  correctly. 
For  in  order  that  an  action  should  be  morally  good, 
it  is  not  enough  that  it  should  conform  to  the  moral 
law,  but  it  should  also  be  done  for  the  ml;e  of  tlie 
law.'' 

In  order  to  make  it  clear  that  the  author's  theory 
of  ethical  ideas  diifers  from  that  which  was  current 
in  his  time,  he  calls  attention  to  the  doctrine  of 
Wolf  in  his  Propa?deutic,  who  contends  for  the  free- 
dom of  the  will  as  the  foundation  of  moral  concepts, 
but,  in  the  judgment  of  Kant,  overlooks  altogether 
the  point  that  it  is  with  acts  of  pure  will,  as  such, 
that  moral  freedom  is  especially  concerned;  in  other 
words,  that  the  subjective  element  of  freedom,  as 
such,  is  not  the  preeminently  ethical  element,  but 
that  what  is  distinctively  ethical  is  the  a  priori, 
motive  with  which  the  will  is  confronted  by  and  from 
the  reason. 

§  22.     In  these  terms  and  statements  the  author 
vaguely   sketches    the    theory  which    he  preliminary 
proposes  to  explain  and  defend  at  length  ^^"i,*!',,'!'!."^  ^^"^ 
in   respect    to   the  fundamental    concep-  ^vstem. 
tions*of  scientific  morality,  and  more  than  vaguely 
hints  what  that  theory  will  inevitably  prove  to  be. 
The  chief  points  which  he  has    thus  far    explicitly 
stated,  seem  to  be  the  following:  That  moral  relations 


42  kant's  ethics. 

are  discerned  b}'  the  reason,  and  by  the  reason  only, 
and  consequently  have  no  discernible  or  necessary 
relation  to  the  empirical  or  emotional  nature,  which 
neither  enters  into  their  essence  nor  imparts  to  them 
authority.  It  follows,  as  it  would  seem,  that  he 
holds  that  neither  the  nature  of  man  as  man  nor  as 
a  sensitive,  rational  being  furnishes  the  ground  or 
enters  into  the  definition  of  ethical  conceptions,  but 
that  these  distinctive  elements  are  simply  a  priori, 
i.e.,  are  a  peculiar  class  of  relations,  which  are  dis- 
cerned and  enforced  by  the  practical  reason  inde- 
pendently and  alone.  All  this  is  vaguely  assumed 
in  the  preface,  or  intimated  as  certain  to  be.  the 
result  of  the  subsequent  discussion.  It  is  also  man- 
ifest even  to  the  superficial  reader  that  this  preface 
was  written  after  the  essay,  and  cannot  be  fully 
appreciated  till  the  essay  shall  have  been  read,  de- 
pending as  it  does  for  its  interpretation  and  enforce- 
ment upon  the  subsequent  discussions  of  which  it 
gives  an  indefinite  outline  or  an  obscure  anticipa- 
tion. It  concludes  with  the  programme  in  which 
the  author  proposes,  (1)  to  proceed  from 

Division  of 

Topics  in  the    the  common  to  the  philosophical  knowl- 

Grundlegung.  , 

edge  ot  morals,  (2)  irom  popular, 
i.e..,  g'Ma.si  -  rational,  morals  to  its  metaphysics, 
and    (3)   from   its    metaphysics    to   the    Critique   of 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MOKALS.  43 

the  Pure  Practical  Reason  —  the  second  treatise, 
for  which  this  is  the  introduction.  This  pro- 
gramme, in  a  general  way,  is  adhered  to  by  the 
author  with  no  great  rigor  of  method:  as  is 
manifest  from  the  digressions  and  anticipations 
which  characterize  his  always  somewhat  rambling 
discussion. 

§  23.     The  hrst  section  of  the  treatise 

Import  of  his 

opens    with    the    memorable    and    often  opening 

,  - _     ,  .  Sentence. 

quoted  utterance,  that  JNothing  can 
possibly  be  conceived  in  the  world,  or  even  out  of  it, 
which  can  be  called  good  without  qualification,  except 
a  good  will."  If  character  is  compared  with  gifts  of 
nature,  as  intelligence,  courage,  and  gifts  of  fortune, 
as  riches,  health,  or  contentment,  all  these  are  de- 
fective, "  if  there  is  not  a  good  will  to  correct  their 
|)ossible  perversion  and  to  rectify  the  whole  princi- 
ple of  acting,  and  adapt  it  to  its  end."  A  man 
who  is  endowed  with  every  other  good  can  never 
give  pleasure  to  an  impartial  rational  spectator. 
unless  he  possesses  a  good  will.  "  Thus  a  good  will 
appears  to  constitute  the  indispensable  condition  of 
being  worthy  of  happiness.  *  *  *  Moreover,  a 
good  will  is  good,  not  for  what  it  effects,  but  for 
what  it  intends,  even  when  it  fails  to  accomplish  its 
vurposes,    *    *    *    as    when  a  man    wills  the   good 


44  rant's  ethics. 

of  anothev  and  is  impotent  to  promote  it,  or  actuall}' 
effects  just  the  opposite  of  what  he  proposes  or 
wills." 

The  author  anticipates  that  this  last  proposition 
may  seem  extravagant,  and  for  this  reason  he  sub- 
jects it  to  a  careful  scrutinj^  He  urges  that  if 
happiness,*  as  such,  were  the  chief  purpose  of  na- 
ture, this  end  would  have  been  more  effectually  pro- 
vided for  by  a  simple  instinct  impelling  directly  and 
invariably  to  this  end,  instead  of  being  left  to  the 
fallibility  of  the  individual  reason  and  the  caprice  of 
the  individual  will.  The  actual  arrangements  of 
nature,  as  we  find  them,  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
they  all  suppose  adaptation  to  the  occasions  and  ser- 
vice of  a  good  will  as  a  good  in  itself.  This  good 
will  as  a  good  in  itself  must  be  "'the  supreme  good 
and  the  condition  of  every  other,  even  of  the  desire 
of  happiness,"  though  it  is  not  the  sole  or  the  com- 
plete good,  inferior  and  accidental  goods  being 
often  connected  with  or  separated  from  this  as  the 
supreme. 

§  28.     Kant    proceeds    to    reason    if   we  seek    to 

*  As  though  happiness,  as  sucli.  or  the  production  of  happiness,  had 
ever  been  supposed  to  have  any  niorjl  excellence,  or  anything  short  of 
the  i>o^(7)i«ri/ production  of  happiness,  and  of  the  hiirhest  happiness  at 
that.  .\s  though  all  moralists  who  are  worth  considering  had  not  em- 
pliasi/ed  the  good  will,  or  tlic  willing  of  good,  as  the  supreme  excel- 
lence. 


THE    METAPHYSICS   OF   ilOKALS.  45 

define  this  '"good  will" — in  other  words,  to  define 
an  act  of  duty — we  must  first  set  aside 

Kanfs  liitiT- 

all  those  actions  which  are  inconsistent  prutation  of 

the  Good  Will. 

with  duty.     JNone  oi  these  can  proceed 
from  a  "good  will.''     We  shall  also  exclude  all  those 
acts  which  are  consistent  with    duty,  and   yet  are 
done  from  incliiiafion  oiihj,  and  not  with  a  conscious 
recognition    of    them    as    morally   good,  (i)  An  Act 

T  1  -i.    •  J    1       ii       from  Inclina- 

in  every  such  case,  it  is  assumed  by  the  ..     „  ^ 

•'  '  -^  tion  Not  an 

author  that  the  act  cannot  be  an  act  of  -'^ct  of  Dnty. 
duty  at  all.  As,  for  example,  a  trader  is  honest 
from  good  policy  only,  or  a  man  preserves  his 
life  as  duty  requires,  but  not  because  duty  re- 
quires; or,  though  to  be  beneficent  where  we  can 
be  is  a  duty,  yet  if  a  man  is  beneficent  because  of 
the  delight  which  follows  to  his  pathological  or  emo- 
tional nature,  his  acts  are  not  acts  of  duty,  "'  For 
the  maxim  of  conduct  here  wants  the  moral  import, 
namely,  that  such  actions  be  done  from  diit)/,  not 
from  inclination.  *  *  *  It  is  in  this  manner,  un- 
doubtedly, that  we  are  to  understand  those  passages 
of  Scripture,  also,  in  which  we  are  commanded  to 
love  our  neighbor,  even  our  enemy.     For  love,*  as  an 

*  We  notice  here  that  Kant  doeir  not  recoirnize  the  i)ossibiIity  that 
love,  or  any  affection  or  emotion,  shonld  be  impelled  or  regiil;ited  Ijy  the 
will,  but  conceives  of  the  will  as  the  controller  of  the  actions  only,  j.^"., 
the  bodily  actions.  Consequently,  the  comprehensive  law,  '-Thou  shall 
/ove  the  Lord  thy  God,"  becomes  to  him  impossible  and  nnnieanint.'. 


46  KAXT's    ETIIIUS. 

afiPection.  cannot  be  commanded,  but  only  beneficence 
for  duty's  sake,  even  though  we  are  not  impelled  to 
it  by  any  inclination,  nay,  are  even  repelled  by  a 
natural  and  unconquerable  aversion.  It  is  prac- 
tical love,  and  not  pafJiolof/ical,  a  love  which  is  seated 
in  the  will,  and  not  in  the  propensions  of  sense;  in 
principles  of  action,  and  not  of  tender  sympathy; 
and  it  is  this  love  only  which  can  be  commanded." 

§  24.  The  second  proposition  is,  "  that  an  action 
(2)The Maxim,  done  from  duty  derives  its  moral  worth, 
no^  u>  IK.  ^^^|.  £j.Qj^^  j.|jg  purpose  which  is  to  be  at- 
Moral  Worth,  tained  by  it,"'  but  from  the  maxim  by 
which  it  is  determined,  and  that  its  moral  character, 
therefore,  does  not  depend  on  the  purpose  being 
realized,  but  merely  on  the  "  principle  of  the  voli- 
tion "  which  has  produced  the  action.  Such  a  prin- 
ciple is  formal  or  a  priori,  as  contrasted  with  a 
spontaneous  or  material  spring  of  action. 

We  observe  here  that  by  maxim  Kant  means  the 
action  in  the  mind  of  the  individual,  the  intended 
object,  when  expressed  as  purposed  by  the  individual, 
and  thus  indicating  the  rule  by  which  he  is  in  fact 
controlled. 

(3)  Respect  S  25.     The  third   proposition  derived 

.?'    ^!-.  ,'r       from  the  foregoing  is,  that  "dutv  is  the 

Essential  to  o        f?       ■ 

Duty.  necessity  of  acting  from  respect  for  the 


THE    METAPHYSICS   0f""M0RALS.  47 

law.  I  may  have  an  inclination  for  an  object  as 
an  effect  of  my  action,  but  I  cannot  have  respect 
for  it,  just  for  this  reason,  that  it  is  an  effect  and 
not  an  energy  of  will.  *  *  *  Jt  is  onlij  what  is  con- 
nected with  the  will  as  a  principle,  but  by  no  means 
as  an  effect — what  does  not  subserve  my  inclination, 
but  overpowers  it,  or,  at  least,  in  case  of  choice  ex- 
cludes it  from  its  calculation  —  in  other  words,  it  is 
simply  the  law  of  itself,  which  can  be  an  object  of 
respect,  and  hence  a  command. 

•■  But  what  sort  of  law  can  there  be,  the  very 
thought  of  which  must  determine  the  The  Content 
will,  without  reference  to  any  effect?  °^j™_'*°j'^^^j 
*  *  *  Every  impulse,  as  such,  has  Law. 
been  set  aside  from  being  a  principle.  Nothing 
remains  but  the  universal  conformity  of  action 
to  law  in  general."  In  other  words,  "  I  am  never 
to  act  otherwise  than  so  that  I  could  also  will 
that  my  maxim  should  become  a  universal  law." 
What  the  author  intends  by  this  very  abstract  state- 
ment he  illustrates  by  an  example:  I  ask,  may  I  ever 
when  in  distress  make  a  promise,  with  the  intention 
not  to  keep  it?  We  do  not  ask,  Is  it  never  prudent, 
but  is  it  ever  right,  thus  to  do?  For  myself  it  may 
be  safe  and  advantageous,  not  only  in  a  single  in- 
stance, but  in  every  case.     There  is  a  short  way  to 


48  kant's  ethics. 

decide  the  question,  "  whether  a  lying  promise  is 
ever  consistent  with  duty,"  and  that  is  to  ask 
whether  such  a  rule  of  action  can  ever  be  made 
a  universal  law.  Though  I  can  will  a  lie,  I  can- 
not will  that  lying  should  be  a  universal  law. 
Why  this  should  be,  Kant  does  not  here  attempt 
to  explain.  He  would  even  assert  that  no  explan- 
ation of  this  unfitness ""  to  become  a  law  is  pos- 
sible. This  remains  as  an  unsolved  problem,  and 
yet  somehow  we  know  that  a  law,  to  be  moral,  must 
be  such  as  can  enter  into  universal  legislation;  also 
that  it  must  extort  or  command  respect,  and  that  this 
respect  takes  precedence  over  and  sets  aside  what- 
ever is  recommended  by  inclination.  Moreover,  the 
necessity  of  acting  from  pure  respect  to  the  law 
constitutes  duty,  and  is  the  condition  of  that  good 
will  which  is  a  good  in  itself,  and  consequently  is 
the  only  thing  which  can  be  styled  good  without 
qualification. 

In  concluding  the  first  section,  the  author  adverts 
to  the  fact  that  the  practical  reason  reveals  its  dis- 
tinctions with  a  simplicity  and  an  authority  which 
are  strikingly  contrasted  with  the  maxims  and  pvin- 

*"  Fitness  to  become  a  law,"  it  should  bo  observed,  is  no  adap- 
tation that  is  founded  in  the  nature  of  man,  indi\idually  or  socially; 
Kant  says  of  it,  that  it  is  purely  rational,  whatever  this  may  be,  ami 
moreover,  that  it  extorts  and  commands  respect. 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  4.9 

ciples  taught  by  the  speculative  reason.  Conse- 
quently, to  accept  the  first,  he  urges,  is  eminently 
safe  and  wise,  even  when  they  seem  to  be  inconsis- 
tent with  the  teachings  of  the  last.  And  yet  we  are 
impelled  by  a  necessity  which  we  cannot  resist  to 
attempt  to  reconcile  the  two,  but  always  with  a 
tenacious  faith  in  the  superior  commands  of  the 
practical  reason. 

§  26.    We  have  already  adverted  {cf.  §  10)  to  the 
(/i<c/s«-sceptical    mood   in    respect  to  the  ,,     .  , 

^  >■  -  Kant  s  Scep- 

trustworthiness     of     speculative     truth,  ticism  in 

Respect  to 

with  its  forms  and  its  categories,  with  speculative 
its  ideas,  phenomena,  noumena.  and  all, 
into  which  Kant  had  brought  himself  and  would 
fain  bring  his  reader,  as  the  outcome  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  We  have  also  ex- 
plained the  deliverance  from  these  entanglements 
which  he  anticipated  as  possible  through  the  cate- 
gorical imperative  of  duty,  as  implied  in  and  en- 
forced by  the  practical  reason.  The  principal 
elements  of  this  concept  of  dut}-  have  been  given 
in  this  first  section,  as  he  conceives  them  to  occur 
in  the  experience  of  unreflecting  men.  To  these 
experiences,  as  we  have  seen,  he  makes  his  final 
appeal.  Whether  his  analysis  of  these  experiences 
is  satisfactory  in  all  these  particulars  remains  to  be 


50  kaxt's  ethics. 

seen,  as  we  seek  to  subject  it  to  careful  criticism 
before  we  proceed  to  an  examination  of  the  ampler 
discussions  which  follow.  We  do  this  at  once  be- 
cause this  section  presents  in  a  brief  but  popular 
form  many  of  the  distinctive  features  of  Kant's 
entire  theor}',  the  fallacy  of  which,  when  detected 
and  exposed,  may  aid  the  reader  in  detecting  similar 
errors  in  the  subsequent  arguments,  and  especially 
may  sharpen  his  discernment  to  distinguish  between 
a  popular  and  a  scientific  metaphysics  of  ethics. 
§  27.  Thus  far  have  we  been  content  to  explain 
Kant's  argument.     We  begin  our  criti- 

Criticism  of 

Kant's  First     cism  with   Kaut's  first  sentence,  an  ut- 

Sentence.  ,  i  •   i      i  i  i        •       /> 

terance  which  has  become  classic  rrom 
its  fervid  tone,  and  which,  when  rightly  inter- 
preted, expresses  an  important  practical  truth. 
''Xofhhtg  can  jwssibli/  be  conceired  in  the  icorld,  or 
even  out  of  it,  which  can  he  called  good  ivithout 
qualification,  except  a  good  iriJI.''  To  this  propo- 
sition, as  an  utterance  of  practical  ethical  truth  in 
popular  language,  the  adherent  of  almost  every 
ethical  theory  would  give  his  ready  and  fervent 
assent.  But  as  uttered  by  Kant,  it  expresses  the 
metaphysical  principle  (in  technical  language)  that 
moral  goodness  has  no  relation  to  any  other  good- 
ness;   that    it    is    not    only    superior    in    quality    to 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OP    MORALS.  61 

every  other,  but  cannot  properly  be  classed  or  com- 
pared with  any  other.  As  accepted  with  equal  posi- 
tiveness  and  fervor,  as  it  may  be  and  often  is,  by 
those  who  dissent  from  Kant,  it  asserts  the  incom- 
parable and  unquestioned  superiority  of  the  moral 
among  the  other  kinds  of  good  with  which  it  can, 
and,  as  it  would  seem,  iinist  be  compared,  in  order 
that  its  supremacy  may  be  manifest.  As  applied  by 
Kant,  it  asserts  that  there  is  but  one  real  good, 
"good  without  qualification,"'  and  that  is  moral 
good,  which  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  any  other, 
and  which  certainly  cannot  be  classed  with  any 
other,  and  as  it  would  seem  can  be  compared  with 
no  other.  As  assented  to  by  those  who  dissent  from 
Kant's  philosophy,  it  would  require  them  to  substi- 
tute the  phrase,  "the  supreme  good,"  for  "good 
without  qualification,"  meaning  by  "  supreme  "  the 
"best  in  quality  or  kind,''  as  distinguished  from 
the  most  energetic  or  intense. 

§  28.     The  "good  will'"  which  either  is  or  brings 
so  great  a  good,  in  the  view  of  those  who 

Diverse 

dissent  from  Kant,  is  an  act  or  state  of  Meanings  of 
the  will,  a   voluntary   choice  or   love  of 
the   highest   or   supreme    natural    good,   which    for 
this  reason  is  both  logically  and  actually  superior  to 
every    other,    "a   good    without    qualification,""    "a 


52  KANT*S    ETHICS. 

good  beyond  compare."  The  difference  between  the 
two  positions  is  explained  by  the  fact  that,  according 
to  Kant,  the  good  will  is  determined  by  no  impulse 
of  or  motion  in,  the  sensibility,  eitlier  felt  or  dis- 
cerned, but  by  the  simple  authority'  of  the  reason, 
which  utters  its  dictum  or  command  without  a 
reason.     Hence    the  good  will  which  is  recognized 

(as  "a  good  without  qualification'"  is  a  will  deter- 
mined hy  the  reason  onJij,  not  merely  in  spite  of 
certain  lower  impulses  of  the  sensibility,  but  inde- 
pendently of  any  motives  whatever  which  are  ad- 
dressed to  any  sensibilities  that  are  higher.  Ac- 
cording to  the  dissentients  from  Kant,  a  good  v^^ill 
is  an  act  or  state  of  will  which  responds  to  a  mo- 
tive that  addresses  the  highest  or  best  natural  sen- 
sibility. The  choice  of  such  a  good,  but  not  the 
chosen  good,  is  the  morally  good  will. 

It  would  seem  that  when  Kant's  proposition  was 
thus  fully  and  fairly  stated,  it  would  at  least  fail  to 
command  unquestioning  assent,  if  it  did  not  in 
many  eases  elicit  a  positive  dissent.  And  yet  it  is 
not  difficult  to  understand  why  it  should  frequently 
seem  to  be  axiomatic  and  self-evident.  It  strikes 
the  key-note  of  Kant's  ethical  system,  revealing  its 
apparent  strength  and  its  real  weakness.  It  finds 
its  apparent  strength  in  its  homage  to  the  higher 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  53 

impulses,  which  it  would  fain  exalt  so  high  that  they 
should  seem  to  rise  above  the  region  of  the  sensibil- 
ities proper,  and  to  float  in  the  empyrean  of  the  pure 
reason.  It  finds  additional  plausibility  in  the  em- 
phasis which  it  lays  upon  the  will  as  the  centre  and 
source  of  all  human  responsibility,  when  contrasted 
with  the  sensibility  and  intellect,  either  or  both.  Its 
weakness  lies  in  its  oversight  of  the  fact  that  it  is 
only  through  the  sensibilities  that  the  will  can  act 
morally  at  all,  by  energizing  and  controlling  them  — 
this  oversight  involving  the  depreciation  and  almost 
the  contemptuous  disesteem  of  the  feelings  as  psy- 
chical experiences,  and  justifying  the  inference  that 
the  emotional  or  pathological  in  man's  nature,  even 
when  animated  and  controlled  by  the  will,  is  not 
only  not  moral,  but  is  positively  immoral  in  its 
functions  and  its  products. 

The  opponents  of  Kant  find  no  difficulty  in  assent- 
ing to  every  one  of  his  utterances  as  true  and  im- 
portant, so  long  as  they  read  between  the  lines  their 
own  interpretation  of  the  terms  and  propositions. 
But  while  they  accept  with  all  their  hearts  his  lead- 
ing propositions  when  thus  modified,  they  must  pro- 
test against  the  dishonor  done  to  the  sensibilities  as 
either  an  immoral  or  an  unethical  element  of  char- 
acter.    They  would   say  emphatically,  while   it   is 


54  KAKTS    ETHICS. 

true  that  mere  sensibility,  except  as  it  is  penetrated 
and  directed  by  the  will,  has  no  ethical  character 
whatever,  it  is  equally  true  —  a  fact  which  Kant 
overlooks,  and  would  almost  seem  to  deny  —  that  an 
act  of  mere  will,  except  as  it  animates  and  controls 
the  sensibility,  is  equally  unethical.  Thej^  accept 
the  doctrine  that  "  a  good  will  is  not  good  because  of 
what  it  performs  or  eflfects,  nor  b}'  its  aptness  for 
the  attainment  of  some  proposed  end,  but  simply  by 
virtue  of  the  volition,"  and  yet  reject  the  inference 
that  it  is  ''good  in  itself,"  if  this  implies  that  no 
good,  i.e.,  no  sentient  good,  is  in  fact  intended,  pro- 
posed as  a  maxim,  felt  as  a  motive,  or  obeyed  as  a 
law,  by  this  masterful  good  icill. 

§  29.     As  we  follow  the    argument    of   Kant,   it 
Kant's  Defect-  would    seem    as  though    he   was  led  to 

ive  Conception  1,1  n  pi-  1       • 

of  His  Oppon-  ^i^i^P^ct  the  soundness  or  his  exclusion 
ents' Doctrine,  gf  sentient  good  as  an  essential  ele- 
ment of  the  satisfactory  definition  of  a  good  will, 
when  he  urges  that,  were  happiness  the  end  of  man's 
existence  it  were  better  and  more  economical  for  na- 
ture to  bestow  happiness  on  him  without  the  hazard 
of  freedom,  taking  on  herself  the  choice  not  only  of 
the  ends  of  human  life,  but  also  of  the  means  for 
their  attainment,  and  with  wise  forecast  intrusting 
both  to  "  instinct" — as  though  anyone  had  contended 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OV   MORALS.  65 

or  dreamed  that  any  single  element  could  constitute 
the  "  good  will."  How  could  he  overlook  the  fact 
so  often  emphasized  by  himself,  that  the  element  of 
freedom  must  be  prominent  in  the  intelligent 
choice  —  as  we  say  between  higher  and  lower  forms 
of  natural  good  —  in  order  to  impart  to  it  a  qual- 
ity so  peculiar  that  it  alone  could  deserve  to  be 
called  "good  in  itself"?  Is  it  not  Kant  himself  who 
contends  that  if  nature  would  adapt  means  to  an  end, 
"  its  true  destination  must  be  to  produce  a  will,  not 
merely  as  a  means  to  something  else,  but  good  in 
itself,  for  which  reason  was  absolutely  necessary"? 
Here  the  question  cannot  but  suggest  itself,  if  reason 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  this  good  will,  why  might 
not  freedom  also  be  necessary  (contrary  to  his  sup- 
position of  instinct),  and  if  freedom  and  reason, 
why  might  not  sensibility  be  also  required,  with  its 
capacity  for  and  its  impulses  toward  higher  and 
lower  natural  good,  even  though  it  must  also  be  vol- 
untary and  directed  by  reason  in  order  to  obtain  an 
ethical  value  and  to  rise  to  the  unmatched  excel- 
lence of  "  the  good  will." 

§  30.  But  from  the  position  that  the  "  good 
will"  is  a  "good  in  itself,"  Kant  easily  Kant's  Limited 
glides  into  the  conclusion  that  it   must  !^"*^    °Z       * 

°  Conception   of 

control   every    other   good,    even    "  the  Happiness. 


56  rant's  ethics. 

desire  of  happiness,"  as  though  these  two  could 
in  any  sense  be  coordinate  or  come  into  conflict. 
We  notice  here,  and  intreat  our  readers  never  to 
lose  sight  of  the  fact,  that  "  happiness "  and  the 
•'  desire  of  happiness,"  are  invariably  used  by  Kant 
in  a  special  and  sensuous  import,  being  limited  to 
the  animal  and  other  lower  affections  as  contrasted 
with  the  rational  and  higher.  It  will  hardly  be  cred- 
ited, and  yet  it  is  true,  that  an  analyst  and  observer 
^      ^     .        so   acute  as    Kant   fails  to  discern  that 

Gratification 

"ftiie  "the    gratification    of   the    reason''    in- 

Reasoii. 

volves  the  existence  of  one  at  least  of 
the  higher  classes  of  sensibilities  as  springs  or 
motives  of  action,  implying  the  possibility  of  a 
peculiar  kind  of  happiness,  and  this  although  imme- 
diately in  this  connection  he  observes  that  "  the  rea- 
son recognizes  the  establishment  of  a  good  will  as  its 
highest  practical  distinction,  and  in  attaining  this 
purpose  is  capable  of  a  satisfaction  of  its  oivn  pecu- 
liar kind,  viz. :  that  derived  from  the  attainment  of 
an  end  which  again  "  is  determined  by  the  reason 
only,  notwithstanding  that  this  may  involve  many  a 
disappointment  to  the  ends  of  inclination."  No 
language,  it  would  seem,  could  be  more  explicit  in 
asserting  that  the  reason  and  ''  inclination  "  have  each 
its  appropriate  sensibility,  dependent  on  its  special 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  57 

conditions,  indeed,  and  its  peculiar  laws,  but  both  be- 
ing capacities  for  emotion  and  involving  enjoyment 
or  suffering  of  differing  kinds  and  degrees.  There 
can  be  no  escape  from  this  interpretation,  unless  the 
satisfaction  peculiar  to  reason  is  limited  to  that 
which  follows  voluntary  action.  But  in  such  case  it 
could  not  be  brought  into  competition  with  inclina- 
tion proper,  and  would  have  no  meaning  for  Kant's 
argument.  There  can  be  no  escape  from  the  conclu- 
sion that  Kant  implicitly,  if  not  avowedly,  more  than 
once  recognizes  a  natural  happiness  which  reason 
gives  and  which  competes  with  inclination,  even  if 
he  did  not  explicitly  recognize  the  ethical  principle 
of  Aristotle,  that  one  of  the  conditions  of  rational 
satisfaction  is  the  attainment  of  the  end  or  purpose 
of  one's  being,  or  the  acting  according  to  nature, — 
which  last  Kant  uniformly  interprets  as  involving 
empirical  as  opposed  to  ethical  relations. 

§  31.     The  next  topic  which  is  discussed  by  Kant 
is   the    conception    of    duty.     The   first  j^^^^^, 
characteristic  which    he   notices  is  that  Defective 

Conception 

duty   implies    an    activity   of    the    will  of  Duty  and 

■  .  1  •     1  Ti   •  r       Obligation. 

against  conscious  hindrances.     It  is  a  fa- 
vorite and  an  oft-repeated  doctrine  of  his  that  an  act 
of  duty  must  be  positively  indifferent  or  disagree- 
able to  the  natural  sensibilities.     He  even  formally 


58  rant's  ethics. 

defines  "  Duty  as  a  compulsion  to  a  purpose  or  aim 
unwillingly  adopted."  Moreover,  unless  an  act  is 
performed  from  a  sense  or  motive  of  simple  duty, 
whether  the  person  is  or  is  not  impelled  by  inclina- 
tion, the  act  is  not  morally  good.  For  this  reason, 
those  acts  to  which  we  are  impelled  by  strong  nat- 
ural sensibility,  may  fail  to  be  morally  good  in  spite 
of  this  fact,  and,  in  a  sense,  in  consequence  of  it. 
All  of  which  is  true,  but  not  for  the  reason  given 
or  assumed,  that  the  element  of  sensibility  is  a 
vitiating  element,  but  because  it  is  the  rolmitanj  ele- 
ment alone  which  determines  the  moral  quality  of 
the  action,  not  as  antagonistic  to  sensibility  of  every 
sort,  but  as  it  selects  between  the  lower  or  higher 
natural  sensibility,  i.e.,  chooses  between  the  higher 
and  lower  natural  good.  It  is  also  worthy  of 
notice  that  Kant  fails  altogether  to  discriminate 
between  internal  and  external  acts  of  duty,  usually 
limiting  duty  to  the  latter,  i.e.,  to  the  henejicent  act 
as  contrasted  with  the  benevolent  volition  —  limiting 
the  sensibility  to  acts  only  as  thus  defined  and  con- 
ceived, and  appropriating  the  voluntary  and  re- 
sponsible to  the  internal. 

In    still    further    elucidation    of    his 

other 

Oversights       theory,   he   observes    that    right   actions 
must  "be  done  from  dutv,  not  from  in- 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  59 

clination,"  as  though  it  were  not  equally  true  and  no 
paradox  to  say,  that  if  such  acts  were  not  done  from 
inclination,  i.e.^  were  not  voluntary  or  volitionized, 
they  would  not  be  acts  of  duty  at  all. 

Under  the  necessities  of  his  theory,  he  does  not 
hesitate  to  affirm  that  those  passages  in  the  Scrip- 
tures which  command  us  to  love  our  neighbor  and 
even  to  love  our  enem}^  do  not  respect  the  feelings 
or  volitions  of  benevolence,  but  only  the  duties  of 
beneficence,  for  the  reason  that  love  and  forgiveness 
cannot  be  the  subject  of  a  command,  practical  and 
not  pathological  love  alone  being  a  matter  of  duty. 
We  need  use  no  words  to  explain  how  inadequate 
is  this  view  of  the  reach  and  import  of  the  moral 
law  as  explained  in  the  Scriptures,  which  not  only 
insist  that  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law,  but 
that  if  love  is  wanting,  though  every  conceivable 
act  of  beneficence  should  be  performed,  not  a  single 
act  of  duty  is  done.  The  truth  which  misled  the 
author  is  the  commonplace  truth  that  duty,  if  it  be 
ethical  and  genuine,  must  show  itself  in  acts,  else  it 
is  hypocritical  or  hollow,  and  hence  acts,  as  well  as 
purposes  and  feelings,  are  insisted  on  as  the  exter- 
nal and  bodily  stuff  of  which  duty  is  made  and 
through  which  it  is  manifested.  The  truth  which 
Kant  caricatures  is  that  the  will,  as  distinfjuished 


60  kant's  ethics. 

from  the  sensibility,  is  the  only  possible  subject  of 
the  law  of  duty,  and  that  what  the  sensibilities  are 
in  their  impulsive  energy  and  proportionate  energy, 
depends  partly  on  the  individual  temperament  and 
culture.  For  this  reason,  and  for  this  alone,  the 
acts  and  not  the  feelings  are  the  measures  and  prac- 
tical tests  of  duty. 

§  o2.  Kant's  second  iiroposition  concerning  duty 
Kaiifs  ^•'''  ^''^^  ^^  derives   its  moral   worth,  not 

Second  Error.  fj-Qm  the  purpose  or  end  which  is  to  be 
attained  b}^  the  act,  but  from  the  principle  of  the 
volition  wliich  pervades  it.  If  he  means  that  the 
actual  fulfilment  or  execution  of  the  volition  does 
not  decide  its  moral  quality,  he  asserts  an  impor- 
tant truth,  but  if  he  means,  as  his  words  would 
imply,  that  the  subjective  moral  character  of  the 
act  of  duty  is  not  determined  by  what  we  object- 
ively intend  or  morally  prefer,  he  commits  a  se- 
rious speculative  and  practical  error.  The  contrast 
which  he  sets  up.  between  the  principle  of  the  will 
and  the  expected  or  chosen  end  in  the  act  proposed 
or  its  result,  cannot  hold.  To  call  the  one  formal 
and  a  priori  and  the  other  material  does  not  avail 
except  to  the  ear. 

Kant's  third  proposition  respecting  duty  is  thus 
expressed:  "Duty  is   the   necessity   of  acting  from 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MOEALS.  61 

respect  to  the  law."     In   this  definition   respect  is 
opposed    to   inclination,    the    one    being  ^^.^^ 
concerned  with  the  regulation  of  the  en-  Mistake. 

Respect  for 

ergy  of  the  will,  or  the  activity  itself,  the  Law  a 
and  the  other  with  the  anticipated 
effect  of  an  act.  That  respect  on  the  one  hand,  and 
desire  or  inclination  on  the  other,  are  properly  con- 
trasted we  do  not  deny,  but  we  deny  altogether  that 
respect  is  not  pathological  and  emotional,  albeit  that 
both  as  sensitive  and  impulsive  it  is  distinguished 
from  the  lower  sensibilities.  We  dissent  from 
Kant's  assertion  that  we  cannot  have  respect  for  a 
feeling  or  an  inclination  in  ourselves  and  others, 
although  we  grant  that,  to  become  an  object  of  re- 
spect, such  a  feeling  must  be  vivified  by  the  will 
and  the  product  of  self-command;  but  the  response 
of  respect  which  it  exacts  is  none  the  less  emotional 
in  its  nature. 

§  33.     It   is    interesting  to   notice    that   at    this 
stage     of    the    development     of   Kant's 

Conceded  to  be 

theory,   with    the    first    introduction    of  an "  obscure 

Feeliu"'." 

"  respect  for  the  law"  as  an  essential  ele- 
ment or  condition  of  duty,  he  recognizes  the  objec- 
tion as  possible  that  this  respect  for  the  law  must  in 
some  sort  be  an  "  obscure  fed'oKj."'     This  difficulty 
he  attempts  to  evade  by  explaining  the  nature  of  the 


62  kant's  ethics. 

feeling  by  the  object  which  occasions  it,  as  a  concept 
of  the  reason,  "  the  law  only,  and  that  the  law  which 
we  impose  on  ourselves."  All  which  does  not  tend 
to  take  respect  out  of  the  category  of  feeling,  but 
only  fixes  it  more  firml}^  within  it!  Let  it  be  ob- 
served here  that  it  is  with  the  subjective  state  of 
the  man  that  we  are  concerned,  not  at  all  with  the 
object  which  occasions  it. 

Leaving  this  difficulty  unsolved,  it  being  assumed 
that  the  law  as  such  commands  respect, 

Criterion  of 

an  Act  of  our  author  proceeds  to  inquire,  What 
kind  of  a  law  is  that  which  is  clothed 
with  this  moral  authority?  To  this  question  he 
replies,  Only  a  law  which  is  fitted  to  be  a  universal 
maxim,  I.e.,  "  I  am  never  to  act  otherwise  than  so 
that  I  could  will  that  my  maxim  should  become  a 
universal  law."  This  position  he  illustrates  at  length 
in  answer  to  the  question  whether  it  is  ever  right  to 
make  a  promise  with  the  intention  never  to  keep  it, 
giving  a  variety  of  reasons  why  any  other  rule  of 
conduct  than  the  one  which  in  this  case  he  approves 
would  be  unfit  to  be  a  universal  law.  These  reasons 
we  need  not  state.  It  is  enough  to  say  of  them  that 
they  are  all  considerations  of  coiiipa/ibiliti/  or  incoiit- 
patiJtHihj  irifli  liKiiiiiH  irell-hciiKj.  In  this  case  at 
least,  so  far  as  the  reasoning  of  the  author  has  an}' 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  63 

meaning,  the  fitness  of  a  course  of  conduct  to  be  a  uni- 
versal law  is  argued  on  grounds  of  its  tendencies,  or 
the  consequences,  good  or  ill,  to  the  natural  sensibili- 
ties, if  the  conduct  supposed  were  occasionally  or  con- 
stantly put  in  practice.  The  self-asserting  and  self- 
asserted  majesty  of  the  law,  which  will  bye-and-bye 
emerge  in  the  autocratic  grandeur  of  the  categorical 
imperative,  is  here  by  the  author's  own  showing  rep- 
resented as  simply  an  appeal  to  that  instinctive  desire 
for  or  sympathy  with  universal  well-being,  which  is 
supposed  to  be  dominant  in  every  human  breast.  In 
all  this  it  is  also  assumed  that  the  human  reason  dis- 
cerns certain  ends  which  are  revealed  in  this  consti- 
tution of  man,  individual  and  social,  and  which  are 
capable  of  being  recognized  by  every  thinking  being, 
as  laws  to  his  own  will  and  to  that  of  his  fellow  man. 
It  also  supposes  that  with  the  well-being  of  the  uni- 
verse and  its  necessary  conditions  every  man  has  a  dis- 
interested sympathy,  latent  or  active,  and  so  becomes 
a  lawgiver  to  himself  as  he  interprets  these  ends 
and  designs,  and  recognizes  nature  and  God  as  impos- 
ing and  confirming  them  as  moral  law.  This  law  is 
eminently  reasonable  and  self-confessed,  and  there- 
fore is  responded  to  with  emotions  of  honor  and 
respect,  which  are  none  the  less  sensibilities  because 


64  kant's  ethics. 

attended,  when  the  reflecting  judgment  comes  in.* 

with  self-ministered  and  self-inflicted  joys  and  pains. 

§  34.     Thus  far   we   have    followed  Kant  in   his 

attempt  to  effect  a  transition  from  the 

Second  Sec- 
tion of  Kanfs  "  common  rational  knowledge  "  of  mo- 
rality to  the  philosophical,  within  the 
domain  of  common  intelligence.  We  proceed  next 
to  the  second  section,  in  which  he  treats  of  the  trans- 
ition from  the  popular  philosophy  to  the  metaphysics 
of  morals,  proposing  hereafter  to  interpret  and  criti- 
cise him  point  by  point  —  changing  our  method  to 
that  of  a  running  criticism. 

The  first  position  which  Kant  takes,  and  to  the 
Kanf<Fir'<t  discussiou  of  which  he  devotes  several 
Position,  that   pages,  is  that  no  example  of  ideal  moral 

Every  Ideal  . 

must  Be  perfection    has    ever  been    actually  dis- 

covered in  any  single  individual.  He 
contends  that  not  only  has  no  perfect  human  being 
ever  been  known  actually  to  exist,  from  whose  exam- 
ple an  ideal  of  moral  excellence  could  be  derived 
and  by  which  it  could  tested,  but  it  may  be  ques- 
tioned  whether  any   (single)    example    of   a    single 

*Ho\v  he  comes  to  be  a  lawgiver  to  himself  and  incidentally  to 
others,  we  do  not  here  inquire.  It  is  enough  that  we  know  that  the 
fact  is  unquestioned.  We  are  only  concerned  here  with  the  po-iition 
that  the  respect  which  is  exacted  is  a  sensibility  fnuiuled  on  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  natural  desirableness  of  that  conduct  which  men  call  duty 
in  feeling  and  in  act. 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  65 

perfectly  morally  good  action  can  be  found  in  the 
history  of  man.  The  inference  suggested  does  not 
hold,  even  if  the  supposition  be  allowed.  It  is  tena- 
ble only  against  the  theory  that  the  ideal  of  duty  can 
only  be  derived  from  some  example  of  its  realization, 
which  is  very  different  from  the  position,  that  a  moral 
ideal  cannot  be  constructed  or  proposed  from  the  actual 
facts,  i.e.,  the  possibilities  or  constitution  of  human 
nature.  It  does  not  follow  that  the  ideal  of  moral 
goodness  is  any  the  less  actual  as  an  ideal,  or  any  the 
less  excellent  or  desirable,  because  it  may  have  never 
been  realized,  provided  it  be  true  that  its  elements 
are  found  in  man's  actual  capacities.  Its  elements 
as  an  ideal  may  have  been  derived  froiy  human  nat- 
ure and  verified  in  human  experience,  even  though 
its  realization  may  have  never  been  observed  or  es- 
tablished as  a  fact.  The  only  truth  that  we  need  to 
enforce  is  that  the  ideal  of  moral  goodness  is  derived 
from  reason  and  is  proposed  to  and  enforced  upon 
the  will.  This  ideal  cannot,  however,  be  proposed  as 
an  object  of  choice  or  action.  Men  choose  objects, 
not  volitions.  Though  the  object  of  moral  choice  is 
related  to  the  act  by  which  it  is  chosen,  the  moral 
act  itself  is  not  chosen.  Moral  excellence  does  not  lie 
in  what  is  chosen,  but  in  the  act  or  response  of  choos- 
ing or  the  eflfeet  of  having  chosen.  But  whether  act 
5 


66  kant's  ethics. 

or  effect,  in  both  cases  it  is  subjective,  however  this 
actual  or  anticipated  state  may  be  related  to  its 
object,  or  color  or  affect  that  object. 

The  only  question  between  Kant  and  his  critics 
.     ,     is,  from  what  source  is  this  moral  ideal 

W  hence  is  the 

Moral  Ideal       derived?       This    question    Kant    would 

Derived? 

Kant,  and  His  answer  by  saying.  From  the  reason  only, 
by  an  imperative  dictum  proposed  to 
the  will.  His  critics  would  say,  From  a  correct  in- 
terpretation of  the  relations  of  the  voluntary  sensi- 
bilities to  one  another,  as  proposed  to  the  will, 
through  the  respective  objects  which  excite  them. 

Of  this  tbeor}^  Kant  takes  a  brief  notice  in  pass- 
ing, to  return  to  it  more  fully  at  length,  represent- 
ing it  as  having  been  held  under  the  titles  of  "  the 
special  distinction  of  human  nature  (including,  how- 
ever, the  idea  of  a  rational  nature  generally)  at  one 
time  perfection,  at  another  happiness,  here  moral 
sense,  there  fear  of  God,  a  little  of  this,  and  a  little  of 
that,  in  marvellous  mixture,  without  its  occurring 
to  the  upholders*  of  these  theories  to  ask  whether  the 
principles  of  morality  are  to  be  sought  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  human  nature  at  all   (which  we  can  have 

*  It  may  not  be  amiss  to  observe  in  passing  that  in  none  of  his  eth- 
ical writings  does  Kant  evince  an  exact  and  critical  knowledge  of  the 
writers  whose  systems  he  criticises,  as  those  of  Aristotle.  Wolf,  or 
Shaftesbury,  although  he  prosecutes  an  active  polemic  against  each  of 
them  in  turn. 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  67 

only  from  experience),  oi',  if  this  is  not  so,  if  these 
princii^les  are  to  be  found  altogether  (i  priori^  free 
from  everything  empirical,  in  pure  rational  con- 
cepts only  and  nowhere  else,  not  even  in  the  small- 
est degree,"  etc. 

Not  only  does  he  express  his  dissatisfaction  with 
these  theories,  but  he  shadows  forth  the  outlines  of 
his  own  as  in  his  view  altogether  original.  He  re- 
peats the  injunction  that  a  pure  ethics  must  be  con- 
structed by  reason  alone,  and,  "  unmixed  with  any 
foreign  addition  of  empirical  attraction,"'  must  give 
us  "  the  pure  conception  of  duty,"  and  that  "  the 
conception  of  the  moral  law  exercises  on  the  human 
heart  by  way  of  reason  alone  an  influence  so  much 
more  powerful  than  all  other  springs  which  may  be 
derived  from  experience."  This  prepares  us  for 
what  follows. 

Having  made  so  much  of  reason,  Kant  very  prop- 
erly begins  with  a  definition  of  reason  and  of  ra- 
tional beings  in  their  ethical  relations.  Rational 
beings  are  such  as  have  the  power  of  acting  accord- 
ing to  laws  as  intelligently  apprehended.  To  be 
able  to  act  thus,  man  must  be  endowed  j^^^^^  q^.^^. 

with   will.      It   deserves    attention    that  '""^s  the  Sen- 
sibility as  an 
Kant's   conception  of  the  will  includes  Element  of  the 

two  elements  only,  Intelligence  and  Ac- 


68  rant's  ethics. 

tion,  overlooking  any  effect  on  the  sensibilities  as 
such,  or  any  rational  relations  which  pertain  to  the 
feelings,  as  a  condition  of  action,  or  a  criterion  of 
character.  What  action  is,  i.e.,  what  ethical  or  re- 
sponsible action  is,  he  nowhere  exactly  defines.  The 
term  "  action  "  is  constantly  employed,  indeed,  but 
action  of  what  kind?  Not  bodily  action,  as  it  would 
seem,  for  in  bodily  action  by  itself  there  is  no  moral 
significance  and  can  be  no  moral  responsibility. 
Not  intellectual  action  only,  for  here  freedom  has  no 
place.  Is  it  perhaps  emotional  action?  Certainly  it 
is  not  any  mere  passive  sensibility.  But  no  other  is 
recognized  in  the  Kantian  analysis,  the  sensibility  as 
such  not  being  conceived  as  admitting  of  any  volun- 
tary direction  or  any  rational  reasons  of  higher  or 
lower,  and  consequently  of  any  ethical  relations  by 
being  subject  to  the  will.*  Certainly  the  possibility 
of  such  a  relation  is  at  least  ignored.  Were  this 
allowed,  it  would  imply  some  possible  relation  of 
reason  to  the  sensibility,  and  make  right  and  wrong 
to  depend  on  that  blending  of  the  rational  and  the 

*  It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  the  will  as  conceived  by  Kant 
was  the  power  to  act,  i.e.,  the  capacity  for  impulse  or  desire.  To  Icnow, 
to  feel,  and  to  act, — internally  as  well  as  with  the  body — were  the  three 
functions  of  man  which  he  recognized.  The  power  to  choose  between 
impulsive  sensibilities  was  not  distinctly  conceived  by  him  as  possible, 
hence  his  incapacity  to  recognize  any  conflict  except  a  conflict  be- 
tween reason  and  feeling.  Hence  his  paradoxical  statement  that  the 
moral  law  respects  the  acts  only,  and  not  the  feelings. 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MORALS.  69 

emotional,  i.e.,  of  the  a  priori  and  the  empirical, 
against  which  Kant  constantly  protests,  as  impossi- 
ble, and  under  the  rejection  of  which  his  theory  con- 
stantly labors. 

§  36.    After  this  imperfect  analysis  of  the  relation 
of  the  reason  to  the  springs  or  impulses  jj.  j^^^  Action 
of  action  and  of  the    nature  of  action  Defined  in  the 

Most  Genei'al 

itself,  we  are  told,  in  the  most  general  wayasReason- 

,,,.,,         , .         .  ,    .      able  Action. 

way,  that  right  action  is  reason  put  in 
practice  and  that  action  or  conduct  controlled  by 
reason  is  practical  reason,  reason  being  required  not 
merely  to  apprehend  whatever  should  be  done,  but  to 
apprehend  it  in  its  principles.  In  case  reason  infal- 
libly and  actually  determines  the  conduct,  the  ac- 
tions made  objectively  necessary  to  the  intellect  are 
subjectively  necessary  to  this  will.  That  is,  we  sup- 
pose, the  convictions  of  the  reason  actually  control 
the  impulses  without  conflict  or  friction,  and  the 
reasonable  is  actually  responded  to  by  the  active  im- 
pulses, called  by  Kant  the  will.  But  if  the  will 
is  not  thus  subjectively  determined  by  these  objec- 
tive conditions  without  conflict,  the  determination  of 
such  a  will  is  ohligatory.  This  can  occur  only  when 
the  sensibilities  resist  the  I'eason.  In  case  the  sensi- 
bilities are  reluctant,  the  objective  principle  becomes 
a  command  and  the  formula  is  imperative,  all  impera- 


70  kaxt's  ethics. 

tives  being  expressed  by  the  word  oiKjld.  Every  im- 
perative does  indeed  say  that  something  w^ould  be 
good,  were  it  done  or  not  done,  but  it  says  this  to  a 
will  which  does  not  actually  conforni  to  the  good  as 
thus  conceived.  The  obligatory,  moreover,  is  distin- 
guished from  the  pleasant,  in  that  the  pleasant 
influences  the  will  only  by  means  of  sensations 
from  merely  subjective  causes  which  are  valid  only 
for  the  sensibility  of  this  or  that  individual,  while 
the  obligatory  is  recognized  as  a  principle  of  the 
reason  which  holds  equally  for  all  men. 

§  37.     A  perfectly  good   will,  Kant  proceeds  to 
expound,  would  invariably  be  subiect  to 

A  Perfect  Will        ^  '  J  J 

Excludes  all  the  objective  laws  of  the  reason,  but 
could  not  be  conceived  as  ohliged  to  act 
lawfully,  because  by  its  subjective  constitution  it  is 
of  itself  already  determined  by  the  objectively  good  * 
without  any  counteracting  impulses.  No  impera- 
tives are  possible,  or  have  any  significance  for  the 
desires  of  a  holy  will.  The  conception  of  obliga- 
tion is  here  totally  out  of  place,  because  such  a  will 


*  It  were  better  to  say,  and  this  would  reconcile  Kant  with  his  dis- 
senters and  critics,  that  the  moral  imperative  as  imperative  does  not 
contemplate  solel)'  the  anticipated  sentient  good,  simply  as  good,  but 
anticipates  what  the  choice  would  be  as  morally  good.  But  then, 
what  would  be  chosen?  not  the  choice,  but  the  object  of  choice.  But 
is  the  object  chosen  morally  good,  or  is  it  the  choice  that  is  morally 
good  ? 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  71 

is  already  in  harmony  or  unison  with  the  objective 
law  and  no  conflict  or  dissent  is  conceivable. 

§  38.  In  order  to  enforce  still  further  his  concep- 
tion of  the  authority  of  the  moral  law,  The  Cate- 
Kant  introduces  and  exj^ands  the  dis-  H^potiietjcai 
tinction  between  the  hypothetical  and  imperative. 
the  categorical  imperative.  In  the  first  case,  the  ac- 
tion concerned  is  a  good  as  a  means  of  something 
else;  in  the  second,  it  is  good  in  itself.  In  either  case, 
it  is  a  good  which  determines  the  will.  It  would 
seem  that  "the  good  in  itself"  and  "the  good  with 
respect  to  something  else '"  are  tacitly  conceived  by 
the  author  as  holding  some  sort  of  a  relation  to  one 
another,  else  they  would  not  be  conceived  as  included 
under  the  common  genus  of  a  good  or  goods.  If 
this  were  conceded,  must  not  this  generic  conception 
be  synonymous  with  the  desirable  in  the  largest  or 
widest  sense  of  the  term,  and  if  both  objects  are  desir- 
able must  they  not  both  in  some  way  affect  and  move 
the  sensibilities? 

The  distinction  set  up  between  the  categorical  and 
the  hypothetical  imperative  is  so  obvious  as  scarcely 
to  need  comment  or  explanation.  There  are  im- 
peratives of  skill,  which  simply  require  and  in  a 
sense  command  that  if  a  man  will  accomplish  a 
given    purpose,   he    must    gain    some    capacity   by 


72  kant's  ethics. 

training  of  the  band  or  of  the  eye.  There  is  also 
a  common  end  which  may  be  supposed  to  be  uni- 
versal with  all  rational  beings,  and  that  end  is 
happiness.  For  this  reason  the  hypothetical  im- 
perative, whether  in  its  narrow  or  more  extended 
application,  is  expressed  in  the  form  of  an  asser- 
tion, rather  than  in  that  of  command.  Skill  in 
the  choice  and  use  of  means  to  this  common  end, 
i.e.,  to  man's  highest  well  being,  Kant  contends,  is 
prudence  in  a  broader  or  a  narrower  sense.  Dis- 
tinguished from  both  of  these,  sharply  and  strongly, 
is  the  categorical  imperative,  which  proposes  certain 
actions  (actions  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term,  as 
activities  of  feeling  or  will  and  even  of  disposition 
and  character,  and  impulses  and  dispositions  involv- 
ing habits)  without  any  condition  in  its  implied  or 
express  reference  to  any  end.  This  imperative,  as 
Kant  insists,  concerns  not  any  matter  or  any  in- 
tended or  implied  result  of  an  action,  but  only  the 
form  and  principle  of  the  action,  i.e.,  the  intention 
or  disposition  itself,  be  its  tendency  or  operation 
what  it  may.  This  imperative  is  the  sole  imperative 
which  morality  recognizes.  Hence,  in  his  view,  we 
have  three  kinds  of  obligation,  involving  rules  of 
skill,  counsels  of  prudence,  and  laws  of  morality, 
the  first  two  being  conditional,  and  the  last  manda- 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MORALS.  ?3 

tory.  The  first  two  labor  under  the  disadvantage 
that  we  cannot  always  satisfactorily  determine  the 
conditions  of  human  happiness  for  ourselves  or  for 
others.  To  a  greater  or  less  extent,  our  conclusions 
in  regard  to  them  are  conjectural  and  at  the  best 
are  invested  with  a  higher  or  lower  degree  of  proba- 
bilit3^  But  the  mandates  of  duty  are  unconditional 
and  imperative.  The  first  say,  Do  this  or  that  if  you 
would  be  happy;  the  last,  Do  this  because  the  act  is 
reasonable,  i.e.,  is  morally  right,  or,  In  the  name  of 
reason  do  it,  or  simply,  Do  it. 

§  39.     This  contrast  between  the  two  classes  of 
imperatives    is    expanded    by    Kant    at  Kaut's 
great   length   in   illustrations    which   we  „         ,.       , 

°  »  Conception  of 

need  not  repeat.  His  argument  is  open  Happiness, 
to  a  single  but  important  critical  observation,  viz.: 
That  the  author  in  his  conceptions  of  possible  and 
actual  happiness  confines  himself  altogether  to  the 
external  consequences  of  actions  and  makes  not  the 
least  recognition  of  that  subjective  good  or  hap- 
piness which  attends  the  exercise  of  a  voluntary 
impulse  or  feeling.  Had  he  done  JT5stice  to  this  dis- 
tinction he  would  have  found  it  easy ;.to  distinguish 
between  prudence  and  morality  in  terms  of  volition- 
ized  sensibility  —  pn;dence  respecting  the  external 
consequences  of  a  volition,  and  morality  the  internal 


74  K  A  NT's   ETHICS. 

affections.  The  possibility  of  any  other  terms  of 
contrast  seems  not  to  have  occurred  to  the  author 
at  this  stage  of  his  inquiries.  He  subsequently 
recognizes  this  possibility,  but  in  the  treatise  before 
us,  he  finds  no  alternative  possible  except  between 
the  external  reward  of  the  virtuous  will,  which  he 
limits  to  the  matter  of  conduct,  and  the  categorical 
command  of  the  reason,  which  he  terms  its  form, 
while  the  form  contemplates  rational  or  logical  rela- 
tions only. 

As  Kant  proceeds  with  his  argument  in  support 
of  this  contrast,  he  acknowledges  that  the  difficul- 
ties thicken  about  him.  He  concedes  that  we  can- 
not appeal  to  experience  as  our  arbiter,  because  our 
convictions  are  not  grounded  in  experience.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  our  conviction  of  the  truth  of  this 
distinction  is  confirmed  by  human  experience  and  is 
necessary  in  order  that  experience  may  be  possible. 
Unless  the  categorical  imperative  were  actually  en- 
forced, there  could  be  none  of  that  morality  which 
we  find  to  be  both  real  and  influential  and  neces- 
sary. But  he  reasons  from  the  analogies  of  the 
speculative  reason,  that  if  a  priori  speculative  prin- 
ciples must  be  assumed  as  the  ground  and  explana- 
tion of  speculative  science,  it  is  reasonable  to  sup- 
pose  that   ethics    should    rest    in    like    manner   on 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MORALS.  75 

ultimate  a  priori  principles  of  its  own.  He  urges 
that  if  we  find  it  difficult  to  conceive  the  possibility 
of  the  one  class  of  axioms,  it  ought  to  be  no  matter 
of  wonder  that  the  fundamental  axioms  of  ethics 
should  occasion  equal  and  similar  embarrassment, 
forgetting  that  the  difticulties  of  speculative  philos- 
ophy had  already  driven  him,  tentatively,  at  least, 
into  the  domain  of  the  practical  reason  as  a  city  of 
refuge,  and  that  the  axioms  of  morals  had  been 
accepted  as  truth  and  invested  with  a  sacred  and 
final  authority  in  both  spheres. 

We  have  already  adverted  to  the  views  of  the 
relations  between  ethical  and  speculative  science, 
which  are  conspicuously  characteristic  of  Kant,  and 
to  the  changes  in  these  views  which  can  be  traced  in 
his  successive  treatises.  It  is  a  matter  of  constant 
surprise  that  the  unsatisfactory  workings  of  his 
doctrine  of  tlie  d  priori  ideas  and  principles  of  the 
speculative  reason  did  not  awaken  the  suspicion  that 
the  difficulties  attendant  upon  the  new  set  of  simi- 
lar principles  which  he  provided  for  ethics  might 
indicate  some  common  weakness  latent  in  both.  It 
could  give  little  satisfaction  to  Kant  himself  to  con- 
fess that  "  the  difficulty  of  discerning  the  possi- 
bility of  the  categorical  imperative  is  a  very  pro- 
found   one,"    and  ."  it   is   an   a    priori   synthetical 


76  KANT  S    ETHICS. 

practical  proposition,  and  as  there  is  so  much  diffi- 
culty in  discerning  the  possibility  of  speculative 
propositions  of  this  kind,  it  may  be  readily  supposed 
that  the  difficulty  will  be  no  less  with  the  practical." 
§  40.  But  he  proceeds  to  say,  if  we  cannot  ex- 
Kant  Adopts    plain  the   possibility  of   the   categorical 

the  Criterion      .  .  i    o  • ;       • 

ofConse-         imperative,    we    can    denne    its   import, 

quencesasa  ^^^  j^j^-g  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^  ^^  follows:  "  Act 
Practical 

Rule.  only  on  that  maxim  whereby  thou  canst, 

at  the  same  time,  will  that  it  should  become  a  uni- 
versal law,"  or,  inasmuch  as  the  laws  by  which  effects 
are  produced  characterize  nature,  he  amends  it  thus: 
"  Act  as  if  the  maxims  of  thy  action  were  to  be- 
come by  thy  will  a  law  of  nature."  Here  we  notice 
as  before,  that  both  in  form  and  by  every  one  of 
the  examples  employed  in  illustration,  the  tests  of 
right  conduct  and  of  the  law  of  duty  are  found  by 
Kant  in  the  effects  of  conduct  or  in  the  tendencies  of 
conduct  to  affect  human  well-being,  and  that  the 
euphemistic  phrases  of  the  fitness  of  a  rule  to  be- 
come a  universal  law  can  signify  nothing  less  than 
the  tendencies  of  conduct  with  respect  to  individual 
and  social  welfare.  Thus  interpreted,  the  form  of 
the  moral  law  would  respect  the  intentions  or  the 
voluntary  purposes  or  the  sensibilities  as  animated 
and  controlled  by  the  will,  or  as  thus  brought  into 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF    MORALS.  77 

mutual  relations  —  these  relations  being  always  the 
same  in  matters  which  come  under  the  categorical 
imperative,  i.e..  which  affect  the  disposition  and 
the  character,  while  the  matter  of  human  action, 
inasmuch  as  it  pertains  to  the  external  and  varia- 
ble, the  outward  and  prudential,  is  capable  of  found- 
ing onl}^  probable  and  proximate  and  to  some  extent 
variable  rules  of  conduct. 

After  laying  down  the  principle  cited  above,  Kant 
proceeds  to  illustrate  it  by  four  examples.  The  first 
example  is  that  of  a  man  who  is  prompted  by  de- 
spair to  commit  suicide  :  the  second,  of  one  who 
under  extreme  necessity  borrows  money,  falsely 
promising  to  repay  it ;  the  thii'd,  of  one  who 
wastes  in  self-indulgent  sloth,  superior  capacities  for 
usefulness  to  his  fellow-men  ;  the  fourth,  of  a  man 
who  indulges  selfish  indifference  to  the  miseries  of 
mankind.  The  conduct  of  each  of  these  persons  is 
universally  condemned  as  morally  wrong,  and  why? 
Because  it  is  not  fitted  to  be  a  universal  law;  but 
why?  Because  of  its  more  or  less  certain  effects  or 
tendencies,  were  it  to  be  accepted  and  acted  on  by  all 
men.  That  Kant  should  be  so  utterly  unconscious 
of  the  logic  of  his  own  arguments  is  sufficiently  sur- 
prising. It  is  still  more  strange  that  he  should  be 
totally  unaware  that  in  every  one  of  the  examples 


78  kant's  ethics. 

which  he  cites,  he  makes  use  of  "  tendency  to  promote 
the  general  welfare  "  under  the  fair  title  of  "  fitness 
to  be  a  universal  law  of  nature."  Similarly,  in  en- 
forcing the  duty  of  cultivating  one's  gifts,  he  urges 
that  "as  a  rational  being  he  necessarily  wills  that  his 
faculties  be  developed,  since  they  serve  him  for  all 
sorts  of  possible  purposes  and  have  been  given  him 
for  this  end."  The  most  superficial  reader  does  not 
need  to  be  told  that  here  is  an  argument  from  the 
adaptations  of  nature  with  respect  to  the  end  for 
which  man's  endowments  are  given,  which,  as  an  ul- 
timate ground  of  moi-al  obligation,  had  already  been 
formally  repudiated  by  Kant  as  beyond  man's  ca- 
pacity to  decide  or  even  to  surmise. 

Still  more  grossly  does  he  offend  against  his  pro- 
fessed principles  and  the  entire  spirit  of  his  moral 
teachings,  when  in  the  fourth  case  supposed,  he  ar- 
gues that  a  man  cannot  justify  himself  in  indiffer- 
ence to  the  sorrows  and  wants  of  his  fellow-men,  for 
the  reason  that  "  a  will  that  resolved  this  would  con- 
tradict itself,  inasmuch  as  many  cases  might  occur 
in  which  one  would  have  need  of  the  love  and  sym- 
pathy of  others  and  in  which  by  such  a  law  of  nat- 
ure, springing  from  his  own  will,  he  would  deprive 
himself  of  all  hope  of  the  aid  he  deserves."  How 
strangely  do  these  words  sound  from  Kant !     What 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  79 

a  plump  descent  into  selfish  utilitarianism  is  made 
by  the  usually  high-toned  Kant  !  One  would  hard- 
ly have  expected  this  of  him.  How  singular  that  so 
acute  a  critic  as  Kant  should  first  explain  the  ten- 
dency of  sympathy  to  beget  sympathy  as  a  simple 
consistency  of  reason  with  itself,  involving  no  rela- 
tions of  feeling  !  How  unconsciously  also  does  he 
descend  from  this  thin  air  of  his  transcendental 
axioms  into  earthly  considerations  of  self-regarding 
l)rudence,  without  being  aware  of  the  downward 
plunge,  and  least  of  all  that  he  has  substituted  the 
impulse  from  self-interest  oi*  man's  instinctive  desire 
of  happiness,  for  a  harmony  of  reason  with  itself, 
which,  if  it  means  anything,  can  only  be  the  logical 
law  of  identity  ! 

^  41.  Thus  far  our  philosopher  pei'suades  him- 
self that  he  has  been  concerned  with  the  Relation  of  the 
categorical   intiierative  in  its   ideal  nat-     "'^"    ^  '^^  !° 

^  ^  the  Actual    in 

uve,     without     deciding    whether    it    is  Man. 

ever  actualized  in  man.  And  how  does  he  decide  this 
question?  Not,  as  it  would  seem,  by  any  inquiry 
of  fact,  but  by  some  process  or  assumption  o  priori. 
lest  the  '■  critical  method "'  should  not  be  main- 
tained. Kant  does  not  hesitate  to  assert  that  what 
man  is.  whether  he  is,  or  is  not,  a  rational  or  moral 
being,  has  nothing  to  do  with  deciding  this  question. 


80  kant's  ethics. 

He  contends  most  persistently  that  we  may  not  as- 
sume that  the  essential  constituents  of  manhood 
throw  any  light  upon  the  essential  elements  of 
moral  responsibility  or  the  nature  and  grounds  of 
moral  obligation  or  the  moral  law.  He  urges  that 
since  moral  laws  ought  to  hold  good  for  every  ra- 
tional creature,  they  must  all  be  derived  from  the 
general  concept  of  a  rational  being.  "  and  in  doing 
so.  we  must  not  make  its  principles."  i.e.,  the  princi- 
ples of  the  moral  law,  to  be  "  dependent  on  the  par- 
ticular nature  of  human  reason."  What  the  author 
understood  by  this  distinction  between  "  the  general 
concept  of  a  rational  being"'  and  "the  particular 
nature  of  human  reason "'  is  not  so  clear  as  it  is  that 
he  intended  to  disparage  and  reject  anj''  analysis  of 
the  nature  of  man  as  the  foundation  of.  or  prelim- 
inary to,  the  determination  of  moral  conceptions  in 
general.  We  may  presume  that  what  he  intends  by 
the  phrase,  "  the  particular  nature  of  human  rea- 
son," is  that  modification  of  the  rational  powers 
which  is  occasioned  by  the  emotions  and  their  rela- 
tions to  the  higher  powers.  What  he  would  insist 
on  is  that  moral  law  is  the  same  for  all  moral  be- 
ings, and  that  all  moral  beings  have  a  common  moral 
nature  {i.e.,  as  he  interprets  this,  a  common  rational 
nature),  to  the  exclusion  of  whatever  is  peculiar  to 


THE    METAPHYSICS   OF   MORALS.  81 

the  individual  oi*  the  race,  in  the  way  of  sensibilities 
or  the  relations  which  they  involve.  This  may  be 
admitted;  but  when  he  would  leap  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  moral  relations  are  rational  only,  not  mere- 
l}^  in  their  form  but  in  their  matter,  so  that  neither 
emotion  nor  will  is  required  to  constitute  a  moral 
being,  he  takes  a  leap  in  which  few  will  follow  him, 
and  in  which,  as  it  would  seem,  on  second  thought 
he  would  scarcely  follow  himself.  It  would  seem 
that  no  one  would  contend  more  earnestly  than  he 
that  the  moral  law,  as  rational,  must  presuppose  a 
will  in  every  being  over  whom  it  has  authority;  and 
that  without  a  will,  whether  in  man  or  any  other 
being,  reason  would  neither  discover  nor  enforce 
moral  relations  of  any  kind.  But  if  a  moral  being 
must  be  endowed  with  a  will,  in  order  that  it  may  be 
moral,  why  may  it  not  be  equally  necessary  that  he 
should  be  endowed  with  sensibility  also,  and  why  may 
not  the  several  sensibilities  stand  in  certain  natural, 
even  rational,  relations  to  one  another,  such  as  might 
be  the  conditions  of  the  moral?  Why.  not  only  may 
'  it  not  be  true,  but  why  must  it  not  be  true,  that 
a  sensitive  nature  is  the  essential  condition  and  me- 
dium for  voluntary,  i.e.,  for  moral,  action  and  moral 
responsibility?     Kant  reasons  well  when  he  reasons 

that  certain  sensibilities,  such  as  might  be  supposed 
G 


82  rant's  ethics. 

peculiar  to  human  beings,  are  in  no  sense  essential 
to  moral  responsibility,  e.g.,  some  of  the  human  ap- 
petites or  tastes,  such  as  are  dependent  on  the  body 
or  the  special  physiological  constitution  of  the  hu- 
man race.  But  Kant  reasons  incorrectly  when  he 
excludes,  as  accidents  of  humanity  and  as  non-es- 
sential to  the  discernment  and  enforcement  of  the 
moral  law,  every  species  of  sensibility  whatever  as 
the  possible  subject  of  rational  discrimination  and 
moral  relationship. 

§  42.     Doubtless    in    this  critical   polemic    Kant 
had    in    mind   the    definition    given    by 

A  Life  »  '' 

According  to  the  ancieiits  of  moral  perfection  as  a 
Nature 

life  according  to  nature.  He  frequently 
criticises  this  doctrine  and  protests  against  it,  as 
involving  a  limited  or  a  varying  standard  and 
as  inconsistent  with  his  doctrine  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned and  positive  character  of  the  practical  reason. 
It  would  seem  that  he  might  have  noticed  the  truth 
to  which  we  have  adverted,  viz. :  that  in  respect  of 
monal  relations,  reason  supposes  sensibility  and  its 
relations,  as  truly  as  it  does  the  will,  and  that  with- 
out sensibility  there  can  be  no  aim  or  purpose  for 
reason  in  the  practical  sense  of  lawgiving  end. 
Perhaps  also  —  in  all  probability  it  was  true  in  fact 
—  what  Kant  had  in  mind  in  his  protest  against  the 


THE   METAPItTSICS   OE   MORALS.  83 

psychological  study  of  human  nature,  was  to  express 
his  dissent  from  the  doctrines  of  the  moral  sense,  as  a 
mere  accident  of  human  nature,  or  an  arbitrary  ele- 
ment in  its  constitution,  such  as  would  make  morality 
to  be  a  matter  of  feeling  or  taste  and  in  opposition 
to  which  he  would  set  up  the  universal  reason  as 
the  lawgiver  of  ethical  truth  and  ethical  authority; 
overlooking  the  fact  that  in  doing  this  he  must 
reduce  reason  to  the  mere  relationships  of  formal 
logic,  without  any  practical  significance  of  value  or 
worth.* 

§  43.  And  yet  he  cannot  confine  himself  to 
these  relationships.     Sooner    than  he  is  Analyzes  Hu- 

,,  . , ,        J.    1     •  man  Nature 

aware,  or  rather  without  being  aware  ^,gj.^j^g  pj^  j^ 
of  what  he  does,  he  finds  himself  fol-  ^^'^f^. 
lowing  the  method  of  a  psychological  analysis  of  the 
nature  and  processes  of  reason  which  he  had  seemed 
to  set  aside,  and  proposing  to  himself  the  ques- 
tion, Why  must  all  rational  beings  judge  of  their 
actions  by  maxims  imposed  on  themselves  as  univer- 
sal    laws  ?     This    question    he    answers    thus:    All 

*  The  fact  is  worth  noticing,  that  while  Butler,  on  the  one  kand, 
insists  as  positivelj'  as  does*  Kant  that  the  distinctive  feature  of  the 
moral  faculty  in  man  is  its  authority,  he  affirms  as  positively,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  moral  relations  are  discovered  by  a  reflective 
study  of  the  nature  of  man.  We  may  say  that  metaphysically  Butler 
agrees  with  Kant,  while  psychologically  he  dissents  from  him  most 
widely.    {Of.  §  94.) 


84  .        Kant's  ethics. 

rational  beings  mu.st  not  only  approve  as  rational 
the  means  which  are  adapted  to  ends,  but  also 
the  ends  which  these  means  subserve.  In  other 
words,  the  subjective  grounds  of  rational  actions  are 
desires;  their  objective  grounds  are  motives.  The 
hypothetical  imperative  respects  the  means,  the  cat- 
egorical, the  ends  of  our  actions.  "  All  objects  of 
the  inclinations  have  only  conditional  worth,"  inas- 
much as  we  might  suppose  these  inclinations  not  to 
exist,  in  which  case  their  objects  would  have  no 
Discovers  worth.  Rational  beings  are  indicated 
and  Person-"'^  ^^  nature  as  being  ends  in  themselves, 
aiity.  and    are     consequently    called    persons 

who  can  never  be  regarded  as  means  only,  but 
possess  absolute  and  independent  worth.  An  end 
in  itself  becomes  invested  with  the  authority  of 
a  categorical  imperative,  the  foundation  of  which 
is  the  principle:  "  A  rational  nature  exists  as  an  end 
in  itself,"  and  from  this  the  imperative  follows: 
"  So  act  as  to  treat  humanity,  whether  in  thine  own 
person  or  in  that  of  every  other,  in  every  case  as  an 
end,  withal  never  as  a  means  only," — the  postulate, 
as  it  would  seem,  being  assumed  that  every  rational 
being  regards  his  existence  as  I  do  my  own,  and 
that,  in  the  arrangements   of   nature   and  of  rea- 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  85 

son,  the  realization  of  the  ends  of  each  is  compatible 
with  the  same  by  othei's. 

The  attentive  and  critical  reader  will  not  fail  to 
have  noticed  that  in  these  last  assumptions  Kant 
has  abandoned  forever  the  ground  which  he  had 
taken  in  respect  to  the  impossibility  of  deriving  the 
categorical  imperative  from  a  critical  examination  of 
the  constitution  of  man  and  the  purposes  of  nature 
with  respect  to  man  as  individual  and  social.  In  every 
one  of  these  assumptions,  on  the  other  hand,  he  affirms 
the  possibility  that  the  ends  provided  in  the  consti- 
tution of  every  rational  being  should  be  discerned, 
as  also  the  compatibility  of  the  well-being  or  ra- 
tional welfare  of  the  individual  with  that  of  the 
community.  In  other  words,  Kant  has  returned 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  ancients,  that  the  moral 
law  is  summed  up  in  the  rule  to  act  according  to 
nature,  and  that  man's  nature  can  be  discerned 
and  interpreted,  if,  indeed,  its  supreme  end  and 
adaptations  can  be  understood. 

These  postulates  being  assumed,  we  need  not  ex- 
plain how  they  are  applied  in  detail  in  enforcing 
special  classes  of  duties.  The  examples  selected  by 
Kant  for  illustration  are  the  same  as  those  previ- 
ously used,  viz.:  (1)  The  duty  of  rejecting  suicide; 
(2)  Of  keeping    one's    promises;     (3)  Of  living  an 


S6  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

elevated  personal  life;  (4)  Of  living  a  life  devoted 
to  the  welfare  of  others.  We  need  use  no  argu- 
ment to  show  how  the  assumptions  given  above 
explain  and  enforce  the  several  duties  as  they  arise, 
and  how  they  cannot  be  enforced  without  these,  and 
how  they  are  enforced  by  Kant  himself  after  this 
very  theory. 

We  agree  altogether  with  Kant,  that  our  faith  in 
each  of  the  several  postulates  which  have  been 
stated  in  respect  to  the  constituents  and  the  har- 
mony of  a  universe  of  rational  and  voluntary  per- 
sons, is  an  original  and  necessary  belief.  But  we 
disagree  altogether  with  him  v/hen  he  seems  now 
and  then  to  argue  that  our  faith  in  these  categories 
rests  upon  the  authority  of  the  practical  reason 
as  it  commands  this  faith  as  a  duty,  except  in  the 
vague  and  popular  acceptation,  that  every  man 
acknowledges  the  intellectual  supremacy  of  his  ra- 
tional convictions.  The  speculative  and  the  practi- 
cal reason  cannot  both  be  the  ultimate  foundations 
of  our  philosophical  and  ethical  convictions,  respect- 
ively, notwithstanding  that  Kant  seems  to  inter- 
change his  allegiance  to  each,  without  being  con- 
scious of  the  incompatibilit}^  of  making  each  in 
its  turn  the  cornerstone  of  his  philosphical  creed. 

In  the  present  case  he  argues  from  the  position, 


THE   METAPHYSICS    OF   MORA^  g9 

that  the  principle  that  every  human,  and,  ii--.nd 
every  rational,  being  is  an  end  in  and  for  itself,  is  not 
borrowed  from  experience,  but  is  an  original  and 
rational  axiom.  We  agree  with  him  in  this,  and  also 
in  the  doctrine  that  this  principle  is  essential  alike 
to  rational  philosophy  and  sound  ethics.  We  disa- 
gree with  him  in  the  occasional  assertion,  and  in  the 
general  tendency  of  his  argument,  that  this  belief 
has  its  foundation,  not  in  the  speculative,  but  in  the 
practical  reason.  From  this  rational  postulate  which 
we  hold  in  common,  it  follows,  that  the  ethical  will 
or  command  of  duty,  which  every  man  accepts  and 
imposes  on  himself,  is  a  universally  legislative  law, 
every  moral  agent  being  at  once  the  giver  and  sub- 
ject of  the  law  as  he  imposes  and  accepts  it  for  him- 
self and  also  imposes  it  on  and  exacts  it  from  every 
other  rational  being. 

We  may  not  conclude,  as  we  have  already  inti- 
mated, that  Kant,  in  using  this  Ian-  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^ 
guage  and  availing  himself  of  these  re-  Formally 

"       "  °  _  Abandon  the 

lations,  has  formally  abandoned  his  dis-  categorical 
tinctive    position,  that  the   law  of  duty 
is  a  simple  and  categorical  command,  which  never 
appeals  to  the  speculative  reason,  and  takes  no  ac- 
count of  the  feelings  or    the    relations  which  they 
involve,  but   is   derived   from  the  authority  of  the 


88  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

practical  reason  alone.  On  the  contrary,  he  returns 
to  it  anew,  and  enforces  it  by  additional  arguments 
under  a  new  appellation  of  the  aiUonomij  of  the  will, 
or  the  direct  or  sovereign  authority  of  duty  as  a 
rational  law,  as  contrasted  with  its  heteronomy,  or 
subjection  to  some  other  impulse  besides  itself.  And 
yet  here  he  insists  as  before  tlmt  duty  does  not  rest 
on  the  feelings  or  inclinations,  but  on  the  relations 
of  rational  beings  to  the  end  of  their  being  and 
actions. 

§  44.  In  arguing  from  rational  ends  to  person- 
And  yet  He  ality,  our  author  treads  upon  ground 
siilfts'^HiJ  which  is  new  to  him.  though  not  new 
Ground.  ^q   Aristotle  or    other  philosophers  wlio 

had  recognized  the  ends  of  human  nature  as  a 
fruitful  and  fundamental  conception  in  ethical  phil- 
osophy. But  while  he  acknowledges  the  reality  of 
^finality,  he  does  not,  however,  discuss  its  nature  or 
its  authority;  he  simply  assumes  its  trustworthiness 
and  its  fruitfulness,  without  even  recognizing  the  fact 
tliat  in  his  speculative  system  it  had  previously  met 
with  a  most  inhospitable  reception  at  his  hands;  his 
aim  being  apparently  to  reconcile  it  with  the  views 
which  he  had  already  expounded.  He  first  reasserts 
that  the  will  is  conceived  as  a  faculty  of  determining 
itself  to  action  in  accordance  with  the  conception  of 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MORALS.  89 

certain  laws.  And  such  a  faculty  can  only  be  found 
in  rational  beings.  Then,  for  the  first  time  in  the 
treatise  he  says,  "  Now  what  serves  the  will  as  the 
objective  ground  of  its  self-determination  is  the  end, 
and  if  this  is  assigned  by  reason  alone  it  must  hold 
for  all  rational  beings."  Here  again  we  have  either 
the  studied  or  the  unconscious  assertion  that  if  ends 
are  rational  and  discerned  by  the  reason  they  exclude 
all  elements  of  feeling,  and,  it  would  seem,  all  appeals 
to  the  will.  As  if  to  secure  this  main  position  by 
every  possible  consideration,  he  makes  a  distinction 
between  a  spring  or  subjective  ground  of  desire  and  a 
motive  as  an  objective  ground  of  volition,  in  order  to 
enforce  the  distinction  between  subjective  and  ob- 
jective ends,  and  again  between  practical  precepts 
or  motives  as  being  formal,  when  abstracted  from 
all  subjective  ends,  and  material  when  they  assume 
and  addi-ess  such  ends.  He  insists  that  all  ends 
which  are  derived  from  the  effects  of  actions  are 
relative  and  occasion  the  hypothetical  imperative, 
while  all  motives  that  have  absolute  worth  suppose 
no  springs  of  action  or  desire,  but  are  simply  ra- 
tional and  formal,  and  enforced  by  the  categorical 
imperative.  That  there  are  such  motives,  he  argues 
from  the  distinction  between  things  which  have  ''  a 
relative  value  as  means,"  and  rational  beings  which 


()0  KANT^S   ETHICS. 

are  "called  persons"  "because  their  very  nature 
points  them  out  as  ends  in  themselves  "  having  abso- 
T?.f    oif        l^^te  worth.     We  assent  to  this  distinc- 

does  not  fjon,  and  recQcrnize  its  supreme  import- 

Exclude  Eeia-  ^  '■ 

tionstothe  ance  in  ethics,  but  we  raise  these  ques- 
tions: Whether  a  person  who  is  an  end 
to  himself,  for  that  reason  finds  no  interest  in  the 
several  ends,  even  the  highest,  which  inspire  his  ac- 
tions; — whether  the  fact  that  he  assumes  these  ends 
to  be  final  and  supreme  in  the  kingdom  of  ends,  and 
is  interested  in  them  as  such,  is  inconsistent  with  the 
fact,  or  rather  explains  the  fact,  that  they  are  em- 
phatically and  supremely  rational; — whether,  on  the 
contrary,  the  fact  that  they  are  rational  does  not 
arise  from  the  fact  that  they  are  distinctively  and 
emphatically  moving  of  or  motiving  to  the  respon- 
sive sensibility  ;  whether,  in  short,  a  rational  na- 
ture, in  the  sense  of  an  insensitive  nature,  can  be 
an  end  to  itself;  and  finally,  whether  the  persistent 
attempts  of  Kant  to  interpret  the  rational  as  exclud- 
ing the  emotional  are  not  invariably  mere  flights  of 
language  in  the  excitement  of  which  the  analyst 
leaves  his  logic  behind. 

We  argue  the  question  still  further,  whether  the 
phrase.  "  a  kingdom  of  ends,"  which  is  rightly  con- 
ceived as  a  community  of  rational  beings  acting  in 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MOKALS.  91 

hai'mony  with  and  subordination  to  one  another, 
according  to  claims  of  duty  and  on  grounds  of 
duty — whether  such  a  kingdom  could  be  assumed 
unless  the  value  and  the  worth  of  its  constituent 
elements  were  capable  of  being  translated  into  terms 
of  feeling,/.^.,  unless  they  interested  the  human  sen- 
sibilities. 

The  further  questions  also  suggest  themselves, 
What  is  the  relation  of  the  will  as  autonomous,  or 
self-law-giving,  to  the  practical  reason  and  its  cat- 
egorical imperative y  Are  the  will  and  practical  rea- 
son regarded  by  Kant  as  faculties  of  the  soul,  and  if 
so,  what  are  the  appropriate  functions  of  each? 
What  are  the  relations  of  the  motives  which  each  is 
said  to  present  as  objective,  when  contrasted  with 
the  springs  of  action  which  are  confessedly  subjec- 
tive? Can  there  be  a  moving  object,  whether  sensi- 
tive or  rational,  which  does  not  also  arouse  or  inter- 
est the  feelings,  and  if  so,  is  not  the  contrast  between 
the  higher  and  lower  motives  to  be  found  solely  in 
the  natural  quality  of  the  emotions  and  desires  which 
they  excite,  as  also  in  the  results  which  they  accom- 
plish, and  consequently  in  their  relative  value,  in- 
volving their  natural  and  moral  worth? 

§  45.  What  are  Kant's  views  of  the  will  in 
these  applications  it  is  not  easy  to  determine.     We 


93  kant's  ethics. 

ask,  again  and  again,  Does  he  mean  by 

Kant's   Views 

of  the  Will       the    will    an    endowment   or    faculty   of 

Indelinite.  •■     t       i.  -^i      .1 

human  nature  coordinate  with  the  rea- 
son or  the  intellect,  and  possibly  —  why  not?  —  with 
the  sensibility,  or  does  he  absorb  the  reason  into  the 
will  by  making  the  person  to  be  the  reasonable  will, 
and  leave  the  sensibility  unconsidered  at  all,  regard- 
ing it  as  a  pariah  in  the  spiritual  organism  of  forces 
and  ends?  The  latter  seems  to  be  the  view  which 
he  would  take.  That  he  usually  connects  and  almost 
blends  the  reason  with  the  will  is  evident  from  the 
terminology  and  logic  of  his  argument.  As  we  have 
already  noticed,  the  will,  whose  autonomy  and  hete- 
ronoray  he  discusses,  is  another  name  for  the  moral 
person  as  self-regulating  in  the  one  instance,  i.e.,  as 
finding  the  moral  law  in  his  own  internal  constitu- 
tion, whatever  that  may  be;  or,  in  the  other,  as  deriv- 
ing both  law  and  impulse  from  any  source  motives 
which  may  address  some  inferior  sensibility.  The 
use  of  this  peculiar  phraseology  adds  nothing  to  his 
argument,  and  it  need  detain  us  no  longer  than  to 
direct  the  attention  to  the  singular  indefiniteness  of 
meaning  which  Kant  attaches  to  the  term  "  will,"  and 
by  which  he  mystifies  his  reader  without  adding  either 
to  the  clearness  or  the  force  of  his  own  theoiy. 

It  is  not  exactly  true  or  just  to  say  that  Kant 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MOKALS.  03 

finds  no  reason  foi'  using  the  phrase,  "the  hete- 
ronomy  of  the  will,"  inasmuch  as  under  this  gen- 
eral title  he  subjects  to  a  brief  review  the  several 
theories  of  morals  in  which  he  finds  this  doctrine 
to  be  exemplified.  All  these  theories  in  his  view 
are  either  empirical  or  rational,  the  first  being 
founded  on  simple  feeling,  either  physical  or 
moral,  or  the  principle  of  happiness;  and  the  last  on 
the  principle  of  perfection,  either  as  a  rational 
conception  of  a  possible  ideal,  or  as  exemplified 
in  or  enforced  by  the  will  of  God.  Under  the 
first  is  classed  the  theory  of  ultimate  happiness 
and  the  theory  of  the  moral  sense;  under  the  sec- 
ond, the  theories  of  perfection  as  a  rational  con- 
ception and  as  divinely  commanded.  Of  the  ulti- 
mate grounds  of  obligation  which  he  thinks  are 
found  in  each  of  these  pairs  of  theories,  the  author 
rejects  the  doctrine  of  ultimate  happiness  as  being 
selfish  and  arbitrary,  for  the  reasons  already  given. 
The  theory  of  a  moral  sense  he  rejects  as  depend- 
ent on  an  arbitrary  constitution,  though  he  lands 
it  as  unselfish,  while  the  theory  of  the  divine  com- 
mand he  condemns  as  being  arbitrary  and  change- 
able. 

Here  the  author  ends  his  argument,  having  proved 
to  his  own  satisfaction  that  the  universally  receivil 


94  kant's  ethics. 

doctrines  of  practical  morality  imply  the  categorical 
imperative  and  the  autonomy  of  the  trill.  These  two 
metaphysical  foundations  of  morals  he  accepts  as 
established  by  this  analysis. 

§  46.  We  have  already  in  passing  noticed  the  ob- 
jections which  might  be  urged  to  the  use 
E^o  Over-  o^  these  and  kindred  phrases,  in  place  of 
looked.  ^jjg    personal    Ego,   which   in    our    view 

can  alone  be  accepted  as  the  moral  lawgiver  over 
the  individual  will,  or  can  enforce  the  moral  law  of 
the  consenting  universe.  The  scepticism  and  denials 
of  Kant's  speculative  theory  in  respect  to  iioumena, 
both  material  and  psychical,  had  unfortunately  cut 
him  off  from  the  possibility  of  recognizing  the  per- 
sonal Ego  as  anything  more  than  a  logical  fiction, 
and  the  attempt  to  find  a  substitute  for  it  in  the 
categorical  imperative  of  the  practical  reason  can 
only  be  regarded  as  a  logical  makeshift  such  as  might 
give  plausibilit}^  to  the  platitudes  of  a  sentimental 
morality  or  the  Protean  forms  of  some  imaginative 
metaphysical  hy|)olhesis. 

The  unsatisfactory  character  of  the  new  elements 
in  Kant's  system,  which  we  have  noticed,  is  made 
especially  manifest  in  his  attempts  to  solve  the  four 
practical  questions  which  he  had  previously  pro- 
posed.    Kant's    second    attempt    to    answer    these 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  95 

questions  in  the  terms  of  his  enlarged  theory  de- 
cisively proves  that  what  he  calls  rationality  and  the 
doctrine  of  ends  involve  sensibility,  and  that  the 
highest  ends  always  imply  the  demands  of  tlie 
noblest  feelings  —  in  short,  that  worth  and  value  are 
terms  which  can  have  no  import,  unless  the  emo- 
tions are  appealed  to. 

In  the    tliifd     or  last  section,   Kant  attempts  to 
effect  a  transition  from  the    Metaphys-  Transition 

ics  of  Morals  to  the  Critique  of  Practical  fi^o'"  the  Meta- 
physics of 
Reason.     That  is,  he  attempts    to   show  Morals  to  the 

, ,  .  ,  •   ,     1        J 1  •    1      ,       Critique  of 

how  the  conceptions  which  he  thinks  he  Practical 
has  discovered  to  be  essential  to  moral  ^''^^°"- 
science  as  such,  may  be  justified  by  a  critical  exami- 
nation of  the  Practical  Reason.  By  the  practical  rea- 
son he  must  understand  the  human  intelligence  as 
concerned  with  ethical  conceptions,  or  the  reason  so 
far  as  it  deals  with  human  action.  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  Kant  has  hitherto  persistently 
refused  to  find  in  the  constitution  of  human  nature 
the  ultimate  explanation  for  ethical  phenomena  or 
ethical  ideas,  for  the  reason  that  this  process  would 
seem  to  found  scientific  truth,  which  in  its  nature  is 
permanent  and  universal,  upon  what  might  be  con- 
sidered as  the  arbitrary  and  mutable  constitution  of 
man.     As  contrasted  with  this  source  of  knowledge 


96  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

and  its  results,  Kant  proposes  the  critical  method, 
which  should  test  the  pure  rational  faculty  by  means 
of  its  products  in  human  knowledge,  and  infer  the 
nature  and  authority  of  human  reason  from  these 
products.  Kant's  problem  would  be  as  follows: 
Given  a  certain  kind  of  knowledge  as  trustworthy 
and  universally  accepted,  to  examine  its  elements  or 
products  and  find  in  them  a  method  for  interpreting 
these  truths  and  the  warrant  for  accepting  them. 
Now,  we  find  in  science  of  every  kind,  and,  indeed, 
in  all  human  experience,  certain  postulates  and  as- 
sumptions which  command  intellectual  confidence 
and  give  law  to  human  action.  In  these  conceptions 
and  principles  we  find  the  vouchers  for  our  inter- 
pi'etation  of  the  merit  and  authority  of  hximan 
reason,  both  speculative  and  practical;  the  specula- 
tive i-eason  giving  us  the  norms  and  principles  of 
speculative  science,  and  the  practical  the  faiths 
which  command  and  control  our  conduct.  If  now 
our  critical  analysis  of  the  metaphysical  conceptions 
of  ethics  is  correct,  we  shall  learn  what  are  the 
axioms  and  what  is  the  nature  of  the  practical 
reason.  There  are  not  two  Reasons  in  man,  he 
graciously  informs  us,  however.  Though  we  speak 
of  the  Speculative  and  the  Practical,  the  two  are  one 
and  the  same,  and  the  principles  of  the  one  must  be 


THE    METAPHYSICS   OF    MORALS.  97 

assumed  to  be  consistent,  if  they  are  not  identical, 
with  those  of  the  other.  Hence  our  question  is 
legitimate,  "  How  can  we  effect  a  transition  from 
the  metaphysical  conceptions  of  morals  as  we  find 
them  in  human  experience,  to  a  critical  and  scien- 
tific knowledge  of  the  intellect  ?  "  It  should  not  be 
forgotten  here  that  Kant  had  already  subjected  the 
scientific  reason  to  a  critical  examination  in  his 
first  famous  Critique,  and  had  also  written  his  con- 
fident, if  not  defiant.  Prolegomena  to  All  Future  Met- 
aphysics. It  ought  not  to  surprise  us  that  he  should 
imagine  that  these  inquiries  had  already  determined 
the  reach  and  trustworthiness  of  the  same  reason 
when  applied  to  ethical  distinctions,  and  that  he 
should  use  their  results  to  solve  the  difficulties  and 
answer  the  inquiries  which  he  might  encounter  in 
his  analysis  of  ethical  or  practical  phenomena. 
We  shall  find  that  his  explanations  are  not  wanting 
in  ingenuity,  even  if  they  fail  to  produce  conviction. 
§  47.  Kant  begins  with  the  concept  of  the  Will 
and  its  freedom  as  the  ground  of  its  Kant  Returns 
autonomy.  He  finds  that  the  will  is  a  ."^j^^*j  J, 
causality  peculiar  to  rational  beings  in  Freedom, 
being  free  from,  or  independent  of,  an}^  agency 
foreign  to  itself.  This  definition  of  freedom  is  nega- 
tive, however,  and  yet  it  involves  the  consequence 


98  kant's  ethics. 

til  at  the  will  is  a  law  to  itself,  finding  "the  reasons 
for  its  action  in  its  own  nature.  An  absolutely 
good  will,  moreover,  is  that  whose  maxim  or  act- 
ually accepted  rule  or  principle  of  action  may 
always  be  regarded  as  a  universal  law  for  all  ra- 
tional beings,  every  one  of  whom  is  also  assumed  to 
be  free. 

But  every  such  being,  so  far  as-  he  is  rational, 
must  also  take  an  interest  in  duty,  in  order  to  re- 
spond to  its  claims.  As  a  sensitive  being,  he  should 
also  have  an  intei'est  in  the  actions  which  duty  com- 
mands, but  the  two  interests  are  of  a  different  sort. 
The  one  of  these  interests,  however,  does  not  exclude 
the  other,  the  obligatory  *  not  being  incompatible 
with  the  desirable. 

The  next  point  which  is  made  by  Kant  is,  that 
while  we  are  not  directly  conscious  of  freedom  as  a 
psychological  fact,  and  cannot  in  tJiis  way  prove  it  to 
be  an  endowment  of  ourselves  or  others,  or  of  human 
nature,  there  are  reasons  why  we  must  yet  assume 
it  to  be  a  universal  endowment  of  ourselves  and  our 

*  Here  the  critical  inquirer  would  doubtless  iuterpoee  with  the 
question,  whether  the  response  of  the  will  to  the  imperative  of  the 
reason,  or  to  the  original  motive  which  is  the  ground  of  the  moral 
command,  may  not  and  must  not  be  a  response  of  feeling.  This  last, 
we  have  already  seen,  Kant  positively  and  pertinaciously  denies, 
saying,  If  reason  recognizes  or  enforces  any  motion  of  sensibility,  it 
can  no  longer  be  reason,  and  if  it  appeals  to  desire,  it  will  no  longer 
be  an  imperative. 


THE   METAfHYSICS   OF   MOKALS.  99 

fellows.  It  is  not  interested  feeling  alone  which 
urges  me  to  action,  but  there  is  an  obligation  to 
take  an  interest,  an  ought  which  every  rational 
being  must  acknowledge.  This  holds  for  every 
rational  being  so  far  as  reason  influences  or  controls 
his  acts.  For  all  those  beings  wlio,  like  men,  are 
also  endowed  with  sensibility,  and  in  whom  there  is 
not  a  ready  res^jonse  to  reason,  hut  a  reluctant  sensi- 
hiJitij,  this  objective  rational  necessity  becomes  an 
ought,  implying  a  can,  while  the  subjective  necessity 
{e.g..  of  the  sensibility)  differs  from  the  objective. 
These  Kant  bids  us  take  as  ultimate  facts,  though 
we  cannot  explain  them. 

It  is  true  that  Kant  here  concedes  that  we  can 
and  do  take  an  interest  in  our  own  personal  attain- 
ments, i.e..  "  We  can  be  interested  in  being  worthy  of 
happiness  without  the  motive  of  participating  in 
the  happiness."  And  yet,  this  experience,  and  the 
prospect  of  it,  is  only  an  attestation  of  that  human 
weakness  under  which  we  are  not,  and  cannot 
be,  independent  of  all  consideration  of  happiness, 
Kant  is  also  aware  that  here  is  a  circle  from  which 
it  is  not  easy  to  escape.  It  is  the  old  difficulty  of 
conceiving  that  the  action  which  is  worthy  of  hap- 
piness should  not  of  itself  be  regarded  as  desirable, 
and  thus  become  an  object  of  desire  at  the  same  time 


100  kakt's  ethics. 

that  it  is  clothed  with  oblij^'ation.  So,  also,  he 
admits  that  in  the  order  of"  ends  and  adaptation 
we  may  conceive  ourselves  subject  to  moral  law, 
because  we  are  convinced  that  we  are  free. 

§  48.    Prom  this  dilemma  we  may  perhaps  deliver 
The  Man  ourselves  by  asking  whether  it  does  not 

*  °"'"''""        arise  from  our  looking  at  the  same  sub- 

aiid  Man  * 

Phenomenal,  ject  from  dift'erent  points  of  view  —  i.e.,  as 
we  consider  ourselves  as  phenomenal  so  far  as  ob- 
jects affect  us,  i.e.,  move  our  sensibilities,  but  as 
tln'jifjs  in  themselves,  so  far  as  we  respond  to  the 
moral  law  —  and  whether  the  same  object-matter 
may  not  at  one  time  address  the  feelings  and  at 
another  the  reason.  He  avers  that  "  We  can 
never  know  objects  speculatively  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  but  only  as  they  affect  us";  while 
yet  "Man  must  necessarily  suppose  something 
else  as  their  basis,  namely,  his  Ego.  whatever  its 
characteristics  in  itself  may  be.  *  *  *  In  respect 
to  perceptions  and  the  receptivity  of  sensations, 
he  may  reckon  himself  as  belonging  to  the  world 
of  sense;  but  in  respect  to  his  pure  activity,  and 
that  which  reaches  consciousness  immediately  and 
not  through  the  affections  of  the  senses,  he  must 
reckon  himself  as  belonging  to  the  intellectual 
world,  of  which,  however,  he  has  no  further  knowl- 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF   MORALS.  101 

edge"  than  that  it  is  a  fact.  "Now  man  finds  in 
himself  a  faculty  by  which  he  distinguishes  himself 
from  everything  else,  even  from  himself  as  affected 
by  objects,  and  that  is  reason."  It  follows  that  a 
rational  being  regards  himself  and  all  his  actions 
from  two  points  of  view:  "First,  so  far  as  he  belongs 
to  the  world  of  sense  and  finds  himself  subject  to 
the  laws  of  nature  (this  being  heteronoiiij/) ;  secondly, 
as  belonging  to  the  intelligible  world,  under  laws 
which,  being  independent  of  nature,  have  their 
foundations,  not  in  experience,  but  in  the  autonomy 
of  the  reason  only."  So  far  as  we  conceive  ourselves 
free,  we  transfer  ourselves  into  the  world  of  under- 
standing, and  recognize  the  autonomy  of  the  will; 
whereas,  so  far  as  we  consider  ourselves  as  under 
obligation,  we  regard  ourselves  as  belonging  to  the 
world  of  sense,  but  also  to  the  world  of  understand- 
ing, the  sensibility  resisting  and  the  reason  command- 
ing. Now,  it  is  evident  if  there  were  two  worlds,  of 
sense  and  understanding  respectively,  they  could 
have  no  common  relations  and  no  bond  of  connection 
whatever.  "Since,  however,  the  world  of  under- 
standing contains  the  foundation  of  the  world  of 
sense,  and  consequently  of  its  laws  also,  and  accord- 
ingly gives  laws  to  the  will,"  the  reason,  here  called 
the  understanding,  assumes  the  right  to  command 


103  Kant's  ethics. 

the  sense-impulses  by  tlie  catecrorical  imperative. 
Hei'e  we  encounter  the  reason,  viz. :  the  practical 
I'eason,  with  its  synthetic  imperative  a  priori.  It 
should  be  remembered,  however,  that  obligation  pre- 
supposes the  reluctant  impulses  of  sense,  and  so  in 
every  case  there  must  be  conflict  between  the  two, 
since  obligation  can  only  be  felt  when  the  autonomous 
will  encounters  the  resisting  sensibility.  It  is  not  to 
be  forgotten,  however,  that  the  reason  not  only  asserts 
its  natural  authority  as  reason  over  sense,  but  that, 
as  this  authority  is  responded  to  as  a  fitness  to  be  a 
universal  law,  it  awakens  the  feeling  of  respect,  it 
being  always  remembered,  however,  that  the  rela- 
tion of  fitness  to  control  precedes  and  occasions,  but 
never  follows,  the  feeling  of  worth  or  desirableness. 
§  49.  It  should  also  be  observed  that  the  freedom 
of  the  will,  according  to  Kant,  is  not  psy- 
Freedom  chologically  conceivcd  as  the  capacity  to 

still  More 

Exactly  choose  between  two  or  more  objects  which 

address  the  sensibilities,  but  signifies 
only  that  freedom  from  the  impulses  of  the  feelings, 
which  necessarily  belongs  to  any  act  ivhich  responds 
to  the  commands  of  reason.  The  will  itself  is  the 
capacity  to  respond  to  these  commands,  independ- 
ently of,  i.e..,  with  freedom  from,  the  impulses  of  sense. 
The  evidence  for  the  reality  of  freedom   is  found 


THE   METAPHYSICS   OF    MORALS.  103 

not  in  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  but  solely  in 
the  fact  that  it  is  implied  by  the  commands  of  reason, 
and  is  accepted  by  the  mind  as  an  a  priori  truth. 

The  order  of  thought  by  which  this  freedom  is 
assented  to,  and  the  subject-matter  of  which  it  is 
affirmed,  may  be  thus  stated.  The  practical  reason 
proposes  to  the  will  a  maxim  that  is  fit  to  be  a 
universal  law.  The  man  addressed,  so  far  as  he 
is  reason,  assents,  therein  exercising  his  practical 
capacity  to  know  things  as  they  are,  and  hence  the 
law  is  invested  with  final  and  supreme  authority. 
So  far  as  the  sensibility  is  concerned,  it  apprehends 
and  assents  to  objects  as  they  aifect  the  feelings, 
the  objects  varying  with  the  varying  sensibility 
which  they  address.  Hence  the  man  oscillates  be- 
tween the  proper  self,  the  self  of  the  reason,  and  the 
self  of  the  sensibilities,  the  noumenal  and  the  phe- 
nomenal. The  reason,  however,  has  no  proper 
knowledge  of  entities  in  a  positive  form,  such  knowl- 
edge being  limited  to  the  senses,  the  reason  presup- 
posing another  order  of  existence,  which  is  super- 
sensible, and  by  this  very  circumstance  is  exempt 
from  the  law  of  cause  and  effect. 

It  would  seem  from  this  statement  that  reason 
gives  the  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves  so  far 
as  that  they  exist,  but  gives  us  no  knowledge  of  what 


104  kant's  ethics. 

the}'  are,  because  this  would  imply  a  knowledge  of 
the  laws  under  which  they  act  as  phenomena,  iu 
obedience  to  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect.  This 
apparent  contradiction  was  recognized  by  Kant,  but 
he  attempts  to  set  it  aside  by  the  consideration  that 
behind  the  appearance  or  the  phenomena  of  the 
sensibility,  as  obeying  the  law  of  natural  causation, 
there  must  lie  at  their  root  (though  hidden)  the 
things  in  themselves,  which  we  cannot  expect  will 
be  governed  by  the  same  laws. 

§  50.  While  thus  Kant  cannot  and  does  not  pro- 
Kant  fess  to  explain  the  freedom  of  the  will 
that  the  ^^Y  farther  than  by  showing  that  it  is 
Moral  Law       ^^^^  impossible,  he  urges  that  we  cannot 

Affects  the  i  o 

Sensibilities,  explain  another  fact  equally  undeniable, 
i.e.,  the  fact  that  the  moral  law  affects  the  sensibil- 
ities of  men.  That  man  takes  some  interest  in  this 
law  he  does  not  deny,  although  he  i-ejects  the  doc- 
trine, in  whatever  form  it  may  be  held,  that  this 
interest  is  the  foundation  of  the  moral  judgments, 
or  their  authority.  He  insists,  however,  that  the 
reason  has  the  power  to  infuse  a  pleasure  into  the 
soul  at  the  fulfilment  of  duty,  i.e.,  directly  to  affect 
the  sensibility  painfully  or  pleasantly.  How  this 
can  be  he  does  not  explain.  Indeed,  he  asserts  that 
such  a  fact  must  be  inexplicable  {i.e.,  the  fact  that 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MOKALS.  105 

a  thought  can  awaken  pleasure  or  pain).  The  exist- 
ence of  such  a  causal  power  is  itself  incapable  of  any 
solution.  The  only  suggestion  which  he  can  give  is 
that  the  sensibility,  with  the  phenomenal  in  general 
and  all  its  relations,  is  necessarily  subordinated  to 
the  thing  in-itself  and  its  possible  relations.  And 
yet  of  the  thing-in-itself  with  its  interior  and  e.x- 
terior  relations,  we  confessedly  know  nothing  beyond 
the  phenomenal  effects  in  which  it  is  manifested 
under  the  laws  of  cause  and  effect.  It  were  most 
presumptuous,  however,  he  suggests,  for  us  to  assert 
that  it  has  no  other  laws  than  these.  The  authority 
of  the  moral  law,  the  suitableness  of  its  maxims  to 
be  universal,  the  reasonableness  of  "  a  kingdom  of 
ends,"  all  require  the  reality  of  moral  freedom  as 
their  subjective  counterpart. 

He  urges  that  these  ultimate  facts  in  the  actual  or 
possible  constitution  of  things  must  all  be  assumed. 
They  cannot  be  explained,  but  they  are  themselves 
necessary  in  order  to  explain  the  phenomena  of 
human  experience.  It  cannot  be  reasonably  urged 
against  them,  that  they  are  unconditioned  or  inde- 
pendent, for  wherever  we  go  we  must  encounter 
certain  ultimate  facts  or  truths,  whether  these  are 
found  in  the  will  of  the  Creator,  the  constitution  of 
things,  or  the  behests  of  reason.     Similarly,  Kant 


106  Kant's  ethics. 

would  say  that  he  refers  us  to  the  practical  reason 
as  the  ultimate  and  the  unconditioned  moral  element 
in  the  careful  critique  of  which  he  expects  to  find 
the  solution  of  all  the  problems  of  ethics,  as  by  the 
examination  of  the  pure  I'eason  he  had  essayed  to 
explain  the  ultimate  asseverations  of  speculative 
truth. 

Here  he  leaves  us,  at  the  end  of  his  attempt  to 
bring  into  distinct  apprehension  and  bold  relief  the 
principal  metaphysical  concepts  which  are  at  the 
foundation  of  ethical  science.  These  concepts,  thus 
developed  by  the  analytic  method,  he  proposes  sub- 
sequently to  explain  by  a  critical  examination  of  the 
pi'actical  reason,  which  should  render  a  service  to 
ethics  similar  to  that  which  he  had  hoped  to  derive 
from  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  in  the  interest  of 
speculative  science. 

The  conclusion  which  he  reaches,  and  in  which  he 
rests  for  the  time,  is  the  following:  Though  we 
cannot  explain  or  reconcile  the  ultimate  concepts 
or  assumptions  of  the  practical  reason  and  the  sci- 
ence of  ethics,  we  can  explain  their  incomprehensibil- 
ity. This  incomprehensibility  is  similar  to  that 
which  had  been  reached  in  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  as  characteristic  of  the  principles  of  specula- 
tive science.     It  arises  from  the  axiomatic  or  dosrmatic 


THE    METAPHYSICS    OF    MORALS.  107 

character  of  certain  irreconcilable  or  unadjustable 
a  priori  elements,  all  of  which  must  necessarily  be 
assumed  in  order  to  explain  the  possibility  of  human 
experience  —  the  experience  in  the  one  case  being 
the  experience  of  knowledge,  in  the  other  the  expe- 
rience of  duty. 

Whether  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  when 
prosecuted,  will  fulfil  the  anticipations  of  its  author, 
whether  it  will  be  equally  successful  with  this  pre- 
liminary essay  on  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals,  or 
more  so,  remains  to  be  seen.  We  must  look  forward 
with  interest  to  its  solution  of  the  problem  which  it 
has  imposed  upon  itself,  viz.:  to  find  in  the  postu- 
lates of  the  practical  reason  not  merely  the  synthetic 
principles  a  priori  which  shall  serve  as  a  foundation 
for  ethical  science,  but  which  shall  also,  through 
ethics,  peiform  the  additional  service  which  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  has  shown  to  be  so  neces- 
sary, and  yet  so  impossible,  for  speculative  philoso- 
phy. 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.* 

§  51.  The  reader  of  the  preface  to  this  treatise 
Preface  and  should  not  fail  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact 
Introduction,  ^j^^^  -^  ^^^^  published  seven  years  after  the 
Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  and  three  years  after 
the  Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Metaphysics  oif 
Morals.  Its  author  might  very  reasonably  suppose 
that  his  readers  were  familiar  with  both  these  trea- 
tises, and  the  place  of  each  in  the  development  of 
his  philosophical  system.  The  remarks  made  in 
both  preface  and  introduction  are  obviously  designed 
to  recall  distinctly,  and  to  reimpress  forcibly  the 
conclusions  which  he  supposed  himself  to  have 
reached,  involving,  as  the  attempt  necessarily  did,  a 
short  review  of  his  entire  system,  and  a  series  of 
short  and  sharp  statements  of  its  distinctive  prin- 
ciples. No  one  who  reads  these  two  papers  atten- 
tively can  doubt  what  his  leading  positions  were  in 
respect  to  the  most  important  questions  which  he 
had  proposed  to  consider  and  answer. 

*  Die  Kritilc  der  Pralitisclien  Vernunft. 
108 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PKACTICAL    REASON.       109 

He  begins  by  explaining  why  he  entitles  the  pres- 
ent treatise  the  Critique  of  the  Practical 

Practical,  not 

Reason,  and  not  the  Critique  of  the  Pure  Pure  anA 
Practical  Reason,  and  gives  the  follow- 
ing: That  if  there  is  or  can  be  a  reason  that  is  truly 
practical,  it  must  necessarily  be  pure,  that,  is  a 
priori  in  its  positions,  inasmuch  as  it  must  begin 
with  an  ultimate,  actual  fact,  the  fact  of  freedom, 
and  this  in  its  very  nature  is  involved  in  an  uncon- 
ditioned and  an  unconditional  imperative.  Now, 
the  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  the  author  proceeds 
to  urge,  has  shown  by  its  analysis  of  all  higher 
human  knowledge  that  it  must  involve  an  a  priori 
element,  called  the  unconditioned.  And  yet  of  this 
t(  priori  element,  the  speculative  reason  does  not 
and  cannot  affirm  objective  reality. 

Qncere,  here  and  always:  Why  does  it  not?  Does 
it  not  in  fact?  Why  does  not  the  analysis  which 
shows  the  unconditioned  to  be  subjectively  necessary 
in  order  to  the  completion  and  trustworthiness  of 
human  knowledge,  and  particularly  of  human  sci- 
ence—  why  does  not  this  very  analysis  involve  and 
justify  the  belief  that  this,  being  unconditioned,  is 
also  an  objective  fact? 

P)ut  it  being  assumed  that  this  essential  a  priori 
element  must  be  furnished,  we  find  that  it  is  sup- 


110  kaxt's  ethics. 

plied  by  the  practical  reason,  viz. :  the  element  of  free- 
,    „      .    ,    dom,  which,  speculatively  or  in  its  scien- 

The  Practical  '■  •' 

Reason  titic  or  philosophical  relations,  is  the  un- 

Siipplies  an 

a  jmori  conditioned,  since  it  is  ideally  involved  in 

the  categorical  imperative  of  duty.  But 
freedom  (if  not  ideally,  at  least  practically)  implies 
Cxod  and  immortality,  if  it  is  to  be  accepted  as  a  fact. 
Hence  we  have  the  basis  of  all  a  priori  knowledge  in 
that  unconditioned  fact  of  freedom  which  is  implied 
in  the  moral  law,  inasmuch  as  the  elements  of  trust- 
worthy speculative  knowledge  rest  on  faith  in  duty, 
this  being  given  as  objectively  true,  with  the  subjec- 
tive freedom  which  it  implies.  That  which  was  a 
problem  becomes  an  actual  fact  —  amplifying  itself 
as  the  Soul,  God,  and  Immortality.  In  this  way, 
through  the  medium  and  by  the  authority  of  the 
practical  reason,  we  establish  the  authority  of  these 
speculative  ideas  of  the  pure  reason. 

Moreover,  we  explain  by  means  of  our  critical  an- 
alysis of  the  speculative  reason,  why  the  practical 
reason  should  be  able  to  supply  to  the  speculative  an 
element  which  it  confesses  to  be  wanting  to  itself. 
The  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  has  shown  that  two 
kinds  of  knowledge  are  supposable,  viz. :  the  knowl- 
edge of  phenomena,  i.e.,  of  things  as  conditioned  by 
sense-forms,  the  categories,  and  in  a  certain  sense 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.      Ill 

by  ideas  —  i.e.,  the  knowledge  of  things  as  they  ap- 
pear—  and  the  knowledge  of  noumena,  i.e.,  of  things 
as  they  really  are.  This  last  confessedly  cannot  be 
gained  by  the  speculative  reason,  but  if  it  can  be 
assured  by  the  practical  reason,  this  last  consequently 
deserves  to  be  accepted  as  pure  so  far  as  it  is  practi- 
cal, and  because  it  is  practical. 

To  the  analysis  of  the  practical  reason  as  thus 
outlined,  the  author  adds  that  his  previous  treatises 
are  preliminary,  both  the  speculative  and  the  practi- 
cal—  the  speculative  as  justifying  the  critical  method 
and  its  postulates,  and  the  ethical  as  defining  or 
vouching  for  its  subject-matter.  Under  the  first  are 
included  the  famous  Critic^ue  and  the  Prolegomena, 
and  under  the  last  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals. 

§  52.  He  notices,  next  in  order,  a  criticism  of  this 
last  work  which  he  deems  worthy  of  his  Reply  to  a 
attention,  viz.:  that  he  did  not  begin  his  Criticism, 
discussion  with  a  definition  of  good,  and  also  that  he 
did  not  define  the  faculty  of  desire.  The  objections 
of  the  critic  seem  to  us  well  taken,  and  to  spring 
into  the  face  of  the  writer  at  almost  every  turn  of 
the  subsequent  discussion.  We  shall  have  frequent 
occasion  to  refer  to  both  as  we  proceed,  and  there- 
fore say  here  only  in  passing,  that  the  attempt  of 
Kant   to    meet    these    objections   seems  to  increase 


li-2  rant's  ethics. 

rather  than  relieve  the  difficulty.  The  objections 
seem  to  strike  the  ke^^-note  of  the  error  which 
pervades  his  entire  theory  of  the  relations  of 
the  sensibility  to  the  will,  and  of  both  to  the 
intellect  (or  moral  reason,  as  it  is  often  called) 
in  its  ultimate  ethical  concepts  and  judgments. 
To  this  error  we  have  had  occasion  previously  to 
advert,  viz. :  the  error  that  because  the  experiences 
of  feeling  and  of  voluntary  affection  are  in  their 
very  nature  personal  and  empirical,  they  cannot 
hold  any  relations  to  the  will  or  to  one  another, 
inasmuch  as  the  voluntary  are  rational  and  per- 
manent, and  involve  authority  and  obligation.  The 
grossness  of  this  error  is  manifest  in  the  absurd- 
ity of  Kant's  attempt  in  the  note,  to  define  desire 
and  pleasure  by  merely  intellectual  concepts  and 
rational  relations.  We  notice  this  error  at  the  out- 
set, and  forewai-n  the  reader  that  it  will  be  repeated 
in  form  or  in  fact  scores  of  times  in  the  treatise. 
For  the  present  he  must  content  himself  as  well  as 
he  may  with  the  following:  "'The  faculty  of  desire 
is  the  being's  faculty  of  becoming  by  means  of  its 
ideas  the  cause  of  the  actual  existence  of  the  objects 
of  these  ideas."  Our  objection  to  this  would  be  that 
it  does  not  conform  to  the  facts  of  conscious  experi- 
ence.    Tt  seems  but  little  better  than  trifling  to  say 


THE   CKITIQUE    OF    PKACTICAJ,    UEASOX.      113 

that  in  desire  the  soul  by  means  of  its  ideas  becomes 
the  cause  of  the  objects  of  these  ideas.  One  does  not 
need  to  be  told  by  Kant  that  this  definition,  with 
others.  '"  is  composed  only  of  terms  belonging  to 
the  understanding,  i.e..  of  categories  which  contain 
nothing  empirical.'"  So  much  for  the  preface.  The 
remaining  topics,  though  instructive  and  interesting, 
do  not  relate  to  Kant's  Ethics,  directly  or  indirectly, 
and  are  beside  our  purpose. 

§  53.     In   the   brief   introduction   which   follows, 
two  points   deserve  special  attention  in 
the  two-fold  function  which  the  author  Function 
asserts   for  the   will.     According  to  the  Ascribed  to 

"  the  Will. 

first,  "the  will  is  a  faculty  either  to  pro- 
duce objects  corresponding  to  ideas,"  or,  according  to 
the  second,  "  to  determine  ourselves  to  the  effecting 
of  such  objects  (whether  the  physical  power  is  sufli- 
cient  or  not)."  This  twofold  definition  is  not  unfa- 
miliar in  our  English  nomenclature,  Sis  first,  the  capa- 
city to  accomplish  physical  effects  of  any  kind,  either 
muscular  or  corporeal  in  ourselves  or  others,  in  the 
world  of  matter  with  which  our  bodies  are  con- 
nected, or  even  in  the  world  of  spirit,  so  far  as  other 
spirits  are  subject  to  any  agency  of  our  own  ;  and 
second,    the  capacity   to    pi'oduce  effects  which   are 


114  K ant's  ethics. 

purely  spiritual  and  in  the  domain  of  feeling,  by  a 
direct  energy  of  volition. 

According  to  Kant,  the  agent  in  either  case  is  not 
the  will,  but  reason  —  reason  being  conceived  of  as 
the  agent  which  acts  on  the  will,  and  in  one  of  the 
two  ways,  either  under  "empirical  conditions,"  as 
when  motives  of  sense  or  desire  solicit  or  take 
possession  of  the  will,  or  when  the  motive  or  com- 
mand of  duty  appears  as  the  categorical  imperative, 
in  some  empirical  form  indeed,  or,  we  should  say,  in 
some  concrete  example,  but  still  as  exemplifying 
some  relation  of  duty.  But  this  command  of  reason 
supposes  freedom,  or  the  capacity  of  unconditioned 
action.  What  this  freedom  is,  as  a  psychological 
endowment  or  act,  Kant  does  not  attempt  to  explain. 
He  does  not  even  afifirm  it  of  the  will  as  a  power  to 
choose,  and  scarcely  recognizes  the  will  as  a  faculty 
of  the  soul  at  all.  He  discu.sses  freedom,  not  as  per- 
taining to  an  activity  of  the  spirit,  but  simply  as 
involving  a  special  metaphysical  relation  of  ideas, 
giving  the  unconditioned  in  objective  thought. 

The  recognition  of  this  double  aspect  or  effect  of 
the  will's  supposed  response  to  reason,  either  in 
internal,  i.e.,  ethical,  results,  or  in  those  which  are 
bodily  and  mechanical,  is  most  important,  and  it  is 
surprising  that   more  of   it  is  not  made   by  Kant. 


'ISE   CRITKiUE   OF   PRACTICAL   REASON.      115 

The  oversight  is  but  one  of  many  examples  of  his 
neglect  of  the  psychological  aspects  of  his  themes  in 
favor  of  the  metaphysical.  We  note  a  still  more 
serious  defect  in  his  failure  to  see  that  reason  may 
be  as  truly  a  moving  and  constraining  force  with 
the  freely  acting  v^^ill,  when  it  addresses  the  feelings 
and  urges  the  claims  of  the  sensibilities,  as  when  it 
confronts  the  will  with  what  Kant  calls  ideas,  or  the 
commands  of  the  reason.  As  we  have  already  in- 
timated, the  assumption  is  utterly  unwarrantable  on 
which  Kant's  entire  theory  rests,  that  the  feelings, 
as  related  to  one  another  and  to  the  highest  and  best 
achievements  of  man,  are  empirical  as  contrasted  with 
the  truly  ra.tional.  Moral  freedom,  or  what  Kant 
calls  the  unconditioned,  is  just  as  compatible  with 
those  rational  concepts  of  the  natural  or  pathological 
feelings  which  the  moral  will  can  make  supreme,  as 
with  those  concepts  which  are  derived  from  intel- 
lectual objects  or  their  relations. 

§  54.     The  indefinite  and  vacillating  conceptions 
of  Kant  in  respect  to  this  topic  can  only  Vacillating 
be   explained    by   the   fact    that    in    his  classification 
times,  and  even  since,  the  will  has  been  °5  ^^^ 

Psychical 

conceived    and   defined    in    so    indefinite  Powers. 
and  vacillating  a  fashion.     The  powers  of  the  soul 
have  often  been  held  to  be  only  two,  viz.:  to  Know 


116  KANT^S    ETHICS. 

and  to  Feel,  while  under  feeling  has  been  included 
every  state  that  has  to  do  with  action,  whether 
internal  or  external.  When  an  improvement  has 
been  made  upon  this  classitication,  and  a  threefold 
division  introduced,  founded  on  "  to  Know,  to  Feel, 
and  to  Act,"  as  three  separate  functions,  great  inde- 
terminateness  has  still  been  attached  to  the  meanings 
of  both  feeling  and  action.  It  has  not  been  decided 
whether  desire  belonged  partly  or  wholly  to  action, 
or  whether  it  partly  pertained  to  feeling  and  partly 
to  will.  Those  who  denied  freedom,  or  did  not 
emphasize  freedom,  have  made  desire  equivalent  to 
action  or  impulse.  Even  since  the  three  designa- 
tions, to  Know,  to  Feel,  and  to  Choose,  were  intro- 
duced, to  Know  and  to  Will  have  been  recognized 
as  the  two  leading  powers,  and  at  times  have  pre- 
occupied for  analysts  the  entire  psychical  arena. 

§  55.     It  is  also  worthy  of  notice,  as  essential  to  a 
correct  interpretation  of  Kant's  reason   Kant's 
ing,  that  Kant's  use  of  the  word  "  will "'  ^"definite 

Conceptions 

is  conspicuously  indefinite  and  variable,  "f 'hewni. 
Now  he  seems  to  make  it  the  capacity  for  ethical 
choice,  whether  as  a  special  form  of  psychological 
activity  which  is  purely  spiritual,  or  whether  it 
passes  over  into  a  corporeal  effect.  Then  again, 
which    is   still    more  surprising,    he   repre.sents   the 


THE    CRITIQL'E    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       117 

will  as  the  giver  or  enforcer  of  the  moral  law, 
as  when  he  speaks  of  it  as  the  autonomous,  as 
contrasted  with  the  heteronomous  will,  making  it 
synonymous  with  the  practical  reason  —  now  the 
giver  of  and  then  the  respondent  to  the  law  of  one 
or  both.  In  this  brief  introduction  a  distinction  is 
made  between  '"the  empirically  conditioned  reason,' 
on  the  one  hand,  "claiming  exclusively  to  furnish  the 
ground  of  determination  of  the  will,"  and  the  "pure 
reason,"  on  the  other.  This  can  only  be  understood 
by  apprehending  the  diiferent  senses  in  which  the 
term  "reason"  is  used,  prominent  among  which  is 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  as  the  lawgiver  to  the 
moral,  i.e..  the  free  will,  which  again  is  distin- 
guished from  the  sensibility  with  its  strong  impulses, 
passionately  and  passively  yielding  to  the  excite- 
ments of  sense. 

In  the  conclusion  of  his  brief  introduction,  the 
author  adds  an  important  remark,  the  full  import 
of  which  might  easily  escape  the  attention  of  the 
reader.  He  says:  "The  order  in  the  subdivision  of 
the  analytic  will  be  the  reverse  of  that  in  the 
Critique  of  the  Pure  Speculative  Reason.  For  in 
the  present  case  we  shall  commence  with  the  prin- 
ciples and  proceed  to  the  concepts,  and  only  then,  if 
possible,  to  the  senses;  whereas,  in  the  case  of  the 


118  Kant's  ethicj,. 

speculative  reason,"  i.e.,  as  analyzed  in  his  famous 
Critique,  ""  we  began  with  the  senses,  and  had  to  end 
with  the  iH'inciples." 

§  56.    This  remark  of  Kant  suggests  the  inquirj" 
whether  knowledge  of  every  kind,  begin- 

Knowledge  °  j  '       o 

of  Every  Sort  ning  with  the  sense-perceptions  and  end- 
Begins  with 
Judgments.      iug  with  the  intuitions  of  the  reason,  is 

not  Concepts.  ,•  ■    \  ^      c      t.      •  iii  -j- 

not  invariabh'  lirst  given  to  the  mind  in 
the  form  of  propositions  or  principles,  which  are 
subsequently  analyzed  into  percepts,  concepts,  or 
ideas;  and  whether  the  sceptical  distrust  with  which 
Kant  invested  all  the  processes  of  the  speculative 
faculty,  and  which  he  seeks  to  overcome  by  such 
manifold  and  unnatural  ways  of  resort  to  the  prac- 
tical reason,  would  not  have  been  rendered  un- 
necessary by  the  distinct  recognition,  on  his  part,  of 
the  truth  which  he  limits  to  the  practical  reason, 
viz.:  that  knowledge  of  every  kind  is  originally  given 
in  the  form  of  judgments,  involving  the  concepts, 
which  are  expressed  in  propositions  by  manifold 
relations.  These  relations,  when  subsequently  ana- 
lyzed and  generalized  b}^  the  critical  judgment,  are 
revealed  as  the  a  priori  bonds  by  which  concepts  are 
united,  and  these,  again,  are  mentally  isolated  and 
analyzed  as  forms  of  sense,  categories  of  the  under- 
standing, and  ideas  of   the  reason,  which  are  also 


THE   ClilTIQUE   OP   PRACTICAL   KEASON.      119 

assumed  psychologically  as  the  subjective  conditions, 
and  metaphysically  as  the  objective  forms  of  all 
human  know^ledge.  Such  a  correction  of  Kant's 
theory  would  justify  our  confidence  in  the  specu- 
lative reason,  and  might  have  saved  Kant  the  neces- 
sity of  resorting  to  the  practical  reason  as  a  make- 
weight or  a  make-shift  for  his  imperfectly  or  rnis- 
conceived  pure  reason. 

§  57.  Following  Kant  still  further,  we  find  that 
the  first  chapter  of  the  Critique  treats  of  principles  of 
the  principles  of  pure  practical  reason,  J^'^^^'^^ 
and  begins  with  a  definition  of  practical  Defined, 
principles,  as  "  propositions  which  contain  a  general 
determination  of  the  will,  having  under  it  (itself) 
several  practical  rules."  The  phrase  allgemeine 
Besthnnmiig  des  Willens  is  sufficiently  abstract  and 
indefinite.  It  certainly  does  not  mean  a  moving  force 
or  agency  which  actually  effects  a  right  or  wrong  con- 
dition of  will,  and  we  conclude  that  it  must  signify 
any  accepted  maxim  or  rule  which  characterizes  or 
defines  the  will  as  morally  good  or  evil,  /.p.,  in  a  gen- 
eral way,  admitting,  of  course,  sundry  subordinate 
particulars,  or  varieties  of  individual  character.  Or 
more  exactly,  it  is  any  universal  rule  which  by  be- 
ing adopted  expresses  the  moral  character  of  the  will. 

The  remark  appended,  that  some  motive  to  such  a 


120  kakt's  ethics. 

state  or  activity  of  the  will  must  always  be  assumed 
to  be  possible,  is  unquestionably  correct. 

§  58.    The  added  remark  that  such  a  motive  must 
address  the  reason  onlv,  as  contradistin- 

Every  Motive 

must  Address  guished  from  the  feelings,  i.e.,  must  be 

the  Reason.'  .  ,     i        -.i       ,1  ,1 

rational  as  contrasted  with  the  patho- 
logical, implies  that  a  motive  furnished  by  reason 
must  exclude  the  feelings  as  such,  or  any  relations 
to  them.  We  have  already  observed  that  such  an 
assumption  or  assertion  would  be  emphatically  re- 
jected by  many  of  Kant's  critics.  No  one,  however, 
would  deny  for  this  reason  that  certain  practical 
principles  are  universal,  inasmuch  as  all  would  con- 
tend that  it  is  always  reasonable  that  the  lower 
natural  feelings  should  give  way  to  the  higher,  as 
also  the  injurious  to  the  beneficent.  All  men  would 
also  assert  that  physical  laws  differ  from  moral  laws, 
and  that  moral  laws  are  in  their  nature  imperative, 
though  on  a  different  theory  from  Kant's.  All  will 
agree  with  him  that  the  moral  law  is  both  internal 
and  external,  that  is,  determines  or  commands  both 
the  internal  state  of  the  will  and  the  bodily  or 
external  actions  which  the  will  controls.  Certain 
moral  laws  are  also  categorically  imperative  so  far 
as  they  suppose  certain  conditions  to  be  common  to 
all  men,  and  concern  themselves  with  those  internal 


THE   CRITIQUE   OF   I'RACTICAL    REASON.      121 

states  of  the  will  which  are  within  the  reach  of  all 
men.  So  far  as  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  condi- 
tions which  respect  the  outward  conduct  are  varia- 
ble, the  moral  law  proper  concerns  itself  universally 
with  the  internal  states  of  the  will,  and  with  them 
only.  So  far  as  these  purposes  or  feelings  require  a 
single  course  of  action,  so  far  is  the  rule  of  action 
uniform  and  fixed.  In  all  these  general  positions  the 
practical  theory  of  Kant  may  be  accepted  by  those 
who  reject  altogether  his  doctrine  of  a  blind  cate- 
gorical imperative  which  assumes  dictatorially  to 
guide  and  control  the  moral  reason. 

In  Theorem  I.  we  find  the  following:  "All  practical 
principles  which  presuppose  an  object  of 

^  ^  lit-  J  Empirical 

the  faculty  of  desire  as  the  ground  of  the  Principles 
determination  of  the  will  are  empirical, 
and  can  furnish  no  practical  laws."  Two  reasons 
are  given  for  this  position :  F/'i'st,  The  desire  precedes 
the  rule,  and  is  founded  on  a  pleasure  actually  expe- 
rienced. Now,  it  is  impossible  to  know  befoi'ehand 
what  any  pleasure  will  be, and  consequently  we  must 
try  a  pleasure  before  we  prescribe  a  law  for  or  against 
it.  To  this  we  reply:  The  law  of  duty  prescribes  an 
affection  as  voluntary,  in  comparison  with  some 
other  one  or  more  affections  also  voluntary,  i.e,  an 
affection  of  some  class,  in  competition  with  one  of 


122  KANT*S    ETHICS. 

another  as  a  class.  On  any  theory,  it  supposes  we 
know  the  natural  excellence  or  desirableness  of  such 
aifections.  It  supposes  this  even  on  the  theory  of 
the  categorical  imperative,  which  commands  the  act, 
as  distinguished  from  a  feeling,  i.e.,  makes  it  mor- 
ally binding  because  by  some  sort  of  experience  it 
knows  it  to  be  naturally  good,  i.e.,  fit  to  he  a  uni- 
versal ride.  The  first  experience  in  the  order  of 
time  is  that  an  action,  say,  of  love  or  pity  or  self- 
sacrifice,  is  naturally  good.  The  knowledge  of  this 
natural  excellence  is  derived  from  some  source  be- 
fore it  is  enforced  by  a  moral  command.  Kant  says,. 
indeed:  "It  is  impossible  to  know  a-  priori  of  any 
idea  whether  it  will  be  connected  with  pleasure  or 
pain,  or  be  indifferent.''"  That  is  true,  and  for  this 
very  reason  we  must  wait  till  we  know  whether  it 
is  connected  with  pleasure  or  pain,  either  by  em- 
pirical experience  or  by  testimony,  before  we  can 
decide  whether  it  comes  under  the  law.  If  this  is 
so,  why  then  must  or  may  we  not  know  the  rela- 
tions of  actions  emjjirically  before  we  know  them 
morally,  or,  as  Kant  would  say,  before  we  know 
them  formally? 

He  adds  in  the  second  place,  that  pleasure  and 
pain  cannot  hold  in  the  same  degree  for  all  rational 
beings,  and  hence  cannot  be  the  foundation  of  a  law. 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       123 

We  answer:  If  they  do  not  hold  in  the  same  degree, 
that  is,  are  not  equally  intense  or  strong,  they  can  be 
the  same  to  all  men  in  their  relative  natural  value 
so  far  as  quality  is  concerned,  i.e.,  natural  quality. 
Otherwise  the  beings  concerned  with  them  do  not 
belong  to  the  same  species,  and  consequently  cannot  in 
any  sense  accept  the  same  moral  law  on  grounds  of 
reason.  In  Kant's  terminology,  unless  the  relations 
of  the  empirical  endowments  of  men  are  the  same, 
their  moral  relations  could  not  be  formally  the 
same,  inasmuch  as  the  formal  cannot  be  known  in 
psychological  experience,  except  as  it  is  exemplified 
in  the  empirical,  i.e.,  cannot  be  proposed  as  a  rule  or 
standard,  except  it  presents  an  ideal  which  has  rela- 
tions to  the  actual  nature  of  the  being  on  whom 
and  by  whom  it  is  self-imposed. 

§  59.    Theorem  II.  is  that  "  all  material  practical 
principles,  as  such,  are  of  one  and  the  Material 
same  kind,  and  come  under  the  general    "''  !*^^ 

'  °  Principles 

principle  of  self-love  or  private   happi-  Defined, 
ness." 

In  support  of  this  position  he  contends  that  there 
is  no  distinction  possible  between  the  desires,  as 
higher  and  lower;  that  the  reason,  as  an  impulse  or 
a  motive,  neither  appeals  to  nor  satisfies  any  desires 
whatever,  and,  moreover,  that  pure   reason  "  must 


134  kant's  ethics. 

be  able  to  determine  the  will  by  the  mere  form  of 
the  practical  rule,  without  supposing  any  feeling." 
But  he  adds:  ''Then  only  when  reason  itself  deter- 
mines the  will  (not  as  the  servant  of  the  inclina- 
tion), is  it  really  a  higher  desire,  to  which  that 
which  is  pathologically  determined  is  subordinate, 
and  is  really  and  even  specifically  distinct  from  the 
latter,  so  that  even  the  slightest  admixture  of  the 
motives  of  the  latter  impairs  its  strength  and  supe- 
riority"; and  still  more  positively:  "Reason,  with 
its  practical  law,  determines  the  will  immediately, 
not  by  means  of  an  intervening  feeling  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  not  even  of  pleasure  in  the  law  itself;  and 
it  is  only  because  it  can,  as  pure  reason,  be  practical 
that  it  is  possible  for  it  to  be  legislative." 

These  assertions  need  no  comment  except  to  refer 
the  reader  to  the  concession  made  by  Kant  in  the 
passage  cited  above,  that  reason  acts  through  a 
higher  desire  whenever  it  in  fact  determines  the 
will. 

§  60.     In  Theorem  III.  he  repeats  the  position  that 

Practical  every  one  of  the  maxims  cited  is  a  practical 

nncip  es        universal  law  in  form  only,  as  contrasted 

tormal,  and  •' ' 

not  Material.  ^Jth  matter.  Form  is  also  frankly  and 
forcibly  defined  to  be  fitness  for  universal  legisla- 
tion.    This  fitness  is  illustrated  by  examples  of  the 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       135 

workings  of  the  four  previously  supposed  rules  of  con- 
duct in  respect  to  human  welfare.  If  these  instan- 
ces mean  anything  they  justify  the  interpretation 
that  Kant's  formula  of  universal  legislation  is  always 
to  will  such  a  purpose  or  voluntaiy  desire  as  would 
produce  acts  which  promote  the  highest  well-being 
of  man.     {Cf.  §  40.) 

§  61.  Two  problems  are  then  proposed.  The  first 
is,  to  find  the  nature  of  the  will  that  can  Two  Problems 
be  determined  b}^  such  a  law,  and  the  Proposed, 
answer  is  only  such  a  will  as  is  free  from  natural 
causality,  i.e.,  the  will  as  such;  in  simple  English, 
the  will  as  a  purpose  or  voluntary  desire  when  con- 
trasted with  the  manifestation  or  execution  of  its 
volition  in  words  or  bodily  acts.  The  second  prob- 
lem is,  "given  such  a  will,  to  find  a  law  competent 
to  determine  it  necessarily,"  which  is  solved  by  the 
discovery  of  a  supposed  unconditioned  practical  law. 
To  this  is  appended  the  remark,  which  not  unfre- 
quently  occurs  in  the  discussion,  that  the  possibility 
of  freedom  would  never  have  been  dreamed  of  and 
its  reality  never  accepted  as  a  fact,  had  not  the 
moral  law  enforced  obligations  which  implied  its 
possibility  and  reality.  Physical  science  does  not 
know  it,  nor  does  the  experience  of  common  life.  It 
is  ethical  experience  only  which  implies  and  affirms 


126  kant's  ethics. 

it.  In  Kant's  own  language,  man  "judges,  there- 
fore, that  he  can  do  a  certain  thing  because  he  is 
conscious  that  he  ought,  and  he  recognizes  that  he  is 
free,  a  fact  which  but  for  the  moral  law  he  would 
never  have  known."  This  is  true  with  a  qualifica- 
tion. We  may  concede  that  man  would  in  fact  know 
no  freedom  except  through  his  moral  experiences, 
but  instead  of  holding  with  Kant  that  man  knows 
he  is  free  because  he  knows  he  ought,  we  contend 
that  he  believes  that  he  ought  because  he  knows  he  is 
free.  Kant's  position  is  still  more  explicitly  assert- 
ed in  the  remark  that  follows,  to  which  is  added  a 
corollary,  which  asserts  that  the  moral  law  extends  to 
all  moral  beings,  with  this  important  exception,  that 
for  the  Infinite  Being  an  act  becomes  holiness  which 
in  created  beings  would  be  obedience,  inasmuch  as 
that  obedience  of  which  the  con-elate  is  obligation, 
is  possible  only  when  there  is  struggling  disinclina- 
tion. In  all  finite  beings,  therefore,  in  whom  virtue 
always  involves  a  conflict  and  who  always  reluctate 
in  opposing  desire,  its  triumphs  are  progressive  but 
never  complete.  This  is  the  logical  and  the  accepted 
outcome  of  Kant's  theoiy  of  obligation,  and  needs 
no  further  comment  here.     {Cf.  §  37.) 

4;  62.     Theorem   TV.  treats  of  the  Autonomj^  and 
Heteronomy  of  the  will,  with  the  same  results  as  in 


THE    CRITIQUE   OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       127 

the  first  treatise.    {Cf.  §  45.)    Special  stress  is  laid 
upon  the  now  familiar  principle  that  the 

^  Autonomy  and 

authority  of  the  moral  law  lies  not  in  its  Heteronomy 

of  the  Will. 

matter,  but  m  its  form,  and  that  the  latter 
consists  in  its  fitness  to  be  universal.  As  previously, 
so  here,  the  examples  find  all  their  interest  and  force 
as  illustrations  of  the  adaptation  of  right  purposes 
and  conduct  to  promote  the  welfare  of  man.  Apart 
from  such  tendency  or  fitness,  as  implied  in  every 
example  cited  by  Kant,  that  is,  as  he  would  insist, 
apart  from  the  inatfer,  and  regarded  as  a  merely 
formal  element,  the  condition  of  universal  fitness  can 
only  require  logical  consistency,  and  can  signify  or 
imply  nothing  more. 

In  the  remarks  which  follow,  Kant  recognizes  the 
fact  that  happiness  may  be  the  object  of  every  hu- 
man being,  and  that  all  men  find  a  rational  sym- 
pathy in  the  happiness  of  others,  and  both  these 
must  be  assumed  in  order  to  make  the  law  of  duty 
practical  or  efficient,  while  he  insists  that  inasmuch 
as  these  elements  are  material  and  not  formal  they 
can  neither  originate  nor  enforce  the  law  of  duty. 
That  this  extreme  position  is  necessary  to  his  view  of 
the  authority  of  the  law,  as  the  categorical  impera- 
tive, is  sufficiently  clear. 

in  Remark  2,  he  seeks  to  reinforce   his  previous 


128  rant's  ethics. 

arguments  by  the  consideration  that  while  men  know 
what  duty  is  with  unquestioning  convictions,  they  find 
it  difficult  to  decide  the  questions  which  relate  to  hap- 
piness, overlooking  entirely  the  point  that  questions 
of  duty  are  clear  only  so  far  as  the  purpose  or  inter- 
nal volition  or  state  is  concerned,  while  questions  of 
happiness  (and,  we  might  add,  of  duty,  so  far  as  they 
depend  on  questions  of  happiness)  turn  on  contin- 
gent and  doubtful  matter,  viz. :  on  changing  circum- 
stances. It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  no  ethical  system, 
whatever  its  professions,  can  usually  go  a  whit  far- 
ther than  the  purposes  or  intentions  in  laying  down 
axiomatic  principles  or  rules  of  duty.  Directions 
for  the  conduct  generally  admit  of  qualifications  and 
exceptions. 

§  63.  Ill-desert  is  next  noticed,  which  is  the  ra- 
iii-desert  tional  prerogative  of  moral  volition  when 
Analyzed.  j^  transgresses  the  moral  law,  right- 
eously to  suffer  evil.  This  property  is  treated  as 
original,  and,  as  we  should  infer  by  the  logic  of  Kant, 
it  must  be  directly  enforced  by  the  categorical  imper- 
ative. {Cf.  §94  on  Bishop  Butler.)  By  what  reason- 
ing or  through  what  relation  it  is  proved  that  the 
purpose  (or  rather  the  man)  which  is  not  conformed 
to  the  law  which  is  fit  to  be  universal,  deserves  to 
suffer  evil,  is  not  explained.     It  is  only  assei-ted  that 


THE    CRITIQUE   OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       129 

were  this  not  true,  the  conception  of  justice  would 
be  impossible. 

The  theory  of  a  moral  sense  is  next  referred  to. 
This  Kant  seems  to  have  known  imperfectly,  as  it 
was  held  by  Hutcheson  and  Shaftesbury.  It  is,  of 
course,  summarily  set  aside  because  it  uses  feeling 
where  reason  alone  is  appropriate.  The  theory  of 
perfection  which  was  taught  by  Wolff  before  and  in 
Kant's  day  is  also  noticed,  but  it  is  dismissed  as  em- 
pirical, even  when  held  in  the  form  of  man's  highest 
dignity  as  suitable  to  the  end  of  human  existence, 
and  for  the  reason  that  it  supposes  an  empirical 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  therefore  must 
rest  on  a  material,  as  contrasted  with  a  formal,  prin- 
ciple of  legislation. 

§  64.     After  this  analysis,  the  author  proceeds  to 
gather  up  and  in  a  sense  to  restate  the  The  Contrast 
results    which  it  seems   to  justify  in  the  ^je't^veen  the 
contrast  which  it  discovers  between  the  ^^^""^  '"'^ 

the  Practical 

pure  and  practical  reason.  Reason. 

The  speculative  reason  gives  us  no  principles  a 
priori,  but  only  time  and  space  as  a  priori  forms, 
necessary  to  the  sense-perceptions.  Besides  these  it 
gives  no  knowledge  of  noumena  or  things  in  them- 
selves, but  only  of  objects  of  possible  experience  as 
connected  by  a  priori  cateyorics.    It  established,  how- 


130  kaxt's  ethics. 

ever,  the  necessity  of  thinking  certain  HOioneini,  and 
thus  provided  negatively  for  freedom, /.e.,  for  the  be- 
lief of  something  more  than  sense  experience  as  such, 
but  without  any  positive  knowledge  concerning  it. 
It  pointed  to  facts  and  relations  beyond  the  world  of 
sense,  to  freedom,  not  merely  in  a  negative,  but  also 
in  a  positive  sense,  as  supposed  and  implied  in  the 
moral  law.  This  introduced  into  sensible  nature  a 
nature  that  is  super-sensible,  or,  as  we  may  say,  con- 
nects an  autonomy  of  pure  practical  reason  with  the 
heteronomy  of  nature,  the  one  controlling  and  in- 
fluencing the  other  without  interfering  with  the 
laws  of  either  —  the  moral  also  proposing  the  control 
of  the  rational  or  sensible  by  its  own  laws,  so  as  to 
produce  the  siimmum  homim. 

For  the  truth  of  this  analysis  Kant  appeals  to  ex- 
perience. The  moral  imperative,  he  asserts,  obliges 
everyone  to  speak  the  truth,  to  preserve  his  own 
life,  etc.  These  acts  are  not,  however,  taught  by 
nature  as  inductions  or  lessons  of  experience,  but  by 
sundry  higher  laws  as  ideals  which  can  only  be  ac- 
tualized in  experience.  Here  also,  he  says,  we  notice 
the  difference  between  the  laws  of  a  system  to  which 
the  will  is  subject  and  of  a  system  which  is  subject 
to  a  will.  In  the  one  case  the  objects  are  the  causes 
of  the  ideas  that  determine  the  wall,  in  the  other  the 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON".       131 

will  is  the  cause  of  the  objects.  Hence  the  two 
problems;  the  first,  how  the  pure  reason  can  cog- 
nize objects  a  priori,  the  second,  how  it  can  deter- 
mine objects  a  priori  The  first  has  been  determined 
by  the  answer  —  only  so  far  as  to  show  how  sense-ex- 
perience is  possible  by  a  priori  intuitions,  and  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves.  The  last 
does  not  explain  how  experiences  of  desire  are  pos- 
sible, for  these  have  also  been  provided  for  —  but  only 
how  reason  can  determine  the  maxims  of  the  will.  It 
does  not  point  to  an  a  priori  intuition,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  speculative  reason;  it  relates  to  the  states  of 
the  will  only,  separately  from  their  manifestations 
in  sense-activity,  inasmuch  as  any  realization  of  an 
act  or  state  by  the  sensibility  would  carry  us  into 
the  field  of  the  speculative  reason. 

In  answering  these  several  questions,  the  critical 
philosophy  begins  with  certain  practical  laws  or 
rules  of  duty  as  real.  Instead  of  the  receptive  forms 
of  intuition  (the  a  priori  element  in  sense-perception) 
it  assumes  the  concept  of  freedom,  inasmuch  as  prac- 
tical laws  of  any  kind  are  only  possible  on  the  sup- 
position of  freedom.  We  do  not  explain  how  free- 
dom is  possible,  but  finding  the  law  of  duty  as  a 
fact,  we  know  that  it  implies  freedom  as  a  fact. 
The  one  is  an  essential  element,  and  in  that  sense  a 


133  Kant's  ethics. 

condition  of  the  other.  This  finishes  the  exposition 
of  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  practical  reason. 

ItH  deduction,  that  is,  the  justification  of  its  va- 
lidity, is  not  so  easy  as  is  that  of  the  principles  of 
the  speculative  reason.  These  last  are  confirmed  by 
an  appeal  to  experience.  But  in  morals  we  cannot 
refer  to  actual  experience,  but  only  to  the  ideal,  i.e., 
to  what  ought  to  be.  To  another  fact,  however,  we  can 
refer.  The  fact  of  freedom,  which  even  the  specu- 
lative reason  was  obliged  to  assume  as  possible  in 
the  form  of  the  unconditioned,  is  now  enforced  as 
the  condition  of  that  law  of  duty,  which  is  imposed 
by  the  practical  reason.  In  this  way,  what  was  a 
negative  but  necessary  speculative  conception  gains 
objective  reality  for  ethics,  and  the  reason,  from  a 
transcendent  position  or  use,  passes  to  one  that  is 
immanent  —  i.e.,  which  is  applicable  to  the  feelings 
and  the  actions  as  phenomena. 

In  the  world  of  sense  every  cause  is  a  conditional 
cause,  and  yet  in  every  series  an  unconditioned  ele- 
ment is  supposable.  We  saw  that  while  in  the 
sphere  of  phenomena  freedom  is  inconceivable  and  is 
excluded  from  positive  knowledge,  it  may  still  be  pos- 
sible in  the  woi'ld  of  uoumena.  But  what  was  thus 
conceived  as  simply  possible  is  now  recognized  and 
enforced  by  the  practical  reason  as  a  condition  of  the 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       133 

law  of  duty,  and  is  therefore  accepted  as  true.  A 
causa  HOHineKon,  i.e.,  a  free  cause,  is  not  directly 
known,  and  cannot  even  be  conceived  by  the  specula- 
tive reason,  and  yet  it  can  be  believed  and  assumed 
as  implied  in  the  imperative  of  the  practical  reason. 
§  65.  The  preceding  suggests  the  question  again, 
How  can  we  reconcile  the  extension,  be-  pj^^,  p,,,^  y^^ 
yond  its  appropriate  limits,  of  the  knowl-  Apply  the 

Commands  of 

edge  thus  gained  by  the  practical  reason,  the  Practical 

Reason  to  the 

i.e.,    from  nouraena  to   the   objects    and  world  of 


Sense? 


phenomena  of  the  sensible  world? 

In  reply  to  this  question,  as  formally  stated,  the 
author  refers  to  Hume's  celebrated  argument,  that 
the  law  of  causation  involves  no  objective  necessity, 
and  is  the  mere  product  of  association,  so  far  as  this 
can  be  applied  to  make  experience  possible.  He 
concedes  that  so  far  as  phenomena  are  concerned, 
this  may  hold  good,  while  yet  it  does  not  extend  to 
noumena  or  the  intelligible  world.  He  contends 
that  the  conclusions  which  we  have  reached  in  re- 
spect to  the  reality  of  freedom,  as  implied  by  the 
necessities  of  the  practical  reason,  simply  establish 
the  fact,  and  consequently  its  possibility,  but  do  not 
provide  for  the  determination  of  any  one  of  its 
laws,  such  laws  being  possible  only  in  the  sphere  of 
phenomena.    And  yet  we  can  know  freedom  so  far  as 


134  rant's  ethics. 

it  intrudes  into  a.nd  inodifie.s  plienoniena,  although 
we  cannot  subject  it  to  laws,  for  to  do  so  would  be 
to  make  it  cease  to  be  freedom.  But  we  gain  this 
much:  if  we  find  no  incompatibility  between  the  two 
spheres,  we  can  accept  the  one  as  consistent  with  the 
other.  We  even  do  more:  we  hold  that  both  are 
necessary  —  the  one  to  make  experience  possible,  i.e, 
possible  to  speculative  reason  in  the  realm  of  con- 
crete and  sensible  phenomena,  and  the  other  to 
make  noumena,  though  unconditioned,  to  be  not 
only  intelligible,  but  necessary  to  our  reason,  i.e.,  to 
our  practical  reason,  so  far  as  it  imposes  on  us  the 
law  of  duty,  thereby  involving  freedom. 

§  66.  Chapter  II.  is  entitled.  The  Concept  of  an 
The  Object  Object  of  Practical  Reason;  or,  as  it 
the^Pr^cHcaf  "^^^^^^  '^^  interrogatively  expressed.  With 
Reason.  what  kind  of  objects  does  the  practical 

reason  concern  itself,  and  what  kind  of  products  can 
it  bring  to  pass  by  its  appropriate  activity? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  brief,  viz.:  The 
object  or  effect  produced  is  in  no  sense  physical:  it 
is  simply  moral,  i.e.^  morally  good  or  evil;  or,  as 
Kant  would  say,  simply  good  or  evil,  inasmuch  as 
he  acknowledges  no  relation  between  sentient  good 
and  evil,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  moral  on  the 
other.     In  our  English  terminology  we  should  say  it 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASOJiT.       135 

was  simply  psychical,  a  state  of  the  will  existing  for 
and  provided  by  the  will  alone;  equally  good  or 
bad,  whether  passing  over  to  any  outward  act  oi-  no. 
Kant  urges  that  these  two  kinds  of  good  must  be 
derived  from  different  sources  —  the  first  from  the 
sensibilities,  and  the  second  from  the  commands  of 
the  moral  reason,  as  their  originator  —  and  that  each 
is  independent  of  the  other.  If  the  contrary  were 
true,  i.e..  if  moral  good  and  evil  were  that  which 
produces  pleasure  and  pain,  he  iirges  that  experience 
would  be  necessary  to  tell  us  which  is  good  or  evil, 
because  it  is  only  by  experience  that  we  can  learn 
the  cause  of  either.  The  maxim  of  the  schoolmen. 
Nihil  apj)t'fii)iiis  iiii^i  si(h  rafio)ie  boiii,  is  often  cited 
to  sustain  this  view.  But  Kant  contends  that  this 
adage  is  misleading  by  reason  of  the  ambiguity  of 
the  word  bonum,  which  may  mean  either  sentient  or 
rational,  i.e.,  moral,  good.  If  both  senses  are  in- 
cluded, then  the  term  is  ambiguous;  if  only  the  first, 
then  it  is  false.  Well  and  ill  refer  to  the  pleasant 
or  unpleasant,  as  determined  by  the  sensibility;  but 
good  or  ei'il  pertains  to  the  will  as  determined  by  the 
reason.  It  is  true  that  man  is  a  rational  being,  and 
as  such  must  use  his  reason  to  judge  between  means 
and  ends,  and  in  this  sense  to  judge  between  sentient 
good  and  evil;   but  he  also  uses  this  power  in  the 


136  kaxt's  ethics. 

higher  function  of  judging  of  that  which  is  good 
and  evil  of  itself,  I.e.,  morally  right  or  wrong.  In 
the  decision  of  this  question,  we  observe  we  are 
compelled  to  select  between  two  alternatives.  We 
must  either,  on  the  one  hand,  accord  to  the  reason 
itself  the  capacity  to  originate  a  rational  principle, 
which  it  applies  as  a  law.  which  law  directly  deter- 
mines the  will,  as  by  its  choice  or  rejection  it  becomes 
morally  good  or  evil.  But  if  we  take  this  position, 
we  must  adopt  an  apparent  paradox,  viz.:  that  the 
concept  of  moral  good  and  evil  is  not  determined 
before  the  moral  law,  but  is  determined  after  it  and 
by  means  of  it.  The  other  alternative  is  for  us  to 
accept  the  necessity  of  defining  good  and  evil  in 
terms  of  sensibility,  and  so,  as  Kant  reasons,  make 
both  the  products  of  experience. 

Moral  distinctions,  however,  he  next  proceeds  to 
say,  pertain  only  to  the  states  of  the  will  itself,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  their  effects  in  any  forms  of  external 
action.  But  the  external  actions  being  phenomena 
of  sense,  moral  experience  must  come  under  at  least 
one  of  the  categories,  i.e.,  of  causality  as  exemplified 
in  the  will  or  voluntary  action.  So  far  as  they  are 
manifested  in  the  forms  of  external  action,  they 
must  also  appear  in  or  take  form  from  all  the  cate- 
gories.    The  relations  of  these  moralized  categories 


TUK    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    KKA80N.       13T 

to  one  another  are  explained  at  some  length,  but  as 
this  point  seems  not  to  be  material  to  the  essential 
features  of  Kant's  theory,  we  pass  it  over. 

§  67.  What  Kant  calls  the  Typk  of  the  pure 
practical  reason  presents  some  important  The  Typic 
and  interesting  features.  The  objects  of"  ^  *j*j  ^"*^ 
the  will  are  either  good  or  evil  according  Reason, 
as  the  practical  reason  determines  the  choice  of  them 
by  the  will  to  be  either  morally  right  or  wrong.  In 
other  words,  says  Kant,  the  will  is  pronounced  by 
the  practical  reason  right  or  wrong  according  as  it 
chooses  this  or  that  object,  the  objects  chosen  them- 
selves thereby  becoming  right  or  wrong.  Inasmuch, 
however,  as  these  moral  states,  or  free  acts,  go  over 
into  the  sphere  of  the  sensible  world  which  obeys 
physical  laws,  the  question  is  at  once  suggested.  How 
such  external  actions  can  be  morally  right  or  wrong. 
As  a  sensible  event,  such  an  action  can  be  conceived 
as  explained  by  the  schematism  of  the  imagination, 
though  it  is  the  product  of  freedom,  but  it  is  not 
easy  to  see  how  a  material  or  sensible  event  can  take 
on  or  be  penetrated  by  moral  quality,  obe^ung  as  it 
must  the  physical  conditions  of  existence.  This  diffi- 
culty of  Kant's  own  suggestion  it  would  seem  to  be 
difficult  for  him  to  answer,  but  he  attemjjts  it  by 
asserting  that  "  the  understanding  for  the  purposes 


138  kaxt's  ethics. 

of  judgment  can  provide  not  a  scheme  of  the  sensi- 
bility, but  a  law"  such  "as  can  be  exhibited  in 
concreto  in  objects  of  the  senses."  "  The  rule  of  the 
judgment  according  to  laws  of  practical  reason  is 
this:  Ask  yourself  whether,  if  the  action  you  pro- 
pose were  to  take  place  by  a  law  of  the  system  of 
nature  of  which  you  were  yourself  a  part,  you  could 
regard  it  as  possible  by  your  own  will."  He  then 
refers  to  the  four  cases  of  obvious  immorality 
(which  he  had  cited  more  than  once),  contending  that 
the  acts  supposed  would  be  wrong,  not  simply  be- 
cause of  the  etiects  or  consequences  which  would  fol- 
low were  the  immoral  acts  in  question  accepted  as 
laws  of  nature,  but  that  such  laws  would  in  a  sense 
be  types  of  the  moral  principles  required  in  their 
several  cases.  He  reasons,  whatever  his  reasoning- 
may  signify,  that  we  must  hold  the  moral  law  to  be 
the  type  of  a  natural  law,  so  as  to  guard  it  against 
that  empiricism  which  judges  of  conduct  by  conse- 
quences, and  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must  defend 
ourselves  against  the  mysticism  which  holds  our 
judgments  aloof  from  and  above  all  consideration  of 
the  tendencies  and  eflFects  of  conduct.  Truly  a  wise 
precaution  on  his  part,  but  how  the  desirhrota  can 
be  provided  by  his  theory  it  is  not  so  easy  to  dis- 
cover. 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       139 

§  68.     Chapter  III.,  of  the  motives  of  pure  practi- 
cal reason,  is  one  of  the  most  instructive  The  Motives 
in  the  treatise,  giving,  as  it  does,  a  series  °     ^.    ^^^ 

'  o  ='  Practical 

of  very  lucid  statements  of  the  practical  Reason, 
working  of  Kant's  theory  and  anticipating  many  of 
the  objections  and  difficulties  which  he  could  not  but 
foresee  would  be  urged  against  it.  The  first  sen- 
tence is  at  once  forcible  and  comprehensive:  "What 
is  essential  in  the  moral  worth  of  actions  is  that  the 
moral  law  should  directly  determine  the  will."  It 
must  do  this  '"  directly."  with  no  intervention  of 
feeling,  inasmuch  as  this  would  make  the  act  not  to 
be  done  for  the  sake  of  the  law,  and  thus  eviscerate 
it  of  its  morality.  If  we  understand  by  motive  the 
subjective  ground  of  an  act  whose  objective  ground 
is  not  reason,  then  the  Divine  Will  cannot  be  influ- 
enced by  motives,  and  if  the  motive  of  the  human 
being  is  the  moral  law  alone,  "  the  objective  princi- 
ple of  determination  must  always  and  alone  be  also 
the  subjectively  sufficient  determining  principle.*" 
We  cannot  show  how  a  law  can  directly  determine 
the  will,  for  tliat  were  to  explain  the  mystery  of  free 
will.  But  we  need  to  clear  its  action  from  every  in- 
fluence upon  the  feelings,  which  can  only  hinder  or 
divide  it. 

§  69.     We  observe,  then,  that  the  moral  law  acts 


140  kant's  ethics. 

on  the  will  not  only  without  the  cooperation  of  the 
sensibilities,  but  often,  if  not  always,  in 

Obligation 

and  Respect     resistance  to  them.     When  this  last  hap- 

for  the  Law.  .  /.     i  ■  i  •   i     • 

pens,  it  checks  the  leelmg  which  it  over- 
comes, producing  as  a  consequence  indirectly  and 
negatively  another  feeling,  which  is  painful  and  is 
the  only  feeling,  the  nature  and  actuality  of  which 
ma}^  be  understood  a  priori,  viz. :  the  feeling  of  obli- 
gation. All  the  inclinations  as  such  tend  to  happi- 
ness and  are  classed  as  ministering  to  selfishness  or 
to  self-conceit.  Selfishness  is  checked  by  the  reason, 
which  prescribes  rational  welfare,  self-conceit  is 
summarily  set  aside  and  rejected.  The  capacity  of 
reason  thus  to  humble  selfish  vanity  is  also  known 
a  priori  and  awakens  respect  for  the  law,  a  feeling 
which,  he  tells  us,  is  not  empirical,  but  is  known 
a  priori,  being  a  feeling  which  is  directly  produced 
by  an  intellectual  cause.  The  strong  tendency  to 
make  a  subjective  into  an  objective  determining 
principle  is  checked  and  humiliated  by  the  moral 
law,  for  which  respect  is  at  once  awakened  as  supe- 
rior to  any  pathological  experience  or  affection. 
Thus,  by  means  of  this  negative  operation  of  repres- 
sion, there  is  awakened  a  positive  emotion  in  opposi- 
tion to  self-love.  Doubtless,  Kant  gladly  availed  him- 
self of  the  opportunity  to  interpose  at  this  point  the 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       141 

following  remark:  "  No  special  kind  of  feeling  need 
be  assumed  for  this  under  the  name  of  a  practical  or 
moral  feeling  as  antecedent  to  the  moral  law  and 
serving  as  its  foundation."  This  negative  effect  is 
pathological.  So  far  as  the  individual  as  a  sensitive 
being  is  concerned,  it  is  also  humiliating,  and  so  far 
as  the  law  is  concerned,  it  is  respect,  which  may  be 
indirectly  called  moral  feeling.  The  effect  produced, 
liowever,  is  not  pathological,  but  practical,  and  the 
respect  for  the  law  is  not  a  motive  to  morality,  but 
is  morality  itself  subjectively  considered  as  a  mo- 
tive. This  respect  and  all  which  it  involves  cannot 
hold  good  of  the  Supreme  Being  or  any  being  who 
like  Him  is  incapable  of  sensibility.  As  for  respect, 
it  need  not  be  said  it  applies  to  persons  only  and  not 
to  things,  i.e.,  to  persons  as  exemplifying  the  moral 
law.  Respect  for  the  law  may  become  an  interest 
in  so  far  as  it  impels  us  by  desire  to  live  a  life  gov- 
erned by  itself  as  an  objective  motive,  and  also  in 
the  technical  sense  a  maxim,  but  in  these  effects  it 
can  be  applied  only  to  imperfect  and  sentient  beings. 
And  yet  the  interest  awakened  is  in  some  se)ise 
moral,  just  as  the  feelings  are  called  moral  by 
courtesy.  An  action  determined  by  the  law  against 
inclination  is  duty,  and  duty  includes  practical  ob- 
ligation, i.e..  a  deterniiuMtion  against  reluctant   feel- 


142  kajs't's  ethics. 

ing.  The  feeling  of  elevation  at  being  animated  by 
such  a  motive  involves  self-approbation.  In  this  way 
Kant  very  rapidly  dispones  of  some  of  the  most  im- 
portant and  characteristic  ethical  emotions. 

§  70.     The  difference  between  acting  according  to 
duty   and   from   a  sense  of   duty,   Kant 

Acting  '' 

According  to    continues,  is  obvious  from  the  principles 

Duty  and 

from  a  Sense    laid  dowu,  and  is  itself  most  important. 
"  ^'  The  first,  i.e.,  legality,  is  possible  if  the 

inclinations  determine  the  will;  the  second,  only 
when  the  moral  law  is  the  objective  motive.  For  a 
perfect  being  the  moral  law  is  a  law  of  holiness; 
for  a  being  morally  imperfect,  it  is  a  law  of  duty. 
"  It  is  a  very  beautiful  thing  to  do  good  to  men 
from  love  to  them  and  from  sympathetic  good  will, 
or  to  be  just  from  love  of  order;  but  this  is  not  the 
true  moral  maxim  of  conduct  which  is  suitable  to 
our  condition  among  rational  beings,  as  iHe)i,  when 
we  pretend  with  fanciful  pride  to  set  oui'selves  above 
the  thought  of  duty,  like  volunteers;  and,  as  if  we 
were  independent  of  the  command,  to  want  to  do  of 
our  own  good  pleasure  what  we  think  we  need  no 
command  to  do.  *  *  *  Duty  and  obligation  are 
the  only  names  that  we  must  give  to  our  relations 
to  the  moral  law." 

§  71.     The  njoral  law  commands  love  to  God  and 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    KEASOX.      143 

our  neighbor,  but  it  commands  neither  as  an  affec- 
tion.    "  To  love  God  means  in  this  sense 

Import  of  a 

to  like  to  do  His  commandments;  to  love  Coinmand 
one's  neighbor,  to  like  to  practice  all 
duties  to  him."  But  this  is  not  a  command  to  have 
the  disposition  in  question,  but  to  "  endeavor  after 
it.  *  *  *  That  law  of  all  law^s,"  viz.:  the  law  of 
love,  exhibits  the  moral  disposition  in  its  perfection 
as  a  moral  ideal  of  holiness,  when  it  shall  have  out- 
grown the  relation  of  duty  and  obligation. 

After  enlarging  upon  this  theme,  Kant  adds  that 
these  remarks  are  not  so  much  designed  to  oppose 
religious  fanaticism  as  that  moral  fanaticism  which 
imagines  that  human  virtue  ought  not  to  be  mili- 
tant, but  to  be  already  perfect  in  holiness. 

"Now,  if  we  search  we  shall  find  for  all  actions 
that  are  worthy  of  praise  a  law  of  duty  which  com- 
mands, and  does  not  leave  us  to  choose  what  may  be 
agreeable  to  our  inclinations.  This  is  the  only  way 
of  representing  things  that  can  give  a  moral  train- 
ing to  the  soul,  because  it  alone  is  capable  of  solid 
and  accurately  defined  principles. 

"  If  fanaticism  in  its  most  general  sense  is  a 
deliberate  overstepping  of  the  limits  of  human  rea- 
son, then  moral  fanaticism  is  such  an  overstepping 
of   the  bounds  that  practical    pure   reason   sets   to 


144  kant's  ethics. 

mankind,  in  that  it  forbids  us  to  place  the  subjective 
determining  principle  of  correct  actions,  that  is, 
their  moral  motive,  in  anything  but  the  law  itself, 
or  to  place  the  disposition  which  is  thereby  brought 
into  the  maxims  in  anything  but  respect  for  this 
law;  and  hence  commands  us  to  take,  as  the  supreme 
vital  principle  of  all  morality  in  men,  the  thought 
of  duty,  which  strikes  down  all  arrogance,  as  well  as 
vain  self-love. 

"If  this  is  so,  it  is  not  only  writers  of  romance  or 
sentimental  educators  (although  thej'^  may  be  zeal- 
ous opponents  of  sentimentalism),  but  sometimes 
even  philosophers;  nay,  even  the  severest  of  all,  the 
Stoics,  that  have  brought  in  moral  fanaticism,  in- 
stead of  a  sober  but  wise  moral  discipline,  although 
the  fanaticism  of  the  latter  was  more  heroic,  that  of 
the  former,  of  an  insipid,  effeminate  character;  and 
we  may,  without  hypocrisy,  say  of  the  moral  teach- 
ing of  the  Gospel,  that  it  first,  by  the  purity  of  its 
moral  principle,  and  at  the  same  time  by  its  suit- 
ability to  the  limitations  of  finite  beings,  brought 
all  the  good  conduct  of  men  under  the  discipline  of 
a  duty  plainly  set  before  their  eyes,  which  does  not 
permit  them  to  indulge  in  dreams  of  imaginary 
moral  perfections;  and  that  it  also  set  the  bounds  of 
humility  (that  is,  self-knowledge)  to  self-conceit  as 


THE   CRITIQUE   OF   PRACTICAL   REASON.      145 

well  as  to  self-love,  both  of  which  are  ready  to  mis- 
take their  limits. 

"Duty!  Thou  sublime  and  mighty  name,  that 
dost  embrace  nothing  charming  or  insin-  Apostrophe 
uating,  but  requirest  submission,  and  ^oDuty. 
yet  seekest  not  to  move  the  will  b}'  threatening 
aught  that  would  arouse  natural  aversion  or  terror, 
but  merely  boldest  forth  a  law  which  of  itself  finds 
entrance  into  the  mind,  and  yet  gains  reluctant 
reverence  (though  not  always  obedience),  a  law 
before  which  all  inclinations  are  dumb,  even  though 
they  secretly  counter- work  it!  What  origin  is  there 
worthy  of  thee,  and  where  is  to  be  found  the  root  of 
thy  noble  descent,  which  proudly  rejects  all  kindred 
with  the  inclinations;  a  root  to  be  derived  from 
which  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  the  only 
worth  which  men  can  give  themselves? 

"  It  can  be  nothing  less  than  a  power  which  ele- 
vates man  above  himself  which  can  enable  a  man 
to  appreciate  the  obligation  and  elevation  of  such  a 
life.  *  *  *  This  power  is  nothing  but  personal  if  ij, 
tliat  is,  freedom  and  independence  of  the  mechanism 
of  nature,  yet,  regarded  as  a  faculty  of  a  being  who  is 
subject  to  special  laws,  namely,  pure  practical  laws 
given  by  its  own  reason,  so  that  the  person,  as  be- 
longing to  the  sensible  world,  is  subject  to  his 
10 


146  rant's  ethics. 

own    personality    as    belonging    to    the    intelligible 
world." 

§  72.     It  is  worthy  of  notice  that  prrsonalittj  is 
here    recognized    for    the    first    time    in 

Personality        ^,       ,,         ,,  •      ,    ,         ,•  mi  j 

Ht-reRecog-     Kant  s  ethical  treatises,      ihe  pregnant 
nizedforthe     i^^pQ^t  of  this  vecuIiuiH  of  human  nature 

First  Time.  '■  ^ 

and  prime  essential  of  responsibility, 
seems  to  have  occurred  to  him  late  in  his  researches, 
especially  in  its  relations  to  freedom  and  duty,  and 
to  have  scarcely  unfolded  its  enormous  significance 
in  respect  to  those  ideas  and  emotions  which  are  dis- 
tinctively ethical.  This  late  recognition  is  still 
more  significant,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  in  all  the 
assumptions  and  conclusions  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  the  Ego  is  regarded  as  a  very  evanescent 
though  potent  noumenon,  which  might  possibly  be 
recognized  as  a  "  logical"  experience  capable  of  ren- 
dering a  questionable  though  important  service  in 
cases  of  need.  No  sooner  is  it  once  fairly  introduced 
than  it  expands  itself  into  an  abundant  and  definite 
import  of  means  and  ends,  involving  some  of  the  most 
important  social  relations  and  pointing  toward  the 
most  important  ethical  experiences.  Under  the  ex- 
citement of  this  new  and  thrilling  discovery,  Kant 
seems  to  forget  all  questionable  metaphysics  and  to 


THE   CRITIQUE   OP   PRACTICAL   REASON.      147 

break  out  into  other  eloquent  and  elevating  pas- 
sages such  as  we  cannot  forbear  to  cite. 

"On  this  origin  are  founded  many  expressions 
which  designate  the  worth  of  objects  according  to 
moral  ideas.  The  moral  law  is  hohj  (inviolable). 
Man  is  indeed  unholy  enough,  but  he  must  regard 
humanity  in  his  own  person  as  holy.  In  all  creation 
everything  over  which  one  has  any  power  can  only  be 
used  merely  as  means;  man  alone,  and  with  him 
every  rational  creature,  is  an  end  in  himself.  By 
virtue  of  the  autonomy  of  his  freedom  he  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  moral  law,  which  is  holy.  Just  for  this 
reason  every  will,  even  every  person's  own  indi- 
vidual will,  in  relation  to  itself,  is  restricted  to  the 
condition  of  agreement  with  the  autonomy  of  the 
rational  being;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  is  not  to  be 
subject  to  any  purpose  which  cannot  accord  with  a 
law  which  might  arise  from  the  will  of  the  imssive 
subject  himself;  the  latter  is,  therefore,  never  to  be 
employed  merely  as  means,  but  as  itself  also,  concur- 
rently, an  end.  We  justly  attribute  this  condition 
even  to  the  Divine  Will,  with  regard  to  the  rational 
beings  in  the  world,  which  are  His  creatures,  since 
it  rests  on  their  personality,  by  which  alone  they  are 
ends  in  themselves. 

"  This  respect-inspiring  idea  of  personality,  which 


148  Kaxt's  ethics. 

sets  before  our  eyes  the  sublimity  of  our  nature  (in 
its  higher  aspect),  while  at  the  same  time  it  shows 
us  the  want  of  accord  of  our  conduct  with  it,  and 
thereby  strikes  down  self-conceit,  is  even  natural  to 
the  commonest  reason,  and  easily  observed.  Has  not 
every  even  moderatelj'  honorable  man  sometimes 
found  that  where  by  an  otherwise  inoffensive  lie  he 
might  either  have  withdrawn  himself  from  an  un- 
pleasant business,  or  even  have  procured  some  ad- 
vantages for  a  loved  and  well-deserving  friend,  he 
has  avoided  it  solely  lest  he  should  despise  himself 
secretly  in  his  own  eyes?" 

§  72.     In  the  Analysis  of  Pure  Practical  Reason, 

the  writer  raises  the  inquiry  why  it  must 

the  Practical     have  this  and  no  other  systematic  form, 

a  sinX^ '^''"'''  ^^^^"  compared  with  the  speculative  sys- 

Systematic       tem,  which  is  founded  on  a  similar  faculty 

Form  Only. 

of  knowledge.  Both  kinds  of  reason  are 
alike  in  that  both  are  pure,  or  a  priori.  They  differ 
in  that  in  the  theoretic  we  begin  with  the  intuitions, 
i.e.,  with  the  sensibility,  and.  proceeding  to  concepts, 
end  with  principles.  The  practical  reason  begins 
with  doing,  instead  of  with  knowing,  i.e.,  with  a  will 
which  is  a  causality,  and  therefore  assumes  practical 
principles  a  priori,  and  out  of  these  it  constructs  its 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       149 

concepts,  i.e.,  beginning  with  principles,  it  ends  with 
concepts.* 

§  73.     In  further  support  of  the  contrast  which 
Kant  observes   between  the    Sciences  of  Appeal  to  the 

Truth  and  of    Duty,   he   appeals  to   the  ^'niver.ai 
^  '^'-  Conscious- 

universal  consciousness  of  man,  to  decide  "^ss 

whether  it  does  not  recognize  the  moral  law  as  alto- 
gether a  priori,  and  whether  its  authority  is  not 
characterized  by  a  peculiar  kind  of  sentiment  which 
always  follows,  but  never  precedes,  the  regulation 
of  the  practical  reason.  He  is  careful  to  remind 
us,  however,  that  we  do  not,  for  this  reason,  re- 
nounce all  claim  to  happiness  on  the  simple  author- 
ity of  duty,  nor  do  we  altogether  take  no  account  of 
happiness.  On  the  other  hand,  he  urges  that  it  is 
our  duty   to    provide   for    our    happiness  for  other 


*  We  notice  here  that  the  dissentients  from  Kant  would  say,  that 
theoretic  and  practical  knowledge  are  alike  In  beginning  with  proposi- 
tions and  ending  with  concepts,  although  some  of  these  principles,  in 
both,  are  a  priori  and  others  a  posteriori.  They  would  also  contend 
that  the  materials  of  the  two  differ  in  that,  in  the  one  case,  they  are 
facts  of  sense  and  facts  or  phenomena  of  spirit  as  controlled  by  fixed 
laws,  while  in  the  other  they  are  activities  of  spirit  as  controlled  by  the 
will.  These  dissimilar  phenomena,  moreover,  indicate  laws  and  pur- 
poses which  justify  scientific  indications,  on  the  one  hand,  of  physical 
or  permanent  laws  in  the  realms  of  both  matter  and  spirit,  and  which 
also  suppose  moral  laws,  on  the  other,  so  far  as  freedom  and  knowl- 
edge make  these  possible.  As  against  Kant,  we  contend  that  the  differ- 
ence between  the  operations  of  pure  and  practical  reason  lies  in  the 
difference  in  material  in  the  two  cases,  and  not,  as  Kant  contends,  in 
a  difference  in  the  method  or  logic  appropriate  to  each. 


150  KANT^S    ETHICS. 

reasons  than  those  of  conscience,  but  it  is  never  our 
duty  to  be  happy  as  such,  or  to  obey  any  law  of 
duty  in  view  of  its  known  relation  to  our  well- 
being. 

He  also  adds:  The  possibility  of  this  ethical 
knowledge  cannot  be  demonstrated  a  priori.  All 
that  we  can  do  is  to  show  that  it  cannot  be  shown  to 
be  inconsistent  with  empirical  knowledge.  He  em- 
phasizes the  fact  that  there  are  those  who  explain 
freedom  on  empirical  principles,  and  treat  freedom 
as  a  psychological  fact,  attested  by  an  inspection  of 
the  soul  and  its  phenomena,  and  not  as  a  transcen- 
dental predicate  of  an  agent  operating  in  the  world 
of  sense;  but  he  objects  that  they  thereby  deprive  the 
soul  of  all  knowledge  of  a  supersensible,  i.e.,  of  a 
noumenal  world. 

From  all  these  difficulties  Kant  would  deliver  us, 
as  we  have  seen,  by  the,  to  him,  familiar  distinction 
between  things  in  themselves  and  phenomena  in 
time,  although  he  contends  at  the  same  time  that  that 
which  is  transcendently  free  can  also  produce  sensi- 
ble effects  in  the  world  of  sense,  under  the  relations 
of  time,  and  after  laws  of  physical  causation. 

§  74.  Others,  he  urges,  would  relieve  us  from  this 
difficulty  by  distinguishing  the  causes  that  are  con- 
cerned, calling  the  one   mechanical  and  the  other 


THE   CRITIQUE   OF   PRACTICAL   REASOK.       151 

spiritual  or  psychical.     Mechanism,  he  replies,  does 
not  designate  the  nature  of  the  material  _  ^ 

°  Difference 

which  operates,  but  the  laws  of  its  work-  between 

Physical  and 

ing.  An  automaton  is  an  automaton,  p><ychicai 
whether  it  is  material  or  spiritual  in  its 
structure.  Moreover,  we  should  remember  that,  so 
far  as  consciousness  decides,  it  attests  that  so  far  as 
the  relations  of  time  and  the  senses  are  concerned, 
we  are  under  the  law  of  necessity;  but  so  far  as  we 
are  conscious  of  ourselves  as  noumena.,  or  things,  itt 
themselves,  we  are  certain  that  we  are  free.  He 
adds,  what  a  man  is  in  himself  is  his  character  — 
that  permanent  something  to  which  he  imputes  his 
several  acts  —  and  with  this  distinction  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  common  life  are  in  complete  harmonj^ 

"It  may,  therefore,  be  admitted  that  if  it  were 
possible  to  have  so  profound  an  insight  into  a  man's 
mental  character,  as  shown  by  internal  as  well  as 
external  actions,  as  to  know  all  its  motives,  even  the 
smallest,  and  likewise  all  the  external  occasions  that 
can  influence  them,  we  could  calculate  a  man's  con- 
duct for  the  future  with  as  complete  certainty  as  a 
lunar  or  solar  eclipse;  and  nevertheless,  we  may 
maintain  that  the  man  is  free.  In  fact,  if  we  were 
capable  of  a  further  glance,  namely,  an  intellectual 
intuition  of  the  same  subject  (which,  indeed,  is  not 


152  rant's  ethics. 

granted  to  us,  and  instead  of  it  we  have  only  the 
rational  concept)  then  we  should  perceive  that  this 
whole  chain  of  appearances  in  regard  to  all  that 
concerns  the  moral  law  depends  on  the  spontaneity 
of  the  subject  as  a  thing  in  itself,  of  the  determina- 
tion of  which  no  physical  explanation  can  be  given. 
In  default  of  this  intuition,  the  moral  law  assures 
us  of  this  distinction  between  the  relation  of  our  ac- 
tions, as  appearances  to  our  sensitive  nature,  and  the 
relation  of  this  sensitive  nature  to  the  supersensible 
substratum  in  us.  In  this  view,  which  is  natural  to 
our  reason,  though  inexplicable,  we  can  also  justify 
some  judgments  which  we  passed  with  all  conscien- 
tiousness, and  which  yet,  at  first  sight,  seem  quite 
opposed  to  all  equity.  There  are  cases  in  which 
men,  even  with  the  same  education  which  has  been 
profitable  to  others,  yet  show  such  early  depravity, 
and  so  continue  to  progress  in  it  to  years  of  man- 
hood, that  they  are  thought  to  be  born  villains,  and 
their  character  altogether  incapable  of  improvement; 
and  nevertheless  they  are  judged  for  what  they  do 
or  leave  undone,  they  are  reproached  for  their  faults 
as  guilty,  nay,  they  themselves  (the  children)  regard 
these  reproaches  as  well  founded,  exactly  as  if,  in 
spite  of  the  hopeless  natural  quality  of  mind 
ascribed  to  them,  they  remained  just  as  responsible 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.      153 

as  any  other  man.  This  could  not  happen  if  we  did 
not  suppose  that  whatever  springs  from  a  man's 
choice  (as  every  action  intentionally  performed  un- 
doubtedly does)  has  as  its  foundation  a  free  caus- 
ality, which  from  early  youth  expresses  its  char- 
acter in  its  manifestations,  i.e.,  outward  actions. 
These,  on  account  of  the  uniformity  of  conduct, 
exhibit  a  natural  connection,  which,  however,  does 
not  make  the  vicious  quality  of  the  will  necessary; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  consequence  of  the  evil 
principles,  voluntarily  adopted  and  unchangeable, 
which  only  make  it  so  much  the  more  culpable  and 
deserving  of  punishment." 

Here,  however,  another  difficulty  is  interposed, 
unless  it  is  escaped  by  the  theory  of  the  author  that 
time  and  space  are  not  realities,  but  are  only  forms 
of  sense.  If  they  were  realities  and  man  were  created 
with  a  sense-organization  conformed  to  them  as  such, 
then  all  his  acts  in  time  and  space  would  be  the  neces- 
sary effects  of  his  nature  as  adapted  to  this  environ- 
ment, even  if  we  should  accord  to  him  as  a  nou- 
menon  moral  freedom,  inasmuch  as  in  such  a  case 
his  acts  would  be  the  necessary  products  of  his  cir- 
cumstances. 

§  75.  From  this  difficulty  we  can  deliver  our- 
selves by  supposing  that  man  is  created  as  a  noume- 


154  KANT*S    ETHtCS. 

non.  and  with  no  real  relations  to  time  and  space, 
„  ,  ,.        ,     if  indeed  neither  time  nor  space  has  any 

Relations  of  '■  •' 

Man  the  reality,  both  being  simply  forms  of  sense. 

Noiimenon 

It)  Time  and     Hence  his  responsibility  can  not  extend 
pace.  ^^    j^._^    ^^^^  ^^   related   to  either.     This 

solution  of  a  serious  diflficulty.  Kant  urges,  not 
only  relieves  us  from  the  direct  presence  of  a  per- 
plexing dilemma,  but  indirectly  confirms  our  faith  in 
the  original  assumption,  which  was  made  in  the 
Critique  of  Speculative  Reason,  that  space  and  time 
are  only  forms  of  sense,  but  are  not  realities  or 
things  in  themselves.  This  relief  is  confirmed  by  a 
direct  appeal  to  the  practical  reason  and  the  testi- 
mony which  it  gives,  that  man  is  only  responsible  for 
what  he  is  in  himself,  by  his  free  and  spiritual  activ- 
ity, and  so  far  is  independent  of  his  Creator. 

Another  incidental  argument  in  support  of  the 
Dynamical  view  that  freedom  is  not  inconsistent 
audMathe-      ^^-^j^    ^j^^    doctrine   of  the   categories   is 

matical  ° 

Categories.  this:  That  while  the  mathematical  cate- 
gories are  simply  analytic,  asserting  nothing  in  the 
predicate  which  is  not  contained  in  the  subject,  the 
dynamical  are  synthetic  and  in  their  very  nature 
introduce  new  matter.  This  allows  us  to  suppose 
the  unconditioned  to  come  in  and  interact  with  or  to 
act  upon  the  conditioned,  and  produce  new  effects, 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PKACTICAL   REASON.       155 

and  to  connect  together  two  kinds  of  causality,  the 
tixed  and  the  free.  This  indirect  confirmation  of  his 
doctrine  of  the  categories  is  welcomed  by  Kant  with 
the  following  interesting  comment: 

"  Let  me  be  permitted  on  this  occasion  to  make 
one  more  remark,  namely,  that  every  step  that  we 
make  with  pure  reason,  even  in  the  practical  sphere 
where  no  attention  is  paid  to  subtile  speculation, 
nevertheless  accords  with  all  the  material  points  of 
the  Critique  of  the  Theoretical  Reason  as  closely  and 
directly  as  if  each  step  had  been  thought  out  with 
deliberate  purpose  to  establish  this  confirmation. 
Such  a  thorough  agreement,  wholly  unsought  for, 
and  quite  obvious  (as  anyone  can  convince  himself, 
if  he  will  only  carry  moral  inquiries  up  to  their 
principles),  between  the  most  important  propositions 
of  practical  reason  and  the  often  seemingly  too  sub- 
tile and  needless  remarks  found  in  the  Critique  of 
the  Speculative  Reason  occasions  surprise  and  aston- 
ishment, and  confirms  the  maxim  already  recognized 
and  praised  by  others:  namely,  that  in  every  scien- 
tific inquiry  we  should  pursue  our  way  steadily  with 
all  possible  exactness  and  frankness  without  caring 
for  any  objections  that  may  be  raised  from  outside 
its  sphere,  but  as  far  as  we  can,  should  carr3'  out  our 
inquiry  truthfully  and  completely  by  itself.      Fre- 


156  kant's  ethics. 

quent  observation  has  convinced  me  that  when  such 
researches  are  concluded,  that  which  in  one  part  of 
them  appeared  to  me  very  questionable,  considered 
in  relation  to  other  extraneous  doctrines,  when  I  left 
this  doubtfulness  out  of  sight  for  a  time,  and  only 
attended  to  the  business  in  hand  until  it  was  com- 
pleted, at  last  was  unexpectedly  found  to  agree  per- 
fectly with  what  had  been  discovered  separately 
without  the  least  regard  to  those  doctrines,  and 
without  any  partiality  or  prejudice  for  them.  Au- 
thors would  save  themselves  many  errors  and  much 
labor  lost  (because  spent  on  a  delusion)  if  they  could 
only  resolve  to  go  to  work  with  more  frankness." 
§  76.  From  the  Analytic  of  Pure  Practical  Rea- 
son, Kant  proceeds  to  its  Dialectic,  that 

The  Dialectic  ^ 

of  thePracti-  is,  to  the  explanation  and  removal  of  the 
illusions  which  necessarily  pertain  to  our 
inquiries.  These  illusions,  according  to  Kant,  are 
incidental  to  their  anal3'ses,  as  to  those  of  the  specu- 
lative reason,  and  for  a  similar  reason,  viz.:  that 
neither  the  practical  nor  the  speculative  can  pene- 
trate to  the  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves,  and 
yet  both  are  prone  to  mistake  the  knowledge  of  the 
sum  of  the  conditions  of  phenomena  for  the  properly 
unconditioned.  The  only  relief  we  can  find  is  b}^  the 
discovery  of  the  grounds  of  each,  and  the  fact  that  we 


THE    CKITIQL'E    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       157 

mistake  the  one  for  the  other.  Under  this  misleading 
tendency  in  ethics  men  have  substituted  the  gratifi- 
cation of  the  inclinations,  under  the  title  of  the  sum- 
niiim  boiniin,  for  that  which  is  good  in  itself  as  given 
b}^  the  practical  reason.  We  have  already  seen  that 
the  moral  law  is  the  sole  determining  principle  of 
the  will,  as  law,  not  as  good,  simply  from  its  form  or 
fitness  to  serve  as  a  universal  principle.  The  siwi,- 
Duon  hoinnii  may  be,  in  fact,  involved  in  it,  but  the 
moral  law  is  to  be  obeyed  as  law,  and  not  to  be 
sought  as  good.  Otherwise  we  introduce  heter- 
onomy  into  the  will.  80  if  the  SKniniidii  hoiuon  in- 
cluded the  moral  law  as  conditional  to  itself,  then 
the  good,  and  not  the  law,  would  give  it  force  over 
the  will.  How  then  shall  Ave  rightly  conceive  and 
define  the  two  in  their  mutual  relations?  This  is 
attempted  in  Chapter  II,  in  which  Kant  first  re- 
marks that  sumtnum  may  mean  supreme,  i.e.,  ulti- 
mate, or  complete,  i.e.,  entire.  The  first  is  depen- 
dent on  no  other  ;  the  second  is  wanting  in  nothing. 
Virtue  has  been  already  shown  to  be  Avorthy  of  hap- 
piness, and  in  this  sense  it  is  not  happiness,  nor  does 
it  involve  happiness,  but  only  desert  of  the  same, 
virtue  being  the  condition  of  happiness,  but  still 
happiness  as  dependent  on  virtue.  The  one  is  not 
identical  with  the  other  through  an  analvtical  con- 


158  kant's  ethics. 

nection,  neither  as  the  Epicureans  nor  as  the  Stoics 
connected  the  two,  but  virtue  must  first  exist,  by  the 
free  activity  of  .  the  will,  in  order  that  happiness 
should  either  be  discerned  or  enjoyed,  and  this  by  an 
a  priori  necessity.  This  involves  an  antinomy  of 
the  practical  reason,  viz.:  (1)  either  the  desire  of 
happiness  must  be  the  motive  to  the  maxims  of  vir- 
tue, or  (2)  the  maxims  of  virtue  must  be  the  causes 
of  happiness.  The  first  is  impossible,  Kant  would 
contend,  as  has  been  abundantly  shown  ;  the  second 
also,  because  happiness  in  this  world  depends  on 
other  knowledge  than  ethical,  and  the  observance  of 
other  laws.  The  antinomy  seems  at  first  insoluble. 
It  is  solved,  however,  by  a  resort  to  the  always  con- 
venient distinction  between  things  in  themselves 
and  phenomena.  The  first  proposition  given  above, 
that  the  desire  of  happiness  produces  virtue,  is  abso- 
lutel}^  false  ;  the  second  is  not  false  absolutely,  but 
only  so  far  as  the  moral  holds  relations  to  the  sensi- 
ble world,  that  is  conditionally;  it  may.  therefore, 
be  true,  so  far  as  this  sensible  world  is  viewed  as 
controlled  by  a  superior  will. 

§  77.  But  here,  again,  the  author  warns  his  read- 
Anticipation  ers  against  confounding  the  influences 
s  f  °t-^t  which  proceed  from  the  anticipated 
Not  Moral.       pleasure    that   follows  virtue   Avith    the 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PKACTICAL    KEASON.       159 

legitimate  iiiiiuence  which  the  moral  law  exerts 
directly  on  the  will. 

"Now  the  consciousness  of  a  determination  of  the 
faculty  of  desire  is  always  the  source  of  a  satisfac- 
tion in  the  resulting  action ;  but  this  pleasure,  this 
satisfaction  in  oneself,  is  not  the  determining  prin- 
ciple of  the  action;  on  the  contrary,  the  determina- 
tion of  the  will  directly  by  reason  is  the  source  of 
the  feeling  of  pleasure,  and  this  remains  a  pure 
practical,  but  not  a  sensible,  determination  of  the 
faculty  of  desire.  Now,  as  this  determination  has 
exactly  the  same  effect  within,  in  impelling  to  activ- 
it}^  that  a  feeling  of  the  pleasure  to  be  expected 
from  the  desired  action  would  have  had,  we  easily 
look  on  what  we  ourselves  do  as  something  which 
we  merely  passively  feel,  and  take  the  moral  spring 
for  a  sensible  impulse,  just  as  it  happens  in  the  so- 
called  illusion  of  the  senses  (in  this  case  in  the  inner 
sense). 

"Respect,  not  pleasure  or  enjoyment  of  happiness, 
is  something  for  which  it  is  not  possible  that  reason 
should  have  any  a)itecedent  feeling  as  its  foundation 
(for  this  would  always  be  sensible  and  pathological); 
and  consciousness  of  immediate  obligation  of  the 
will  by  the  law  is  b}'  no  means  analogous  to  the 
feeling   of    pleasure,    although    in    relation   to   ik^ 


160  rant's  ethics. 

faculty  of  desire  it  produces  the  same  effect,  but 
from  different  sources.  It  is  only  by  this  mode  of 
conception,  however,  that  we  can  attain  what  we 
are  seeking,  namely,  that  actions  be  done  not  merely 
in  accordance  with  duty  (as  a  result  of  pleasant 
feelings),  but  from  duty,  which  must  be  the  true 
end  of  all  moral  cultivation." 

§  78.     Will   it   be  believed  that  immediately  on 
writing    these    words    our    critical    phi- 

Self -con  tent-  °  ' 

ment  Con-       losopher  recovers  his  thoughts  and  asks: 

ceded  to 

be  Ethically     "  Have  we  not,  however,  a  word  which 

Legitimate.         j  j.  •  j.  i  • 

does  not  express  enjoyment,  as  happiness 
does,  but  indicates  a  satisfaction  in  ones  existence, 
an  analogue  of  the  happiness  which  must  necessarily 
accompany  the  consciousness  of  virtue?  Yes!  this 
word  is  seIf-contentine)it,  which  in  its  proper  signifi- 
cation always  designates  only  a  negative  satisfaction 
in  one's  existence,  in  which  one  is  conscious  of  need- 
ing nothing.  Freedom,  and  the  consciousness  of  it, 
as  a  faculty  of  following  the  moral  law  with  un- 
yielding resolution,  is  independent  of  inclinations, 
at  least  as  motives  determining  (though  not  affect- 
ing) our  desire;  and  so  far  as  I  am  conscious  of  this 
freedom  in  following  my  moral  maxims,  it  is  the 
only  source  of  an  unaltered  contentment  which  is 
necessarily  connected  with  it,  and  rests  on  no  special 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       161 

feeling.  This  may  be  called  intellectual  content- 
ment. The  sensible  contentment  (improperly  so 
called)  which  rests  on  the  satisfaction  of  the  inclina- 
tions, however  delicate  they  may  be  imagined  to  be, 
can  never  be  adequate  to  the  conception  of  it.  For 
the  inclinations  change;  they  grow  with  the  indul- 
gence shown  them,  and  always  leave  behind  a  still 
greater  void  than  we  had  thought  to  fill.  Hence 
they  are  always  burdensome  to  a  rational  being,  and 
although  he  cannot  lay  them  aside,  they  wrest  from 
him  the  wish  to  be  rid  of  them.  Even  an  inclination 
to  what  is  right  {e.g.,  to  beneficence),  though  it  may 
much  facilitate  the  efficacy  of  the  moral  maxims, 
cannot  produce  any.  For  in  these  all  must  be 
directed  to  the  conception  of  the  law  as  a  determined 
principle,  if  the  action  is  to  contain  morality,  and 
not  merely  legality. 

"  Freedom  itself  becomes  in  this  way  (namely, 
indirectly)  capable  of  an  enjoyment  which  cannot 
be  called  happiness,  because  it  does  not  depend  on 
the  positive  concurrence  of  a  feeling,  nor  is  it,  strictly 
speaking,  hliss.  since  it  does  not  include  complete 
independence  on  inclinations  and  wants;  but  it  re- 
sembles bliss  in  so  far  as  the  determination  of  one"s 
will,  at  least,  can  hold  itself  free  from  their  influ- 
ence; and  thus,  at  least  in  its  origin,  this  enjoyment 
11 


162  kant's  ethics, 

is  analogous  to  the  self-sufl&ciency  which  we  can 
ascribe  only  to  the  Supi-eme  Being." 

§  79.  Chapter  III.  opens  a  topic  of  marvellous  in- 
The  Primacy  terest,  viz.:  the  primacy  of  pure  practical 
Practical  reason  in  its  union  with  the  speculative 

above  tiie         reason.     The  brief  remarks  which  the  au- 

Speculative 

Reason.  thor  offers  are  admirable  for  their  practi- 

cal good  sense,  however  unsatisfactory  some  of  them 
may  seem  for  the  want  of  scientific  exactness.  We 
accept  with  thanks  what  he  says  in  the  following,  when 
it  is  popularly  or  practically  interpreted:  "But  if 
pure  reason  of  itself  can  be  practical,  and  is  actually 
so,  as  the  consciousness  of  the  moral  law  proves,  then 
still  it  is  only  one  and  the  same  reason  which,  whether 
in  a  theoretical  or  a  practical  point  of  view,  judges 
according  to  a  priori  principles;  and  then  it  is  clear 
that  although  it  is  in  the  first  point  of  view  incom- 
petent to  establish  certain  propositions  positively, 
which,  however,  do  not  contradict  it,  then  as  soon  as 
these  propositions  are  inseparably  attached  to  the 
practical  interest  of  pure  reason,  it  must  accept 
them,  though  it  be  as  something  offered  to  it  from  a 
foreign  source,  something  that  has  not  grown  on  its 
own  ground,  but  yet  is  sufficiently  authenticated; 
and  it  must  try  to  compare  and  connect  them  with 
everything  that  it  has  in  its  power  as   speculative 


THE    CRITIQUE    OP    PRACTICAL    REASON.       163 

reason.  It  must  remember,  however,  that  these  are 
not  additions  to  its  insight,  but  yet  are  extensions  of 
its  employment  in  anothei",  namely  a  practical 
aspect;  and  this  is  not  in  the  least  opposed  to  its 
interest,  which  consists  in  the  restriction  of  wild 
speculation. 

"  Thus,  when  pure  speculative  and  pure  practical 
reason  are  combined  in  one  cognition,  the  latter  has 
the  primacy,  provided,  namely,  that  this  combination 
is  not  contingent  and  arbitrary,  but  founded  a  priori 
on  reason  itself,  and  therefore  necessary." 

§  80.  The  practical  wisdom  and  the  catholic  lib- 
erality of  these  views  are  obvious  to  any 

How  Far 

candid  mind.  The  only  question  which  Have  the  Two 
they  might  suggest  would  be  in  what  ^^^°'J'°'°° 
respects  the  practical  reason  differs  from 
the  speculative,  and  wherein  they  spring  from  a 
common  root  of  a  priori  truths.  If  they  are  so 
nearly  akin  as  to  be  in  substance  the  same,  how  can 
it  be  that  the  categorical  principles  of  the  two  are 
held  by  Kant  to  differ  so  widely,  and  by  what  au- 
thority does  the  practical  reason  supplement  the 
speculative  in  so  many  important  particulars?  As 
Kant  appeals  to  the  authority  of  the  practical  rea- 
son as  supreme  in  the  chapters  which  follow,  we  are 
tempted  to  ask  whether  the  speculative  does  not  in 


164  K ant's  ethics. 

fact  play  as  important  a  role  as  the  practical  in  sup- 
port of  the  vital  truths  which  he  proceeds,  in  the 
next  chapter,  to  present  in  order  as  "  Postulates  of 
the  Pure  Practical  Reason." 

§  81.  IV.  The  first  of  these  is  the  immortality 
Argument  for  of  ^^^^  soul.  Kaut's  argument  that  this 
Immortality,  j^  demanded  by  the  "  practical  reason  "  is 
as  follows.  A  will  controlled  by  the  moral  law  will 
of  necessity  require  the  realization  of  the  sunimum 
bonum.  But  in  such  a  will  there  must  be  the  com- 
plete accordance  of  the  feelings  {dispositions,  Gesinn- 
ungeii)  with  the  moral  law.  This  must  be  practicable, 
or  it  would  not  be  required.  But  such  a  perfection 
is  holiness,  of  which  no  rational  being  in  the  condi- 
tions of  sense-existence  is  capable.  It  can  be  found 
only  in  his  pi'ogress  ad  Injinitum  toward  this  ideal. 
But  this  progress  involves  actual  immortality,  or  an 
endless  duration  of  the  existence  and  personality  of 
the  rational  being  who  is  the  subject  of  the  law  of 
duty;  the  sit  1)1  nuoH  bonum  required  by  the  moral  law 
being  attainable  only  on  condition  of  the  soul's  actual 
experience  of  an  endlessly  continued,  i.e.,  an  immor- 
tal existence,  or  rather  a  long-continued  existence 
which  has  no  raison  d'etre  after  moral  perfection  has 
been  attained  and  the  service  of  duty  has  been 
exchanged  for  the  raptures  of  holy  love. 


thp:  ckitique  of  practical  reason.     I(i5 

This  argument  needs  only  a  brief  comment.  It 
assumes  that  whatever  is  demanded  by  the  moral 
law  will  in  every  case  be  realized,  i.e.,  that  all  moral 
ideals  must  sooner  or  later  be  fulfilled  in  fact  or 
tendency.  The  assumption  is  set  aside  by  the  plain 
fact  of  experience  that  these  ideals  in  many  cases 
are  not  made  good.  The  underlying  principle  can- 
not be  accepted  as  a  postulate  which  admits  of  no 
exception,  and  if  the  postulate  fails,  the  conclusion 
derived  from  it  must  fail  also. 

What  gives  plausibility  to  the  argument  is  the 
appeal  to  purpose  or  final  cause,  which  may  be  sup- 
posed to  underlie  this  verbal  argument  of  Kant. 
Thus  interpreted,  the  argument  would  be  as  follows: 
Perfect  holiness,  in  some  moral  beings,  at  least, 
must  be  the  final  issue  of  the  system  of  moral 
influences  by  which  men  are  disciplined.  Such  holi- 
ness, it  may  be  conceded,  requires  for  its  consum- 
mation a  long-continued,  i.e.,  a  practically  endless 
existence.  Therefore,  in  this  sense,  and  by  this 
logic,  the  conscience,  or  moral  reason,  demands  and 
insures  an  immortal  existence  to  some  moral  beings, 
and  perhaps  to  all. 

§  82.  Admitting  that  this  argument,  stated  in 
this  form,  is  valid,  it  should  be  observed  that  it  rests 
solely  on    the    relation   of  purpose  or   final  cause. 


166  kaxt's  ethics. 

which  is  a  category  of  the  pure  reason,  if  of  either  ; 
and  derives  all  its  logical  or  rational  force 

This  Argil-  ° 

ment  Assumes  from   a   relation  which  Kant's  practical 

Design  as 

Objectively  rsason  does  not  recognize,  viz.:  the  re- 
lation of  adaptation.  The  subject-matter 
of  the  argument  is  ethical,  indeed,  but  the  logic 
is  altogether  speculative.  The  necessity  of  ap- 
pealing to  the  practical  reason  for  a  logic  which  the 
speculative  reason  fails  to  present,  is  so  far  from 
being  made  good  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  val- 
idity of  speculative  logic  with  its  rational  categories 
is  made  more  conspicuous  by  the  very  argument 
which  is  introduced  in  its  place  from  the  sol-disant 
practical  reason  alone.  Moreover,  the  grand  con- 
summation which  both  these  ponderous  Critiques 
were  constructed  to  achieve,  viz. :  that  the  categories 
of  the  speculative  reason  are  failures  except  so  far  as 
the}'  are  enforced  by  the  practical  reason,  is  brought 
to  nothing  by  the  very  argument  for  immortality, 
with  which  this  latter  would  triumphantly  reinfoi'ce 
our  philosophy  and  our  faith. 

§  83.     Kant's  argument  for  the  existence  of  God 
from  the  practical  reason  is  closely  allied 

Argument 

for  God's         to  his  argument  for  man's  immortality. 
The  moral  reason  commands  man  to  real- 
ize the  first  element  of  the  summurn    boinon,   i.e., 


THE   CRITIQUE   OP   PRACTICAL   REASON.      167 

moral  perfection,  or,  as  Kant  terms  it,  holiness,  in 
the  sense  of  a  cheerful  and  loving  acquiescence  in 
the  law  of  duty.  But  such  holiness  is  only  possible 
on  the  supposition  of  the  continued,  i.e.,  the  im- 
mortal, existence  of  the  human  sou).  It  follows  that 
if  man  is  a  moral,  he  must  be  an  immortal  being. 
But  the  same  moral  law,  in  its  demand  of  the  reali- 
zation of  the  summum  bonum  as  a  duty,  also  requires 
that  the  moral  being,  so  far  as  he  is  sentient,  should 
be  made  happy,  not  on  the  ground  that  the  con- 
ception of  holiness  includes  in  its  contents  any  rela- 
tion whatever  to  sentient  enjoyment,  but  on  the 
ground  that  moral  goodness  in  its  very  essence  or 
nature  involves  desert  of  sentient  good,  i.e.,  worthi- 
ness to  be  happy.  This,  according  to  Kant,  is  the 
second  or  completing  half  of  the  conception  which  is 
enforced  by  its  demand. 

This  being  assumed,  he  proceeds  to  reason  thus: 
The  moral  law%  in  demanding  this  of  the  moral  will 
—  this  desert  of  happiness  —  assumes  the  possibility 
that  this  desideratum  should  be  realized.  But  this 
implies  that  a  being  exists  who  is  both  able  and  dis- 
posed to  reward  the  good;  i.e.,  it  implies  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  "  It  was  seen  to  be  a  duty  for  us  to 
promote  the  summum  bonum,  consequently  it  is  not 
merely  allowable,   but  it  is  a  necessity  connected 


168  kant's  ethics. 

with  duty  as  a  requisite  that  we  should  presuppose 
the  possibility  of  this  f^innmum  honum,  and  as  this  is 
possible  only  on  condition  of  the  existence  of  God,  it 
inseparably  connects  the  supposition  of  this  with 
duty,  that  is,  it  is  morally  necessary  to  assume  the 
existence  of  God."'  That  we  should  presuppose  this 
possibility.  Kant  reasons,  follows  from  the  obligation 
to  promote  the  sum  mum  honum  in  its  double  form  of 
moral  and  natural  good,  but  the  realization  of  this 
possibility  seems  also  to  require  that  we  suppose 
a  supreme  intelligence.  As  a  principle  of  ex- 
planation for  the  speculative  reason,  this  may  be 
called  a  hypothesis,  but  when  viewed  in  the  light 
of  the  moral  significance  of  the  imperative  of  the 
moral  law,  it  may  be  called  faith. 

§  84.     In   this  argument,  if  it  can   be  called  an 

Difference        argument,   Kant   overlooks   the   obvious 

etween  distinction  between  the  proposition  that 

Rational  and  ^       ^ 

Moral  Ends,  the  universe  is  controlled  and,  so  to 
speak,  administered  by  an  intelligent  being  for 
rational  ends,  and  the  truth  that  he  administers  it 
for  moral  ends,  and  is,  therefore,  a  moral  being,  as 
is  I'equired  by  our  faith  in  duty,  and  our  rational 
inferences  from  this  faith.  We  cannot  forget  that, 
in  the  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  he  had  criticised 
the  principal  speculative  arguments  for  the  existence 


THE   CRITIQUE   OF   PRACTICAL    REASON.      169 

of  God,  and  had  found  in  them  all,  the  common 
weakness  that,  in  his  view,  pertains  to  all  the  specu- 
lative relations  of  the  unconditioned,  whether  viewed 
in  idea  or  in  fact.  In  the  Critique  of  the  Practical 
Reason  he  had  proposed  to  supply  this  defect,  and  to 
furnish  the  materials  and  to  explain  the  processes 
which  through  our  moral  faith  should  establish  God 
to  our  speculative  reason,  and  thus  supplement  all 
the  defects  and  JactDue  which  the  latter  was  so  quick 
to  discover,  but  so  impotent  to  supplement  or  to 
overcome.  How  does  he  succeed  in  these  promises, 
long  deferred  and  stoutly  maintained?  We  are 
compelled  to  say  that  the  import  of  the  promise 
seems  almost  to  have  been  forgotten,  in  the  seeming 
effort  to  fulfil  it.  All  that  Kant  even  attempts  to 
prove  is,  that  the  moral  law,  in  imposing  or  assert- 
ing the  truth  that  moral  goodness  deserves  to  be 
rewarded,  requires  for  this  end  a  moral  being  who 
is  able  and  willing  to  effect  its  behests.  As  if  there 
were  no  difference  between  what  ought  to  be  and 
what  actually  is,  and  as  though  the  moral  law,  as 
ideal  and  mandatory,  were  not  conspicuous  in  en- 
forcing this  distinction.  Meanwhile,  the  point  is 
certainly  overlooked,  that  the  apparent  force  of  the 
argument  is  derived  from  the  assumption  that  there 
is  a  rational  and  almighty  Intelligence  behind  the 


170  KANTS   ETHICS. 

sensible  universe,  in  respect  to  whom,  provided  we 

are  assured  that  He  exists,  it  may  be  argued  that  He 

is  moral,  and  will  enforce  the  behests  of  the  moral 

law.    But  we  have  been  waiting  all  this  while  under 

the  questioning,  not  to  say  the  sceptical,  suggestions 

of  the  first  Critique,  to  know  whether  we  may  trust 

our  speculative  reason  confidently  enough  to  know 

whether  God  actually  exists.     Meanwhile,  we  have 

been  told   that  the  practical   reason  would   remove 

and  settle  all   these  questionings.     It  is  somewhat 

tantalizing,  after  all  this  delay,  to  be  informed  that 

all  that  it  can  do  for  us  is  to  make  it  clear  that  if 

there  is  a  God,  "He   is  a  rewarder  of  those  who 

diligently  seek  Him";  but  that  all  we  can  know  of 

God,  in  fact,  is  included  in  certain  moral  necessities 

of  man,  and  whatsoever  these  may  imply. 

§  85.    Our  philosopher  is  not  content  with  leaving 

this   topic  here.     He   seems   to  be  fully 
New  ^  ; 

Argument  aware  that  he  has  not  entirely  cleared  it 
up  to  the  satisfaction  of  his  readers,  and 
perhaps  not  completely  to  his  own.  After  a  few 
remarks  in  respect  to  the  teachings  of  the  ancient 
religions,  and  particularly  the  Christian,  he  seeks  to 
make  his  views  more  clear  in  respect  to  the  postu- 
lates of  pure  practical  reason  in  general,  viz.:  im- 
mortality,   freedom,   and   God.     The    first,   as    has 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PIIACTICAL    REASOX.       171 

already  been  explained,  is  derived  from  the  duty 
enjoined  completely  to  fulfil  the  moral  law,  or  to 
attain  that  holiness  which  can  only  be  achieved  by  a 
continued  and  practically  endless  future  existence. 
The  second,  freedom,  is  implied  in  that  practical  in- 
dependence of  all  motives  of  sense  which  is  involved 
in  obeying  a  rational  law.  The  third,  the  existence 
of  God,  is  implied  in  the  realization  of  the  summam 
honum  by  the  sole  agency  which  is  conceivable  as 
adequate  to  its  achievement  —  that  of  the  Supreme. 
These  ethical  postulates  of  the  practical  reason  lead 
to  inferences  which  the  speculative  reason  necessarily 
proposes  to  itself,  but  cannot  solve.  Should  it 
attempt  to  do  either,  it  must  fall  into  paralogisms, 
and  therefore  it  must  content  itself  with  knowing  of 
each  that  there  is  a  something  ethically  related  to 
the  moral  nature,  or  law  and  destiny  of  man,  of 
which  it  knows  that  its  moral  needs  require  so  much 
and  nothing  more. 

"  Is  our  knowledge,  however,  actually  extended  in 
this  way  by  pure  practical  reason,  and  is  that  itniiid- 
nent  in  practical  reason,  which  for  the  speculative 
was  only  transcendent?  Certainly,  but  only  m  a 
practical  point  of  view.  For  we  do  not  thereby  take 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  our  souls,  nor  of  the 
intelligible  world,  nor  of  the  Supreme  Being,  with 


172  rant's  ethics. 

respect  to  what  they  are  in  themselves;  but  we  have 
merely  combined  the  conceptions  of  them  in  the 
practical  concept  of  the  sitDDHHin  honum  as  the  object 
of  our  will,  and  this  altogether  a  priori.,  but  only 
by  means  of  the  moral  law,  and  merely  in  I'eference 
to  it,  in  respect  of  the  object  which  it  commands. 
But  how  freedom  is  possible,  and  how  we  are  to 
conceive  this  kind  of  causality  theoretically  and 
positively,  is  not  thereby  discovered;  but  only  that 
such  a  causality  is  postulated  by  the  moral  law  and 
in  its  behoof.  It  is  the  same  with  the  remaining 
ideas,  the  possibility  of  which  no  human  intelligence 
will  ever  fathom,  but  the  truth  of  which,  on  the 
other  hand,  no  sophistry  will  ever  wrest  from  the 
conviction  even  of  the  commonest  man." 

§  86.     This    attempt   at   explanation   suggests  to 
Can  the  ^^^^  critic  himself'the  following  pertinent 

Practical  be      inquirv  (VII):     '"  How  is  it  possible  to 

Independent 

oftheSpecu-    couceive  an  extension  of  pure  reason  in 

lative  Reason?  ,•      i  •    l        f        •  ^ 

a  practical  point  oi  view,  unless  its 
speculative  knowledge  is  also  at  the  same  time  en- 
larged? '"  This  question  he  answei*s  as  follows:  The 
warrant  for  practically  extending  a  pure  cognition 
must  be  furnished  by  some  purpose  or  end  enforced 
on  the  will  by  the  categorical  imperative.  "  Thus, 
by  the  practical  law,  which  commands  the  existence 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       173 

of  the  highest  good  possible  in  a  world,  the  possi- 
bilit}^  of  those  objects  of  pure  speculative  reason  is 
postulated  and  the  objective  reality  which  the  latter 
could  not  assure  them."  That  is,  the  theoretical 
knowledge  is  enlarged,  but  only  so  far  as  the  practi- 
cal necessities  require.  But  this  extension  gives  no 
warrant  for  making  any  theoretical  use  of  the  same. 
Nothing  i?  gained  except  that  these  concepts  exist 
and  have  their  possible  objects.  These  three  ideas 
are  in  themselves  not  cognitions  of  fact,  but  they  are 
concepts  in  which  there  is  nothing  impossible. 
Being  necessary  conditions  of  objects  that  are  mor- 
ally imperative,  they  become  real  without  our  know- 
ing how  they  are  intellectually  or  rationally  related 
to  our  conception  of  them.  In  a  word,  we  know  that 
they  are,  but  do  not  know  what  they  are  in  any  real 
sense  so  that  we  can  define  them  completely  or 
derive  from  them  any  other  than  certain  limited 
practical  inferences.  To  the  speculative  reason  they 
are  transcendent  and  I'egulative  only.  When  the 
categories  are  to  be  applied  to  these  ideas,  it  is  not 
possible  to  find  any  existing  objects  for  them  by  in- 
tuition,  but  only  for  the  concepts  which  are  involved 
in  the  siiniinuin  hoiiiint  which  the  practical  reason 
requires.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  limitations 
enforced  upon  the  speculative  reason  are  not  limita- 


174  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

tions  in  the  number  of  the  relations  or  properties 
affirmed,  but  in  the  kind  of  those  which  can  possibly 
be  asserted  of  them.  Were  the  first  true,  the  defect 
of  ethical  concepts  would  be  a  defect  of  degree  only; 
whereas  the  defect  is  owing  to  the  nature  of  the 
subject-matter,  which  refuses  to  be  classed  with  the 
relations  or  methods  that  belong  to  any  objects  which 
are  subjected  to  the  forms  or  intuitions  of  space  or 
time. 

§  87.  The  requirement  or  ground  of  belief  in 
^,.^  each  of  these  cases  is   peculiar  (VIII), 

Diflfereiice  '  ^  ' 

between  a        "A  want  or  requirement  of  pure  reason 

Hypothesis 

and  a  in    its    Speculative    use   leads  only  to  a 

hypothesis,  that  of  pure  practical  reason 
to  a  postulate.''''  In  the  one  case  I  suppose  or  find  a 
set  of  facts  which  I  explain  to  my  reason.  In  the 
other,  I  find  a  duty,  the  possibility  of  which  requires 
certain  conditions,  as  God,  freedom,  and  immortality. 
The  duty  is  independent  of  these  conditions,  but  the 
disposition  to  perforin  it  presupposes  that  its  perfect 
realization  is  possible,  as  a  fact,  with  all  that  this 
realization  implies. 

It  would  seem  at  first  that  this  doctrine  implies 
that  a  rational  faith  is  in  so  far  a  matter  of  com- 
mand. Let  it  be  observed,  then,  that  the  first  ele- 
ment, duty  as  duty,  is  the  subject  of  a  command,  but 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       175 

only  while  the  second,  the  possibility  of  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  happiness  which  duty  merits,  is  a  ques- 
tion in  respect  to  which  a  doubt  is  possible.  The 
mind  which  is  rightly  disposed  will  accept  but  one 
conclusion.  This  faith  "  may  at  times  waver  in  the 
well  disposed,  but  can  never  be  reduced  to  unbelief." 
§  88.  If  this  is  the  conclusion  which  Kant  reaches, 
it  would  seem  to  lower  our  faith  in  these 

Kant's  Argu- 

three  supreme  conditions  of  the  suminnm  ment  Reduced 
honum  to  a  simple  hypothesis  which  is 
highly  probable  because  it  is  enforced  by  our  noblest 
aspirations.  As  against  this  objection,  Kant  care- 
fully defines  the  limitations  of  our  cognitive  faculties, 
both  speculative  and  practical,  which  are  taught  in  his 
speculative  and  practical  treatises.  This  exposition 
is  given  in  the  concluding  Chapter  IX.  under  the 
title,  "  Of  the  Wise  Adaptation  of  Man's  Cognitive 
Faculties  to  his  Practical  Destination,"  and  consists 
of  the  following  suggestions:  Were  our  capacities 
for  speculative  and  practical  knowledge  less  limited 
than  they  are,  could  we  completely  understand  the 
nature  of  things  by  our  speculative  and  practical 
reason,  including  God  and  all  his  relations  to  nat- 
ure and  to  man;  we  should  live  and  act  in  the  con- 
stant and  living  presence  of  these  astounding  and 
comprehended  truths.     It  may  be  supposed  that  in 


176  rant's  ethics. 

such  a  case  we  should  necessarily  and  constantly 
conform  our  characters  and  conduct  to  these  over- 
whelming realities.  But  such  a  conformity  would  be 
mechanical,  necessary,  perhaps  interested  and  selfish, 
and  at  the  best  it  would  fail  of  that  nol^le  and  disin- 
terested virtue  which  the  present  limitations  of  our 
knowledge  render  possible  and  even  necessary.  We 
conclude,  then,  that  for  the  purposes  of  moral  disci- 
pline and  culture  these  limitations  are  wisely  adapted 
to  man's  true  well-being,  and  in  this  wise  adaptation 
we  find  an  additional  evidence  that  our  theory  is 
true. 

§  89.     The  second   and   concluding   part    of  this 
Critique  is  entitled  "The  Methodology  of 

Methodology 

ofthePrac-  Pure  Practical  Reason,"  and  is  a  brief 
treatise  on  the  best  practical  methods  by 
which  the  practical  reason  may  be  instructed  and 
trained.  In  it  the  author  reiterates  in  a  practical 
form  the  doctrines  of  his  treatise,  that  morality 
must  be  disinterested  and  self-centred,  authoritative 
and  unselfish,  and  that  whether  it  can  be  success- 
fully imparted  will  depend  largely  on  the  method  by 
which  it  is  inculcated  and  exemplified  by  teachers 
and  writers,  by  parents  and  guai-dians.  In  this  dis- 
cussion he  presses  very  hard  upon  sentimental  and 
selfish  moralists  because,  in  his  opinion,  they  use  flat- 


THE    CRITK^UE    OF    PKACTICAL    REASON.       177 

tery  and  employ  mercenary  appliances,  and  fail  to 
set  forth  duty  in  its  majestic  and  self-asserting 
authority,  and  to  invest  it  with  its  simple  dignity  and 
grace. 

The  discussion  ends  with  the  following  celebrated 
and  oft-quoted  meditation: 

"Two  things   fill    the  mind   with    ever    new  and 
increasing  admiration  and  awe,  the  oft- The  starry 
ener  and  the  more  steadily  we  reflect  on     ^J*!f"'' 

•'  and  the 

them :  the  starry  heavens  above  and  the  Moral  Law. 
moral  law  within.*  I  have  not  to  search  for  them 
and  conjecture  them  as  though  they  were  veiled  in 
darkness,  or  were  in  the  transcendent  region  beyond 
my  horizon.  I  see  them  before  me,  and  connect 
them  directly  with  the  consciousness  of  my  exist- 
ence. The  former  begins  from  the  place  I  occupy  in 
the  external  world  of  sense,  and  enlarges  my  con- 
nection therein  to  an  unbounded  extent  with  worlds 

*  It  is  possible  that  Wordsworth's  Ode  to  Duty  may  have   been 
inspired  by  these  thoughts,  particularly  the  following: 
"Stern  Lawgiver!  yet  thou  dost  wear 

The  Godhead's  most  benignant  grace; 

Nor  know  we  anything  so  fair 

As  is  the  smile  upon  thy  face. 

Flowers  laugh  before  thee  on  their  beds, 

And  fragrance  in  thy  footing  treads; 

Thou  dost  preserve  the  stars  from  wrong: 

And  the  most  ancient  heavens  through  thee  are  fresh  and  strong." 
Or,  which  is  still  more  probable,  both  may  have  been  unconsciously 
suggested  by  Psalm  xix,  vss.  1,  7,  8. 

13 


178  kant's  ethics. 

upon  worlds  and  systems  of  systems,  and.  moreover, 
into  limitless  times  of  their  periodic  motion,  its  be- 
ginning and  continuance.  The  second  begins  from 
my  invisible  self,  my  personality,  and  exhibits  me  in 
a  world  which  has  true  infinit}',  but  which  is  trace- 
able only  by  the  understanding,  and  with  which  I 
discei'n  that  I  am  not  in  a  merely  contingent,  but  in 
a  universal  and  necessary  connection,  as  T  am  also 
thereby  with  all  those  visible  worlds.  The  former 
view  of  a  countless  multitude  of  worlds  anni- 
hilates, as  it  were,  my  importance  as  an  animal 
creature,  which,  after  it  has  been  for  a  short  time 
provided  with  vital  power,  one  knows  not  how,  must 
again  give  back  the  matter  of  which  it  was  formed 
to  the  planet  it  inhabits  (a  mei-e  speck  in  the  uni- 
verse). The  second,  on  the  contrary,  infinitely  ele- 
vates my  worth  as  an  intelligence  by  my  personality, 
in  which  the  moral  law  reveals  to  me  a  life  inde- 
pendent on  animality,  and  even  on  the  whole  sensi- 
ble world,  at  least  so  far  as  may  be  inferred  from 
the  destination  assigned  to  my  existence  by  this  law, 
a  destination  not  restricted  to  conditions  and  limits 
of  this  life,  but  reaching  into  the  infinite. 

"  But  though  admiration  and  respect  may  excite  to 
inquiry,  they  cannot  supply  the  want  of  it.  What, 
then,  is  to  be  done  in  order  to  enter  on  this  in  a 


THE   CRITIQUE   OP   I>RACTlCAL    KEASOK.       179 

useful  manner,  and  one  adapted  to  tlie  loftiness  of 
the  subject?  Examples  may  serve  in  this  as  a  warn- 
ing, and  also  for  imitation.  The  contemplation  of 
the  world  began  from  the  noblest  spectacle  that  the 
luiman  senses  present  to  us,  and  that  our  under- 
standing can  bear  to  follow  in  their  vast  reach,  and 
it  ended  in  —  astrology.  Morality  began  with  the 
noblest  attribute  of  human  nature,  the  development 
and  cultivation  of  which  give  a  prospect  of  infinite 
utility,  and  ended  in  —  fanaticism  or  superstition." 

§  90.  The  answer  which  we  should  give  to  this 
pregnant  inquiry  of  Kant  is  the  exact  practical 
opposite  of  the  conclusion  which  he  de-  g^prem^g^and 
rives  from  the  critique  to  which  he  has  if'olated. 
subjected  the  practical  reason.  We  should  say  that 
ethical  phenomena  and  laws  are  as  truly  the  subjects 
of  scientific  investigation  as  those  which  are  physical. 
Misdirected  agencies  and  imaginative  theories  in  both 
lead  to  mischief  of  every  species.  It  is  only  as  we 
understand  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter  of  both 
that  we  can  adopt  a  true  method  for  either.  With 
this  interpretation  we  should  heartily  adopt  his 
parting  words:  "In  one  word,  science  (critically 
undertaken  and  methodically  directed)  is  the  nar- 
row gate  that  leads  to  the  true  doctrine  of  prac- 
tical wisdom,  if  we  understand  by  this  not  merely 


180  KANT^S    ETHICS. 

what  one  ought  to  do,  but  what  ought  to  serve 
teachers  as  a  guide  to  construct  well  and  clearly 
the  road  to  wisdom  which  everyone  should  travel, 
and  to  secure  others  from  going  astray.  Philoso- 
phy must  always  continue  to  be  the  guardian  of  this 
science,  and  although  the  public  does  not  take  any 
interest  in  its  subtle  investigations,  it  must  in  the 
resulting  doctrines  which  such  an  examination  first 
puts  in  a  clear  light." 

§  91.    This  rhapsodical  conclusion  of  this  elaborate 
Critique  reminds  the  reader  of  the  title 

Comments 

on  the  of    the    last   chapter    of    Dr.    Johnson's 

Rasselas,  viz. :  "  The  Conclusion  in  Which 
Nothing  is  Concluded."  The  imaginative  meditation 
of  the  eloquent  writer  upon  the  starry  heavens  and 
the  law  of  duty  is  both  impressive  and  elevating;  but 
the  vague  replies  to  our  most  serious  questionings 
with  which  it  puts  us  off,  and  its  indefinite  resolu- 
tion of  our  philosophic  doubts,  only  serve  to  aggra- 
vate the  keenness  of  our  disappointment.  The  first 
of  these  treatises  which  we  have  reviewed,  the 
Grrundlegung,  had  professed  only  to  prepare  our 
way  for  moi'e  exact  analyses  and  more  scientific 
inquiries.  It  left  us  with  the  equivocal  consolation 
of  being  at  least  made  fully  acquainted  with  the 
reasons  why  the  ultimate  concepts  and  axioms  of 


THE    CRITK^LK    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON.       181 

ethical  science  must  in  some  sense  be  ultimate  and 
incomprehensible.  But  notwithstanding  this  dis- 
couraging intimation,  we  were  encouraged  to  hope 
that  the  Critique  of  the  Practical  Reason  might  not 
only  clear  up  the  incomprehensibilities  into  which 
the  earlier  ethical  treatise  had  plunged  us,  but  that  it 
might  redeem  the  hope  or  promise  which  had  cheered 
us  on  our  thorny  path,  viz.:  that  the  analysis  of  the 
practical  reason,  in  dissipating  its  own  difficulties, 
would  restore  our  confidence  in  the  decisions  of  the 
speculative  reason.  But,  alas  I  at  the  end  of  our  toil 
we  are  informed  that  the  axioms  of  ethical  faith  are 
rooted  only  in  our  own  ineradicable  conviction  of 
their  i^ractical  importance,  and  that  they  scarcely 
seem  capable  of  either  scientific  formulation  or  phil- 
osophic adjustment;  while  the  practical  reason 
itself  is  so  far  from  going  farther  than  this,  or 
from  rendering  its  proifered  and  promised  aid  to  the 
speculative,  that  it  can  best  satisfy  its  own  needs 
and  that  of  its  elder  sister  by  looking  up  to  the 
heavens  in  an  attitude  of  wondering  worship,  and 
down  into  the  heart  of  man  in  reverent  faith.  We 
confess  ourselves  surprised  at  this  conclusion,  after 
the  long  trial  to  our  patience  from  the  scholastic 
terminology,  the  acute  criticism,  and  the  sharp  in- 
sight with  which  these  treatises  superabound,  all  of 


182  kant\s  p:THicft. 

which  had  prepared  us  to  hope  that  all  these  prepa- 
rations would  have  given  us  something  more  than 
this  effusion  of  the  imagination,  truthful  and  eloquent 
though  it  be. 

The  conclusion  also  suggests  a  thought  which,  in 
our  opinion,  is  of  no  inconsiderable  importance  as  an 
explanation  of  the  charm  with  which  Kant's  original 
researches  continue  to  be  invested,  and  of  their 
power  to  excite  and  hold  the  minds  of  men  long 
after  the  original  questions,  as  Kant  proposed  them, 
had  taken  new  forms,  and  been  expressed  in  new 
terminology.  Kant's  extraordinary  power  to  attract 
and  hold  his  readers  seems  to  lie  in  that  rare  combina- 
tion of  metaphysical  acuteness  with  imaginative  verve 
and  inspiration,  by  which  he  is  distinguished.  Not 
unfrequently  he  seems  to  lose  himself  and  to  bewilder 
his  readers  in  the  entangled  maze  of  his  over-refined 
analyses  and  his  barbarous  terminology.  On  other 
occasions  he  sinks  in  helpless  discouragement  under 
the  weight  of  those  transcendental  ideas  which  his 
philosophy  is  forced  to  recognize,  but  is  incapable  of 
defining  and  defending  by  his  own  chosen  termi- 
nology. In  these  extremities,  however  urgent,  his 
imagination  never  fails  to  find  language  in  which  to 
give  expression  to  those  faiths  which  he  has  the 
magnanimity  to  confess  are  "the  light  of  all  our  see- 


THE    CRITIQUE    OF    PRACTICAL    REASON".       183 

ing,"  while  his  glowing  rhetoric  lights  up  the  thorn- 
iest maze  of  abstract  reasoning  with  a  radiance  which 
extorts  the  wonder  of  the  admiring  reader,  even  when 
the  argument,  thus  illuminated,  fails  to  commend  it- 
self to  his  cooler  judgment.  For  this  reason,  among 
many  others,  it  seems  to  us  that  the  watchword.  '''Back 
to  Kant,''  will  long  be  repeated  and  responded  to 
even  by  those  students  of  philosophy  who  find  no 
occasion  to  accept  Kant  as  their  master. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

A   CRITICAL  SUMMARY  OF  KANT'S  ETHICAL 
THEORY. 

§   92.     AVe    begin    with    Kant's   doctrine    of    the 
The  Practical    pfcictical    veasoH.     The    introduction    of 
eabon  ^j^j^  appellation  by  Kant  excited  wonder 

Described.  and  Called  forth  criticism  from  many 
quarters.  How  can  there  be  two  sorts  of  reason, 
was  asked  by  his  critics,  and  with  what  propriety 
can  reason  be  designated  as  practical  at  all?  In 
answer  to  these  queries,  Kant  denied  that  be  held  to 
two  kinds  of  reason,  but  sought  to  justify  the  double 
application  of  the  term  by  explaining  that  it  was 
occasioned  by  the  difterence  in  the  subject-matter* 
with  which  reason  has  to  do,  and  the  consequent 
difference  in  the  relations  or  attributes  which  it  is 
supposed  to  discern.  While  the  speculative  reason  is 
concerned  with  the  attributes  of  fact  or  truth,  the 

*It  is  pertinent  here  to  ask,  however,  whether,  according  to  Kant's 
own  analj'sis,  oliligation,  or  the  nucleus  of  the  same,  must  not  first  be 
experienced  or  felt,  before  It  is  discerned,  i.e.,  whether  some  form  of 
sensibility  and  its  relations,  rather  than  the  intellect,  does  not  fur- 
nish the  objective  material  oi  moral  distinctions,  contrarilj'  to  his 
entire  thcorv. 

184 


SUMMARY   OF   KANT*S   ETHICAL  THEORY.     185 

practical  is  limited  to  attributes  of  action  and  of 
duty;  the  one  affirming  what  is  true  and  should  be 
assented  to,  the  other  what  should  be  done  or  effected ; 
the  first  implying  knowledge ,  and  the  second  obi  iff  a- 
tioii.  It  may  be  questioned,  however,  whether  the 
language  which  he  used,  and  the  illustrations  and 
arguments  which  he  employed  were  not  all  fitted  to 
leave  the  impression  that  the  diff"erence  was  in  no  wise 
limited  to  the  objective  matter  of  intellectual  assent; 
but  was  also  extended  to  the  subjective  character  of 
the  processes  by  which  ethical  truth  is  responded 
to  or  obeyed.  At  all  events,  it  is  certain  that  Kant 
intended  that,  as  in  the  phenomena  of  speculative 
reason  the  intellect  alone  is  concerned  only  with 
relations  of  fact  or  truth,  so  the  practical  reason  im- 
plies only  relations  to  the  will,  and  enforces  relations 
of  duty.  It  would  follow  that  the  will,  being  the 
necessary  correlate  of  the  intellect,  acting  as  the 
practical  reason,  both  logically  and  actually,  might 
also  occasionally  be  used  by  Kant  interchangeably 
Avith  it — the  practical  reason  discerning  and  enforc- 
ing obligation  for  and  upon  the  will,  and  the  will 
subjectively  responding  to  this  relation  in  its  free- 
dom under  a  sense  of  mere  authority. 

§  93.     It  is  also  a  fundamental  truth  with  Kant, 
and  oft  repeated  by  him,  that  the  authority  of  its 


186  kant\s  ethics. 

commands  is  not  derived  from  the  goodness  of  that 
Whence  Its  which  is  Commanded;  but  that  an  act 
Authority.  ^^  morally  good  because  it  is  commanded 
by  the  reason.  No  action  is  commanded  because  it  is 
good,  or  as  being  good;  but  it  is  good  because  and 
in  so  far  as  it  is  enforced  by  the  practical  reason, 
it  being  first  simply  commanded  and  accepted  as 
morally  right,  and  thereby  becoming  morally  good. 
It  is  not  enforced  as  morally  right,  because  it  is 
desirable,  or  excellent,  or  good;  but  is  good  because 
it  is  enforced  as  right  by  the  reason.  The  sense  of 
obligation,  moreover,  it  should  be  noticed,  in  all 
cases  supposes  a  reluctant,  even  though  it  be  an 
obedient  will.  A  being  who  responds  to  the  judg- 
ments of  the  practical  reason  without  a  conflict, — 
showing  that  his  emotional  and  active  nature  is 
already  in  harmony  with  the  moral  law, —  has  no 
sense  of  obligation,  however  complete  his  holiness, 
and  the  decisions  or  judgments  of  the  practical 
reason  do  not  assume  for  him  the  power  or  force  of 
law.  Such  a  man  is  a  holy,  but  not  a  virtuous  man. 
§  94.  The  practical  reason  of  Kant  seems  at  first 
How  Related  thought  to  be  identical  with  the  "  supe- 
to  Butler  s       ^.•^^,  p^.^j^g^-^jg  Qf  reflection  or  conscience  " 

Principle  or  '^  •■ 

Reflection.       of   Bishop  Butler,  whose   functions    are 
thus  defined;  it  "distinguishes  between  the  internal 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT's    ETHICAL    THEORY.     187 

principles  of  his  heart'';  it  "passes  judgment  upon 
himself"  and  other  men;  it  "'pronounces  determin- 
edly some  actions  to  be  in  themselves  just,  right,  and 
good,"  etc.,  "without  being  advised  with";  it  ''un- 
questionably exerts  itself,  and  approves  or  condemns 
him  the  doer."  Butler  recognizes  in  these  features 
"  a  prerogative  or  natural  supremacy  of  this  moral 
faculty,"  or,  as  he  once  calls  it,  "the  moral  reason," 
and  contends  that  "we  may  have  a  clear  conception 
of  the  superior  nature  of  our  inward  principles  to  one 
another,"  and  gathers  the  result  of  his  analysis  into 
the  pregnant  conclusion  that  "this  is  a  constituent 
part  of  the  idea  —  that  is,  of  the  faculty  itself — and 
to  preside  and  govern  from  the  very  economy  and 
constitution  of  man,  belongs  to  it.  Had  it  strength 
as  it  has  right,  had  it  power  as  it  has  manifest 
authority,  it  would  absolutely  govern  the  world." 
These  and  other  assertions  of  Butler  seem  to  be 
almost  literal  translations  of  the  language  of  Kant 
in  respect  to  the  practical  reason  and  the  categorical 
imperative.  It  is  worthy  of  notice,  however,  that 
Butler  finds  in  these  doctrines  only  illustrations  and 
confirmations  of  the  truth  held  by  the  best  Greek 
schools,  that  the  nature  or  constitution  of  man  is  the 
norm  or  standard  by  which  moral  distinctions  are 
tested  and  enforced,  and  that  the   rule  "  to  follow 


188  rant's  ethics. 

nature,"  or  "to  live  according  to  nature,"  was  in  his 
view  broad  enough  to  provide  for  every  special 
ethical  direction.  While  Butler  appears  to  agree 
with  Kant  in  holding  the  categorical  imperative,  he 
differs  from  him  in  finding  the  enforcement  of  its 
authority  in  the  constitution  of  man  as  its  powers 
and  ends  are  interpreted  by  himself.  That  is  to  say, 
as  against  Kant,  he  founded  the  authority  of  con- 
science on  the  matter  of  its  commands,  as  contrasted 
with  their  mere /orw.  This  difference,  expressed  in 
other  language,  would  be  as  follows:  While  Kant 
begins  with  a  simple  dictum  of  authority,  Butler 
explains  and  enforces  this  authorit}^  as  an  interpre- 
tation of  the  ends  of  reason,  as  manifested  in  the 
constitution  of  the  soul  and  the  universe  of  God, 
and  enforced  by  their  ultimate  authority.  Instead 
of  a  categorical  imperative,  Butler  furnishes  an 
imperative  that  is  hypothetical,  enforcing  its  dicta 
with  the  implied  condition.  If  you  would  act  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  things,  or  the  ends  for  which 
you  exist,  you  will  do  or  avoid  so  and  so.  It  is 
true,  he  assumes  the  nature  of  man  to  be  so  and 
so.  Eveiy  occasion  of  doubt  will  bring  up  the  ques- 
tion. Is  this  nature  such  as  you  assume  it  to 
be?  By  what  methods  or  tests  we  are  to  discover 
and    determine    this    nature,    with    its   subordinate 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT'S    ETHICAL   THEORY.     189 

or  supi*erne  ends,  Butler  does  not  explain.  Indeed, 
he  attempts  no  analysis  or  explanation,  or  ver\' 
scantily,  of  what  he  means  by  conformity  to  nature, 
being  content  with  a  few  positive  and  disconnected 
utterances,  which  he  does  not  attempt  to  reconcile 
or  adjust  with  one  another,  either  by  psychological 
introspection  or  metaphysical  analysis. 

The  very  elaborate  preface  to  his  sermons  is  in- 
structive and  suggestive  in  respect  to  all  the  points 
to  which  we  have  referred,  and  particularly  the  gen- 
eral truth  that  he  relies  on  the  analysis  of  man's 
nature  for  the  determination  of  the  purposes  for 
which  it  exists,  and  the  normal  uses  to  which  it  should 
be  applied.  It  is  particularly  worthy  of  notice  that 
the  authority  of  this  "superior  principle  of  reflec- 
tion "  is  partially  explained  by  its  being  other  than  a 
"  propension  "  or  impulse.  It  is  true  that  Butler,  like 
Kant,  in  words  attaches  to  a  simple  thought-object 
a  lawgiving  power  over  an  impulse,  and  there  leaves 
the  analysis  of  obligation;  but  he  does  not,  like 
Kant,  exalt  a  metaphor  into  a  theory,  and  hyposta- 
size  an  abstraction  into  a  fancied  personality,  called 
the  categorical  imperative.  In  this  he  may  have 
been  Kant's  inferior  as  a  poet,  but  he  was  his  superior 
as  a  philosopher. 

§  95.     The  next  question  is.  What  rule  of  duty  is 


190  kant's  ethics. 

imposed  by  the  moral  reason?     It  is  one  thing  to 
determine  that  there  is  a  moral  law  so 

Kant's  Ob- 
jective Rule      far  as  this  is  implied  in  the  reality  of  the 

of  Duty.  ,  •      1 

practical  reason,  and  another  to  determine 
what  this  law  requires,  or  what  is  its  import.  This 
question  Kant  proposes,  and  labors  earnestly  to  an- 
swer. He  is  also  clearly  aware  that  it  is  a  question 
which  moralists  of  all  the  schools  have  labored  ear- 
nestly to  answer,  some  saying,  Do  that  which  will 
make  j^ou  perfect  or  happy,  or  that  which  will  ac- 
cord with  human  nature,  or  that  which  will  please 
God.  Indeed,  it  is  with  the  answers  to  this  question 
that  all  theories  of  morals  are  chiefly  concerned. 
The  answer  which  Kant  gives  is  simply:  That  conduct 
is  right  which  when  accepted  as  a  maxim,  i.e.,  an  ac- 
cepted or  working  rule,  is  fit  to  be  universal.  In  other 
words,  universality  or  universal  fitness  {for  wJiat  is 
not  said)  is  the  one  criterion  which  should  test  every 
moral  law.  The  application  of  this  criterion,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  illustrated  by  several  supposed  cases. 
But  all  of  these  supposed  cases  are  not  only  varied 
examples  of  adaptation  to  an  end,  but  of  an  adapta- 
tion to  an  end  which  is  presumed  to  be  naturally 
good,  involving  as  the  or  as  a  fundamental  relation, 
that  of  adaptation  to  natural  well-being  as  an  end 
or  law.     If  it  were  urged  that  Kant's  criterion,  as 


SUMMARY    OF    KAXT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     191 

he  insists,  involved  nothing  which  is  worthy  to  be 
called  matter,  then  the  j^i-inciple  would  be  merely 
formal,  as  he  contends  it  ought  to  be  —  and  this,  the 
identical  proposition  that  like  every  fundamental  or 
original  axiomatic  criterion  it  should  be  universally 
applicable.  This,  as  we  have  seen",  would  be  a  very 
safe  but  a  very  useless  proposition,  which  would 
impart  no  information  and  be  exposed  to  no  denial. 

§  96.     The  next  element  of  moral  quality  which 
requires  attention  is   qood  or  ill-desert. 

'■  ^  Good  and 

The  practical  reason,  according  to  Kant,  m-desert  ac- 
cording to 
not   merely  commands    to   duty,   but   it  Kant  and 

teaches  or  declares  that  the  obedient 
will  is  deserving  of  good  as  a  reward.  While 
the  authority  of  its  command  can  in  no  sense 
be  possibly  derived  from  the  natural  good  which 
lies  beneath  or  follows  after  the  virtuous  act  that 
is  required,  yet  if  this  command  is  obeyed,  the 
conclusion  follows  with  equal  positiveness.  that  the 
obedient  act  and  the  obedient  man  deserve  only 
good.  In  this  way  do  we  gain  our  completed  con- 
ception of  the  sumniuiH  bonuin  as  including,  _yi!">',s^,  the 
good  will,  which  is  itself  the  supreme  and  ultimate 
good  which  is  to  be  followed  for  its  own  sake  and 
obeyed  for  its  autocratic  authority,  and  next,  the 
reward  which  it  merits,  which  completes  the  circle 


193  kant's  ethics. 

of  possible  blessings  as  involving  every  kind  of  good 
that  is  conceivable,  i.e.,  the  snmmtim  honum.  No 
reason  is  given  for  this  connection  of  natural  with 
moral  good  as  its  reward.  Its  propriety  with  its 
consequent  authority,  according  to  Kant,  is  to  be 
accepted  as  an  ultimate  fact. 

In  this  doctrine  Kant  also  reminds  us  of  Butler, 
when  he  says,  "  Our  sense  or  discernment  of  actions 
as  morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  dis- 
cernment of  them  as  of  good  or  ill-desert"  (Diss.  II.); 
"  Upon  considering  them  or  viewing  together  our 
notion  of  vice  and  of  misery,  there  results  a 
third,  that  of  ill-desert."  These  judgments,  like  the 
others,  according  to  Butler,  are  not,  as  was  taught 
by  Kant,  original  and  inexplicable,  but  "  Our  per- 
ception of  vice  and  ill-desert  arises  from  and  is  the 
result  of  a  comparison  of  actions  ivith  the  nature 
and  capacities  of  the  agent.''''  By  what  process  or  on 
what  grounds  he  would  connect  the  two.  or  what  is 
involved  subjectively  or  objectively  in  the  act  of 
comparison  is  not  explained  by  Butler.  Nor  is  this 
necessary  for  our  purposes.  It  is  enough  that  we 
notice  that  he  grounds  the  connection  of  the  two 
upon  the  consideration  of  the  end  for  which  the 
moral  being  exists,  and  to  which  his  powers  are 
adapted;  in  other  words,  that  the  relation  of  good 


SUMMARY    OF    KAXT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     103 

01-  ill-desert  is  derived  from  the  relation  of  fitness  or 
suitableness  to  the  end  or  intention  or  idea  of  nat- 
ure, and  is  not,  as  is  held  by  Kant,  an  original  or 
axiomatic  truth  of  the  practical  or  moral  reason.  In 
other  words,  so  far  as  good  or  ill-desert  is  con- 
cerned, Butler  derives  the  concept  of  moral  from 
that  of  natural  good,  which  Kant  so  positively  repu- 
diates, both  in  form  and  in  fact. 

§  97.    The  will,  as  related  to  the  practical  reason, 
according  to  Kant,  is  the  capacity  in  man 

Kant's 

to  determine  himself  to  action  by  the  ap-  Doctrine  of 
prehension  of  the  laws  which  the  reason 
imposes.  So  far  as  this  will  is  not  determined  by 
any  of  the  natui'al  impulses  of  the  sensibility,  but 
obeys  the  behests  of  the  practical  reason,  it  is  called 
free,  i.e.,  free  from  sense  or  material  motives.  Yet 
in  being  free  from  these  laws  it  accepts  and  obeys 
the  moral  law. 

Natural  law,  however,  it  should  be  remembered, 
pertains  only  to  phenomena,  and  not  to  things  in 
themselves.  It  is  apprehended  of  and  enforced  upon 
phenomena  as  they  occur  under  the  form  of  time,  in 
order  to  make  experience  possible.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  power  to  accept  and.  so  to  speak,  to  en- 
force moral  law,  pertains  to  things  in  themselves, 
or  noiimeiKi,  of  which  causative  power  is  affirmed, 
13 


194  kant's  ethics. 

but  not  relations  of  time.  Through  the  practical 
i-eason  we  reach  reality,  the  Ding  an  sich,  the  Ego, 
or  the  soul,  the  nature  and  reality  of  which  we 
have  previously  striven  in  vain  to  discover.  This 
reality,  however,  is  not  given  directly  to  conscious 
experience  or  intuition,  but  it  is  given  hnpliedly 
so  far,  and  so  far  only,  as  reality  is  involved  in  the 
moral  law.  We  do  not  assert  freedom  as  a  posi- 
tive endowment  of  which  we  are  immediately  con- 
scious, but  we  discern  freedom  as  logically  involved 
in  the  conscious  fact  of  obligation.  We  do  not  say, 
I  can,  therefore  I  ouf/Jit,  to  choose  so  and  so.  i.e.,  to 
exercise  or  assert^  my  freedom,  but  /  otifflit,  fJtereforc 
I  can. 

We  are  reminded  here  of  the  familiar  lines  of 
Emerson,  which  were  doubtless  inspired  by  some  of 
the  memorable  and  spirit-stirring  utterances  of 
Kant: 

"So  nigh  is  grandeur  to  oiu"  dust, 
So  near  is  God  to  luaii. 
When  duty  whispers  low,  'Thou  must,' 
The  youth  replies,   'I  can.'" 

The  meaning  of  the  poet,  at  first  thought,  seems  to 
be  obvious,  but  on  a  second  reading  the  question 
might  still  arise,  whether  he  did  not  after  all  have  a 
glimmering  reference  to  the  Kantian  interpretation, 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     195 

and  find  in  its  paradox  a  poetic  mystery.  Some 
would  say  the  more  paradoxical  the  statement  the 
more  profound  the  truth.  But  on  second  thought 
most  readers  will  hnd  in  its  stirring  appeal  the  ut- 
terance of  the  most  solid  of  truths,  that  of  a  sense  of 
inward  power  aroused  by  the  trumpet  call  of  duty. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  will  is  also  called 
by  Kant  the  practical  reason,  because  the  truth 
which  it  assumes  and  enforces  is  the  moral  law,  in- 
volving the  idea  of  duty,  which  this  will  acknowl- 
edges by  its  subjective  assent  to  its  authority,  even 
when  it  disobeys  its  commands.  This  moral  law 
with  its  objective  authority,  moreover,  is  distin- 
guished from  a  mere  maxim  of  the  will,  which 
may  be  defined  as  an}^  special  rule  which  is  in  fact 

accepted  by  the  individual  man  for  himself,  and 
which  may  be  more  or  less  completely  conformed 
to  this  comprehensive  rule  or  law.     {Cf.  §57.) 

§  98.  Fi'eedom  as  the  ground  of  responsibility  is 
onlv  apnlicable  to  the  noumenon  or  thing- 

^  Freedom 

in-itself,  it  being  excluded  from  phenom-  in  the  Ego 
en  a  by  the  fact  that  these  only  obey  the 
law  of  causation.     And  yet  Kant  inconsistently  con- 
tends that  causation  can  connect  the  noumenon  with 
phenomena   for    the    reason  that  being  one    of  the 
categories,  it  may  be  applied  to  phenomena  as  such; 


196  Kant's  ethtos. 

overlooking,  as  it  would  seem,  that  it  is  only  between 
phenomenon  and  phenomenon  that  any  of  the  cate- 
gories apply.  In  this  way  he  finds  no  incompatibility 
between  necessary  law  and  supersensible  freedom. 
By  the  same  rule  he  distinguishes  between  a  perma- 
nent or  timeless  character  and  a  permanent  moral 
state,  regarded  as  the  product  of  will.  He  goes  so 
far  as  to  affirm  that,  given  a  man's  character,  every 
act  of  his  could  be"predicted  as  the  certain  and  neces- 
sary effect  of  his  permanent  moral  character  or 
state  ;  while  yet  for  this  character  man  himself  is 
responsible,  because  as  a  noumenon  he  is  its  origina- 
tor.* The  freedom  for  which  Kant  contends  in  any 
such  application  is  obviously  a  conception  entirely 
diffei-ent  from  that  which  he  had  defined  as  responsive 
to  the  imperative  of  reason,  and  therefore  the  negative 
of  an  impulse  of  sense,  and  in  that  sense  free;  it 
being  a  positive  function  which  is  recognized  as  the 
ground  of  personal  responsibility,  and  finds  its  war- 
rant in  that  direct  consciousness  which  Kant  usually 
treats  with  supercilious  disdain. 

The  InteUiyibJe  eliaracfer  of  the  noumenon  Ego. 
as  thus  explained,  is  also  used  by  Kant  as  the  basis 
and  explanation  of  that  characteristic  disposition  to 

*  Of.  Kant's  Lehre  von  rter  Freiheit,  etc.,  von  Dr.  Carl  Gerhard. 
Heidelberg:  Georg  Weiss.    1885. 


SUMMARY    OF    KAXT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     197 

moral  evil  which  lie  recognizes  as  one  of  the  conspic- 
uous facts  of  human  nature,  and  which  forms  the 
subject  of  a  special  essay  entitled,  "  Religion  Inner- 
halb  der  Grenzen  der  Reinen  Vernunft."  In  this 
essay  he  finds  in  his  ethical  theory  a  naturalistic  or 
physiological  explanation  of  the  theological  doctrine 
of  man's  natural  sinfulness  or  depravity,  finding  in 
the  reluctance  of  the  sensibility  toward  the  good 
the  ground  for  the  sense  of  obligation,  as  elsewhere 
explained.*     [Cf.  §§  25,  31,  38,  61,  69.) 

*  Dr.  Kurd  Lasswitz  (Die  Lehre  Kaiits  von  der  Idealitat  des  Raumes 
und  der  Zeit,  etc.  Berlin:  1883,  §§51-54)  distinguishes  tiie  /  or 
Ego  as  first  the  determining  agent  of  all  its  products  or  states,  and 
second  as  the  determined  product  of  its  own  activities.  To  the  first 
Ego  neither  the  categories  nor  the  time  and  space-forms  have  any 
application.  The  second  is  two- fold,  consisting  of  the  self-conscions 
Ego  as  known  in  its  several  states  and  objects  —  its  Individual  thoughts, 
feelings,  desires  and  resolves  —  and  the  objects  given  by  sense-percep- 
tion. Both  the  last  are  objects  of  experience,  i.e.,  whether  events  or 
beings,  the  experiences  of  consciousness  or  sense-perception,  and  both 
obey  the  law  of  necessity.  All  that  pertains  to  the  Ego  as  a  state  or  phe- 
nomenon, i.e.,  as  a  tliought,"  or  feeling,  or  conclusion,  obeys  the  law  of 
causation  as  truly  as  do  tliose  agents  which  we  call  physical  or  material, 
including  as  it  does  the  entire  realm,of  determined  psychical  experience. 
Behind  and  beneath  this  is  the  self-determined  Ego,which  by  an  activity 
of  its  own  originates  the  individual  moral  self  that  appears  in  con- 
sciousness as  a  determined  force,  and  gives  character  to  all  that  con- 
sciousness takes  note  of.  The  ingenious  author  insists  that  Kant  in 
this  way  intended  to  provide  for  two  noumena  in  the  Ego  —  the  real, 
active,  self-determining  Ego  of  moral  freedom,  and  the  second,  which 
is  the  complex,  or  content,  of  those  objects  and  relations  which  con- 
stitute experience  and  are  given  in  consciousness.  Of  the  first  only 
can  freedom  be  affirmed;  over  the  last  the  law  of  necessity  prevails. 

The  distinction  is  apparently  valid,  and  has  been  recognized  by 
others.  Cf.  Alfred  Holder:  Darstellung  der  Kantischen  Erkenntniss- 
theorie. Tiibingen,  1874,  i)p.  6()-64.  Cf.'S.  Porter:  The  Human  In- 
tellect, §§  86,  96. 


198  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

§  100.     We   notice  next  the   relations  of  Kant's 

Relation  of      ethics  to  his  Speculative  philosophy.     As 

an  b   t  109   ^g  have  seen,  in  the  soul's  knowledge  of 

to  Specula-  '  => 

tive  Truth.  i^s  own  freedom  is  involved  the  discern- 
ment of  noumena  or  things  in  themselves,  as  con- 
trasted with  phenomena  or  events  as  they  appear. 
Through  the  knowledge  of  itself  as  free  it  breaks  the 
shell  of  appearances,  which  follow  one  after  another, 
and,  so  to  speak,  depend  on  one  another  after  the 
laws  of  nature;  and  knows  itself,  the  Ego,  as  a  thing- 
in-itself  It,  moreover,  knows  itself  as  a  cause  pro- 
ducing phenomenal  effects  of  its  own,  yet  without 
disturbing  the  chain  or  connection  of  those  causes 
and  effects  which  follow  one  another  according  to 
natural  laws.  Its  knowledge  of  the  Ego  does  not, 
however,  involve  an  insight  into  its  constitution  or 
endowment  as  a  thing  in  itself,  but  only  as  capable 
of  free  origination,  and  this  so  far  only  as  the  moral 
law  implies  this  power,  its  exercise,  and  its  products. 
AVith  the  capacity  to  respond  to  this  law,  personality 
is  implied,  and  a  possible  community  of  persons  and 
aims  or  ends  of  activity  which  are  harmonious  with 
one  another.  Such  a  community  or  kingdom  of 
aims  or  ends  was  implied  indeed  in  the  statement  or 
definition  previously  given  by  Kant  of  the  matter  of 
the  moral  law  as  a  law  which  is  fit  to  be  universal. 


SUMMARY    OF    KaKT^S    tTHlCAL   THEORY.     199 

But  fitness  implies  adaptation  to  an  end,  and  tlie 
capacity  for  harmony  between  the  ends  of  each  in- 
dividual, as  also  a  harmony  with  and  subordination 
to  the  highest  end  of  each  and  all. 

It  appears  from  all  this  that  the  practical  reason 
in  the  Kantian  system  alone  gives  us  reality  or 
things  in  themselves,  so  far  as  to  justify  some  knowl- 
edge of  the  soul  as  a  noumenon.  The  moral  law 
which  enforces  duty  by  its  command  asserts  the 
reality  of  the  Ego  as  a  fact,  the  nature  of  which  and 
the  law  of  which  it  knows  only  by  those  phenomena 
or  conscious  experiences  in  which  the  soul  makes 
itself  manifest  as  an  ethical  force. 

§  101.  It  also  establishes  the  soul's  immortality, 
by  the  behests  of  the  practical   reason.  Ethical 

mi  I  •      1    •  J.-         •  J.        1  Grounds  for 

ine  categorical  imperative  is  not  only  a  ggij^j  jj, 
command  that  the  soul  should  obey  the  immortality 
moral  law,  wherein  are  implied  its  freedom  and  its 
actual  existence,  but  it  insists  that  the  obedient  soul 
shall  be  made  happy  simply  because  it  so  requires, 
and  therefore  assumes  that  the  soul  deserves  to 
become  so.  So  long  as  it  feels  obligation  it  is 
under  the  dominion  of  sensibility,  and  consequently 
there  must  ensue  a  constant  strife  between  the 
higher  law  of  duty  and  the  lower  or  emotional  im- 
pulses of  sense  and  passion.    So  long  as  this  struggle 


200  kaxt's  ethics. 

eontinues,  it  will  fail  to  attain  that  happiness  which 
the  practical  reason  —  the  supreme  arbiter  —  pro- 
nounces that  it  deserves.  But  if  it  deserves  this  it 
surely  will  attain  it,  because  the  practical  reason 
commands  it.  But  if  it  shall  attain  a  complete 
harmony  between  resisting  impulse  and  imperative 
law,  it  must  continue  to  exist  and  consequently  for 
all  practical  purposes  it  must  be  immortal  and  inde- 
structible, i.e.,  superior  to  any  of  those  natural  laws 
which  control  or  effect  those  changes  in  phenomena 
which  occur  in  time. 

If  the  practical  reason  requires  or  commands  that 
the  soul  should  continue  to  exist,  it  by  the  same  rule 
demands  that  God  should  exist,  in  order  that  its  own 
behests  concerning  the  rewards  which  goodness  de- 
serves should  in  fact  be  accomplished  through  Him. 
Thus,  by  an  ethical  necessity,  the  reality  of  certain 
nomnena  or  things  in  themselves  and  their  more  im- 
portant relations  are  established,  so  far,  at  least,  as 
the  practical  concerns  of  man  require.  At  the  same 
time  the  contrast  is  indicated  and  justified  between 
man's  absolute  ignorance  of  things  in  themselves,  on 
the  one  hand,  with  the  exceptions  provided  for,  and 
the  progressive  yet  limited  knowledge  which  he 
attains  of  their  relations  and  phenomena  under  nat- 
ural laws,  on  the  other. 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     201 

§  102.  To  the  brief  summary  which  we  have 
given  of  the  leading  principles  of  Kant's  Further  Re- 
ethical  system,  we  subjoin  the  follovvinof  ^' "" , "  "'"'" 
critical  remarks  and  queries.  The  first  imperative, 
which  we  select  is  the  categorical  impcrafirr  which  is 
enforced  and  assented  to  by  the  practical  reason, 
as  an  essential  attribute,  property,  or  element  of  the 
moral  law.  This  is  held  by  Kant  to  be  original  and 
simple  and  comparable  in  this  respect  to  any  one  of 
those  mathematical  relations  or  concepts  which  we  rec- 
ognize as  original.  It  is  also  capable  of  eliciting  emo- 
tions, or  one,  at  least,  viz. :  that  of  esteem  or  respect. 
The  discerned  relation  of  authority  is  on  the  one 
side,  and  the  felt  emotion  of  obligation  is  on  the 
other.  To  the  recognition  of  either  of  these  ele- 
ments as  original,  whether  the  objective  or  the  sub- 
jective, we  object  that  they  are  unique,  and  there- 
fore require  an  extraordinary  claim  upon  our  confi- 
dence. This  claim  they  are  so  far  from  justifying, 
through  their  use  in  explaining  "  human  experi- 
ence,'' that  they  contradict  the  analogies  of  this  ex- 
perience, while  the  phenomena  for  which  they  are 
required  can  be  satisfactorily  explained  by  being 
resolved  into  other  elements.  We  cannot  conceive 
of  a  mere  fhongJit  or  Judf/menf  of  moral  import, 
whether  in  the  general  or  the  individual  form,  like 


202  KANt\s    ETHK-'li, 

"Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor,"  or,  "Thou  shall 
relieve  the  hunger  of  A  or  B,"  that  is  capable  of  ue- 
ing  self-enforced  and  thus  invested  with  moral  au- 
thority. The  conception  of  authority  seems  w^holly 
disparate  with  or  unrelated  to  any  mere  thought  or 
judgment,  or  any  hypostasized  rational  or  intellectual 
entity. 

55  108.     We  accept  the  axiom  as  self-evident  that 
"  obligation  supposes  an  obliger,''  as  an 

Personality 

Essential  to  analytic  or  axiomatic  proposition,  because 
the  word  and  the  thought  suppose  a 
person  commanding  and  a  i)erson  responding,  with 
the  correlate  emotion  of  constraint.  It  would  seem 
to  follow  that  the  relation  and  the  feeling  it  evokes 
can  belong  only  to  one  person  as  set  over  against 
another,  and  under  any  conditions  that  might  evoke 
reverence  or  fear  by  command  or  direction.  For 
this  reason  it  is  held  by  a  recent  writer,  Dr.  James 
Martineau,*  that  these  cannot  exist  or  hold  except  of 
man  as  in  contact  with  his  fellow-man  or  as  subject  to 
Grod's  command.  But  man  is  not  only  a  political  and 
a  religious  animal,  he  maintains  an  economy  of  organ- 
ization and  rule  within  himself.  By  his  capacity  for 
self-consciousness  or  reflection  he  can  give  law  to 
himself  as  truly  as,  and  far  more  completely  than,  he 

*On  the  Relation  between  Ethics  and  Religion.    London:  1883. 
Cf.  Types  of  Ethical  Theory.    London:  1885. 


SUMMARY    OF    KAXT's    ETHICAL   THEOJiY.     203 

can  give  law  to  others.  He  can  obey  or  disobey 
himself,  and  reward  or  punish  himself  with  his  own 
complacence  or  displacency,  and  therefore  can  hold 
or  bind  himself  to  the  feelings  and  acts  which  he  ac- 
knowledges to  be  right  or  wrong.  It  is  only  as  we 
remember  that  man  is  endowed  with  consciousness; 
and  that  consciousness  can  be  thus  intensified  into 
reflection;  and  that  man  as  self-conscious  is  thereby 
capable  of  proposing  and  imposing  ideal  ends  and 
laws  for  himself  as  voluntary,  as  truly  as  for  others; 
and  that  he  can  respond  to  these  ideals  and  laws  by 
his  freely  choosing  will,  and  can  also  reflect  upon  his 
choices  and  decide  upon  their  conformit}'  or  noncon- 
formity to  the  law  self-imposed,  and  can  reward  or 
punish  himself  by  his  own  approval  or  condemnation 
—  it  is  only  as  we  remember  all  these  facts  and  relations 
that  we  can  ex[)Iain  obligation  and  authority  in  their 
highest  significance,  with  the  correlative  emotions  of 
reverence  and  constraint.  These  emphatically  moral 
relations  are  emphatically  personal  relationships. 
They  are  incapable  of  existing  where  personality  is 
wanting,  and  are  capable  of  existing  in  their  highest 
and  most  perfect  form  only  where  personal  relations 
are  most  energetic  and  intense.  These  facts  and  re- 
lations of  human  experience  are  not  denied  by  Kant. 
They  are  most  distinctly  recognized  by  him  so  soon 


204  kaxt's  ethics. 

as  they  come  prominently  into  bis  field  of  view.  At 
a  late  period  of  his  inquiries  he  defines  a  person 
as  one  who  is  an  end  to  and  within  himself,  and 
founds  on  this  definition  his  doctrine  of  human 
rights,  when  he  faces  the  doctrine  of  rights;  but 
be  overlooks  personality  altogether  in  his  formal 
exposition  of  moral  obligation  and  authority,  and  the 
categorical  imperative.  In  the  exposition  of  bis 
ethical  theory  and  the  practical  reason  he  loses  sight 
of  the  significance  of  personality,  with  its  individual 
will,  its  reflecting  reason,  and  its  interpreting  power, 
and  only  comes  back  to  it  after  having  asked  leave  of 
the  practical  reason  to  justify  bis  belief  in  the  re- 
ality of  this  noumenon  within  his  breast.  {Cf.  §  72.) 
§  103.  If  now  it  can  be  made  good  that  the  rela- 
Sense  of  tion  of  authority  itself,  with  its  attendant 

Complex  and  emotion,  can  be  derived  from  and  re- 
Denved.  solved  iuto  and  explained  by  other  known 

endowments  of  man's  nature,  it  follows  that,  neither 
as  intellectually  apprehended  nor  as  emotionally  re- 
sponded to,  can  it  be  accepted  as  an  original  relation  or 
ultimate  experience.  We  mean,  of  course,  when  we 
use  language  witrh  any  claim  or  effort  for  scientific 
exactness.  We  know  that  as  a  poetic  metaphor  or 
an  imaginative  expression,  such  a  representation  mav 
be  both  significant  and  satisfying;  but  for  this  very 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT'S    ETHICAL   THEORY.     205 

reason  it  may  be  the  more  misleading  when  there 
is  any  danger  of  its  being  mistaken  for  analytic 
or  exact  terminology.  If  by  the  practical  reason 
we  are  undei-stood  to  mean  the  reflective  reason 
when  it  confronts  voluntary  activities,  there  can  be 
no  objection  to  such  an  application  of  the  term.  But 
if  the  categorical  imperative  is  made  to  describe  a 
constraining  force  over  the  feelings  or  will,  which  is 
supposed  to  be  emitted  or  to  proceed  from  an  intel- 
lectual judgment  or  proposition,  instead  of  the  activ- 
ity of  a  living  personality,  then  we  cannot  but  call 
it  a  metaphor  and  treat  it  as  such. 

§  104.     We  prefer  our  own  solution  to  the  Kant- 
ian,—  if  the  latter  deserves  to  be  called 

The  Two 

an  explanation,  and  not  a  mere  figure  of  Explanations 

,  ,  •,         /.  i       1  Contracted. 

speech. —  because  it  reiers  us  to  known 
human  endowments  which  cannot  be  denied,  and 
recognizes  their  familiar  activit}^  and  their  universal 
prevalence,  and  because  it  fully  explains  a  problem 
which  the  Kantian  theory  does  not  attempt  to  solve, 
but  declares  to  be  inexplicable,  and  which  it  then 
proceeds  to  envelop  in  a  cloud  of  imposing  imagery, 
and  to  speed  on  the  winged  woi'ds  of  a  soaring 
poetic  diction.  Our  solution  holds  fast  to  the  author- 
ity of  the  moral  reason  and  the  moral  law,  as  recog- 
nized bv  both  Kant  and  Butler,     So  far  as  Butler 


306  rant's  ethics. 

recognizes  simple  authority  as  the  distinctive  attri- 
bute of  the  moral  reason  or  the  moral  nature  in  the 
way  of  personification,  without  any  explanation  of 
the  natural  endowments  which  make  it  possible,  so 
far  is  he  fairly  open  to  criticism.  So  far  as  he 
resolves  the  possession  and  use  of  this  authority  into 
the  nature  of  man  as  a  reflective  and  voluntaiy 
being,  so  far  does  he  make  his  theory  rational. 

Another  unique  feature  which  remains  to  be  noticed 
in  Kant's  conception  of  obligation,  is  that  he  conditions 
it  entirely  on  the  supposed  resistance,  reaction,  or  re- 
luctance of  the  passions  and  emotions  of  the  sentient 
soul.  So  long  as  a  struggle  arises  between  the  reluc- 
tant passions  and  the  imperative  reason  —  not,  be  it 
observed,  between  the  lower  and  higher  emotions, 
for  such  a  distinction  is  not  admitted  by  Kant,  but 
between  feeling  and  authority  —  then,  and  only  then, 
obligation  will  be  felt.  When  the  passions  are  all 
at  rest  in  perfected  harmony,  then  a  state  of  holiness 
ensues,  as  contrasted  with  a  condition  of  reluctant 
but  obedient  virtue,  and  then  obligation  ceases  to  be 
felt  or  known.  "  The  perfected  spirits  of  the  just," 
according  to  Kant,  have  no  sense  or  experience  of 
obligation.  A  paradoxical  statement,  like  this,  can 
only  be  accounted  for  by  the  necessities  of  a  one- 
sided theory. 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT'S    ETHICAL   THEORY.     207 

§  105.     The  next  point  to  be  considered  is  Kant's 
conception    and   attempted  definition   of  Kant's 
the    moral    law.     The    practical   reason,    f^P  ""^''"" 

'■  '  of  the 

according  to  Kant,  confronts  the  will  Moral  Law. 
with  the  categorical  imperative.  It  authoritatively 
commands  the  will,  but  to  do  or  to  be  what?  If  it 
meets  the  will  which,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  cer- 
tainly a  power  to  do  or  become  something,  what  does 
it  propose  that  it  be  or  do?  Whether  it  be  in  the  gen- 
eral command,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor,  or  in  the 
concrete.  Thou  shalt  will  or  give  him  food,  there  must 
be  a  definite  kind  of  feeling  or  doing  proposed  or  com- 
manded. What  is  this  command?  This  question  has 
often  been  asked,  and  each  answer  represents  a  sepa- 
rate theory  in  ethics.  To  this  question,  as  we  have 
seen,  Kant  gives  no  answer  except  the  mere  formal 
rule.  See  that  your  law  be  universal,  or  fit  to  be  univer- 
sal—  that  is,  that  it  admit  no  exception — when  it  comes 
to  be  applied.  What  Kant  means  by  this  criterion 
he  illustrates  by  the  four  oft-repeated  suppositions 
of  temptation  to  personal  degradation,  to  suicide,  to 
an  idle  and  self-indulgent  life,  and  to  falsehood.  We 
have  seen  that  in  every  one  of  these  cases  this  unfit- 
ness to  be  universal  is  exemplified  b}'^  the  tendency 
of  the  conduct  to  hinder  or  mar  human  well-being. 
This,  Kant  would  say,   is  a  mere  accident   of  the 


308  kant's  ethics. 

mattei-,  with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do.  It  is  onl}'- 
with  the  actual  necessity  that  the  law  should  be  uni- 
versal that  he  is  concerned,  not  at  all  with  the  fact  that 
the  act  should  always  conduce  to  human  well-being. 
If  this  be  so,  then  it  is  the  fact  that  the  rule  admits 
no  exception;  that  is,  it  is  its  formal  universality 
alone  which  gives  it  its  binding  force.  But  mere 
universality,  as  such,  when  separated  from  univer- 
sal results  of  blessing,  would  invest  the  law  with  no 
moral  authority.  Rather  would  it  be  the  farther 
removed  from  such  dignity,  the  more  manifest  it  be- 
came that,  in  its  tendency  to  natural  evil,  it  was  con- 
sistent with  itself.     Does  not  Milton  truly  tell  us: 

"     *    *    *    devil  with  devil  damn'd 
Finn  concord  holds;  men  only  disagree." 

The  actual  universality  of  a  law,  or  the  universal 
approval  of  the  same,  can  only  be  interpreted  as 
the  evidence  of  its  manifest  tendency  to  promote 
the  well-being  of  those  whom  it  concerns.  It  is 
strange,  indeed,  that  an  eye  usually  so  acute  as  was 
Kant's  should  fail  to  penetrate  so  thin  a  disguise. 

The  examples  selected  by  Kant,  as  explained  by 
himself,  show  that  so  far  as  the  content  of  the  moral 
law  is  concerned,  in  each  of  the  instances  supposed, 
it  has  solely  to  do  with  its  bearing  on  human  well- 
being.     Kant  does  not  seem  to  be  aware  of  this  fact; 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT'S    ETHICAL    THEORY.     209 

for  not  only  are  these  the  only  examples  which  he 
quotes,  but  they  are  repeated  by  him  again  and 
again,  in  oi'der  to  make  clear  what  he  thinks  of  the 
content  of  the  moral  law,  and  the  reasons  for  its 
being  of  universal  obligation.  Considerations  of  this 
sort  constitute  and  exhaust  his  entire  repertory  of 
reasons. 

§  106.  Tills  is  very  remarkable  when  considered 
in  connection  with  his  constantly  repeat-  Kant's  view 
ed  assertion  that  the  nature  of  man  can  °^  1^13"^'°'^'"'  ^ 
never,  as  the  ancients  taught  us,  explain  Moral  Nature. 
the  content  of  the  moral  law,  this  being  transient 
matter,  the  product  of  arbitrary  conditions,  and 
therefore  inferior  to  tJie  eternal  forms  of  things, 
which  are  supposed  to  be  incapable  of  change  and 
dissolution.  Kindred  to  this  was  the  assertion,  which 
we  shall  have  occasion  to  consider,  that  feeling,  as 
such,  and  anything  which  excites  feeling,  is  transient 
and  unstable  matter,  and  therefore  incapable  of 
being  the  element  or  ground  of  any  rule  of  duty. 
The  untenableness  and  the  inconsistenc}'  of  Kant's 
strictures  upon  the  derivation  of  the  moral  law  from 
the  constitution  of  human  nature,  and  upon  the  defini- 
tion by  the  Aristotelian  and  Stoic  schools  of  virtue 
as  a  life  according  to  nature,  and  their  rule  of  duty 

as  derived   from   the   nature  of   things   in  general, 
14 


210  kant's  ethics. 

together  with  the  dishonor  which  he  puts  upon  feel- 
ing as  an  uncertain  and  unstable  element  in  the 
construction  of  any  ethical  system,  are  eminently 
chai'acteristic  of  his  theory,  and  are  continually  pre- 
senting themselves  in  one  form  or  another,  as 
stones  of  stumbling  to  the  ingenuous  mind. 

§  107.     Kant's  doctrine  of  the  will  and  of  free- 
Further  Criti-   dora  is  obscure  and  unsatisfactory.     It  is 

cism  of  Kant's     ■,  ^  p  •  i_  •  i-  xi 

Doctrine  of  Clear  only  SO  tar  as  it  is  negative,  t  ree- 
the  Will.  (Jqj^-^  j^  g^  condition  opposed  to  that  of  be- 

ing bound  by  natural  laws,  viz.:  those  laws  which 
govern  phenomena  and  which  are  assumed  a  priori 
to  be  necessary  in  order  to  make  experience  possible. 
In  contrast  with  the  dominion  of  these  laws,  it  is 
asserted  that  the  will  is  free;  or  rather  it  is  con- 
cluded that  it  must  be  free  for  the  reason  that  man 
ought  to  obey  the  moral  law.  The  fact  or  truth  of 
freedom  is  not  known  by  conscious  intuition.  Indeed 
no  positive  activity  is  asserted  of  choice  or  selection 
of  one  of  two  conflicting  objects  or  between  conflict- 
ing natural  impulses.  The  belief  in  freedom,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  is  in  no  sense  direct  and  immediate. 
It  is  uniformly  held  as  an  inference  from  another 
fact  or  truth.  The  proposition  which  expresses  our 
faith  is,  We  ought,  therefore  we  can.  The  truth 
that  tve  ought  comes  first  and  the  truth  that  ire  can 


StTMMAilY   OF   KANt's   ETHICAL  THEORY.    211 

comes  last,  as  implied  and  enforced  by  the  categori- 
cal imperative  of  the  practical  reason.  We  know 
that  we  can  in  knowing  that  we  ought.  But  why  or 
how.  we  are  not  informed.  It  is  pointedly  denied, 
however,  that  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  naturally 
or  morally  free. 

That  there  neither  is  nor  can  be  any  incompati- 
bility between  freedom  and  necessity  is  urged  by 
Kant,  and  reasoned  by  him  on  the  ground  that 
necessity  pertains  to  phenomena,  while  freedom  can 
belong  only  to  noumena.  We  interpret  phenomena 
by  causal  relations  under  natural  laws,  in  order  to 
make  experience  possible,  that  is,  in  order  to  explain 
the  past  and  adapt  ourselves  to  the  future.  We  in- 
terpret freedom  of  noumena  as  being  something  more 
and  possibly  exempt  from  natural  laws,  even  though 
we  conceive  of  them  as  causal  in  their  activity  within 
the  world  of  phenomena.  But  while  we  know  this 
truth  because  the  exigencies  of  the  moral  law  force  it 
upon  our  assent,  this  is  all  that  we  know.  We  are 
constrained  by  the  reality  of  freedom,  and  accept  it 
as  trustworthy  simply  because  it  is  essential  to  the 
assent  which  we  cannot  deny  to  the  authority  of  the 
categorical  imperative. 

The  critic  of  Kant  does  not  find  it  very  difficult  to 
urge  that  Kant's  axiom,  wp  oiu/Iit,  tJtPrefore  we  can, 


213  Kant's  ethics. 

is  an  analytic  or  identical  proposition,  asserting  that 
as  the  ground  of  our  conviction  of  the  fact  of  obliga- 
tion, there  is  involved  the  discernment  of  the  fact  of 
freedom.  The  circumstance  that  Kant  is  never  con- 
sciously responsible  for  any  psychological,  as  distin- 
guished from  a  metaphysical,  analysis,  does  not 
make  it  any  the  less  difficult  to  suppose  that  he  may 
mistake  the  one  for  the  other.  But  of  this  more  in 
another  place. 

§  108.     That  Kant  does  scant  justice  to  the  range 

„  ,,  r  .  and  import  of  those  truths  w^hich  self- 
Kant's  Late  ^ 

andinade-       consciousness  attests  is  still  more  strik- 

quate  Recog- 
nition of  ingly  manifest  from  his  scant  recognition 
urpose.  ^^  ^^^^  ^^_  design  as  an  element  of  person- 
ality and  a  condition  of  moral  obligation.  Freedom 
implies  a  choice  of  a  supreme  end  when  recognized 
as  fitted  and  designed  to  control  free  action,  per- 
sonal emotion,  and  individual  activity.  This  im- 
plies that  a  rational  universe  supposes  a  harmony  to 
be  possible  between  the  best  acts  of  its  constituent 
members,  and  the  best  acts  and  results  of  all  acting 
together.  In  the  enumeration  of  the  categories  of 
the  pure  or  the  practical  reason  we  find  no  distinct 
recognition  of  this  fundamental  relation  as  such, 
and  consequently  no  provision  for  the  use  of  the 
same  in  the  analysis  or  explanation  of  scientific  or 


SUMMAKY    OF    KANT's    ETHICAL   THEORY,     213 

ethical  truth.  Consequently  it  is  not  surprising  that 
we  find  this  relation  nowhere  recognized  by  Kant  as 
furnishing  the  explanation  of  the  authority  of  the 
moral  law  over  the  personal  will. 

We  contend  that  the  end  for  which  one  or  more 
forces  or  agencies  exist,  especially  if  it  coiitrols  the 
combined  or  conspiring  activity  of  many  others,  is 
rightly  conceived  as  exercising  authority  over  all 
these  forces,  and  acting  as  a  lawgiver  and  law-en- 
forcer for  them  all.  If  we  find  any  form  of  natural 
good  appearing  to  control  unconscious  existence  or 
instinctive  action,  it  is  regarded  as  invested  with 
authority  and  imposing  the  necessity  of  obedience. 
If  it  is  consciously  recognized  as  fit  to  control  the  ac- 
tions and  results  of  one  who  obeys  and  disobeys  its 
behests,  it  is  conceived  as  his  ruler,  which  will  not  be 
trifled  with,  as  exercising  a  mastery  which  is  none 
the  less  an  object  of  reverence  even  if  the  power 
which  it  evokes  is  blind.  If  a  man  offends  against 
his  own  nature,  i.e.,  his  own  living  self,  as  represented 
by  the  purpose  which  is  the  law  for  his  being  as  to  its 
best  possible  achievements,  he  acknowledges  its  right 
to  command  when  he  feels  its  power  to  condemn  and 
punish.  If  he  attains  any  just  idea  of  the  excel- 
lence of  the  good  (the  natural  good)  which  he  might 
have  achieved,  and  the  badness  of  the  loss  which  he 


214  Kant's  ethics. 

has  incurred,  he  invests  such  a  purpose  with  author- 
ity over  his  will  as  supreme,  having  a  sacredness 
which  can  be  compared  with  no  other.  But  in 
order  that  these  experiences  may  be  possible  these 
psychological  and  metaphysical  elements  must  be 
recognized  and  applied.  Kant  fails  in  both,  and 
consequently  fails  in  the  explanation  of  attaining  a 
good  or  satisfactory  theory  of  the  most  important  of 
ethical  experiences,  that  of  moral  obligation.  As  if 
to  atone  for  his  failure,  he  substitutes  for  it  a  fig- 
ment of  the  poetic  imagination,  which  he  invests 
with  the  borrowed  drapery  of  factitious  disinterest- 
edness, doing  violence  at  the  same  time  to  the  most 
sacred  and  inextinguishable  of  human  aspirations, 
the  realization  of  its  highest  natural  capacities  of  de- 
sire and  impulse,  and  displacing  the  rights  of  the 
supreme  reason  by  the  pretended  claims  of  a  blind 
impei'ative  which  owns  no  allegiance  to  the  nature 
of  man,  but  authoritatively  issues  its  unreasoned  de- 
mands, in  response  to  which  it  requires  an  unemo- 
tional and  an  unreasoning  will. 

§  109.     It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that  in  the 
logical  and  natural  consequence  of  this 

°  Kant's  Failure 

double  defect  —  subjectively  in  respect  to  to  do  Justice 

freedom,  and    objectively    in    respect  to 

purpose  —  Kant  should  fail  to  recognize  the  ethical 


SUMMARY  OP  Kant's  ethical  theory.   215 

significance  of  personality.  In  psychology  he  knows 
no  other  Ego  than  a  noumenon  capable  of  the  sole 
function  of  reverently  responding  to  an  irrational 
moral  law,  the  authority  of  which  it  blindly  respects 
and  freely  though  reluctantly  follows,  while  in  sci- 
ence it  is  known  by  its  reflex  in  a  synthetic  apper- 
ception of  the  unity  which  it  imparts  to  the  objects  of 
knowledge.  The  self-conscious  Ego,  as  a  choosing 
and  loving  being  which  knows  its  powers  and  possi- 
bilities by  its  self-conscious  judgment,  and  proposes 
aims  to  itself  which  it  imposes  as  laws  ;  which,  as 
will,  chooses  or  refuses  the  good  which  is  made  possi- 
ble by  its  capacities  ;  and  which  by  these,  as  stand- 
ards, measures  and  judges  its  acts  and  attainments  — 
of  all  this  he  knows  nothing  as  the  foundation  of  his 
ethical  conceptions  or  emotions,  but,  instead  thei-eof, 
gives  us  the  dry  scaffolding  of  a  merely  logical 
hypostasis  which  he  illumines  with  the  weird  light 
of  fantastic  illustrations. 

When  he  approaches  the  sphere  of  concrete  real- 
ities and  touches  the  realm  of  the  actual,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  he  recognizes  the  importance  and 
significance  of  personality;  especially  when  he  treats 
of  the  doctrine  of  human  rights  in  his  Metaphysik 
der  Sitten. 

§    110.      Kant's     dogmatic    depreciation    of    the 


^16  Kant's  ethics. 

emotions  in  his  ethical  theory  is  open  to  the  most 
„.  ^        .      decided   criticism.     From  the  beffinningr 

His  Deprecia-  °  ° 

tion  of  the       to  the  end  of  his  expositions  he  excludes 

Emotions 

and  the  any    recognition    of  the   sensibilities  in 

' '  ^'  faculty  or  manifestation,  for  the  compre- 
hensive reason  that  they  are  necessarily  changeable 
with  the  individual,  and  consequently  are  incapable 
of  any  fixed  relationships  which  involve  permanent 
and  universal  worth.  In  this  general  position,  which 
is  constantly  assumed  or  asserted,  Kant  overlooks 
two  considerations;  the  first  that  the  sensibilities  as 
such  are  no  matter  of  ethical  valuation  or  authority, 
but  only  the  sensibilities  as  energized  and  regulated 
by  the  will.  It  is  not  the  positive  strength  of  any 
or  all  of  the  passions,  as  a  natural  or  a  hereditary 
endowment,  nor  the  relative  intensity  or  energy  of 
any  one  when  thus  estimated,  which  is  praise-  or 
blame-worthy,  but  it  is  the  positive  strength  of  one 
or  the  relative  energy  of  many  as  the  expression  of 
the  individual  will,  that  constitutes  character,  and 
is  the  object  of  ethical  approval  or  condemnation. 
While  it  is  true,  as  Kant  contends,  that  sensibility 
or  emotion,  as  such,  is  involuntary,  accidental, 
and  arbitrary,  and  subject  to  all  manner  of  caprices, 
it  is  equally  true  that  the  emotions  as  volition- 
ized  are  susceptible  of   constant   relations  with   an 


StJMMAKY   OF   KANT^S    ^:THICAL  THEORY.    217 

ever-varying  material,  and  that  under  an  endless 
variety  of  energy  and  activity  there  may  be  con- 
stancy of  proportion  under  the  controlling  energy 
of  the  central  will.  Man's  natural  sensibilities  of 
every  sort,  his  responsive  loves  and  hatreds,  his 
sympathies  and  antipathies,  seem  as  changeable  and 
capricious  as  the  lawless  wind;  but  whenever  and  so 
far  as  they  meet  in  conflict  and  measure  their  claims 
by  the  highest  possibilities  of  human  nature,  so  far 
do  they  admit  a  standard,  a  law,  a  sentence  and  its 
execution;  in  other  words,  so  far  do  they  provide  for 
moral  relations,  making  them  both  possible  and 
necessary.  Tlie  second  consideration  overlooked  by 
Kant  is,  that  the  will  without  sensibility  is  incapable 
of  stimulating  or  directing  activity,  lacking,  as  it 
does,  any  material  to  regulate,  and  the  motives  which 
might  give  life  to  the  moral  purposes,  and  warmth 
and  energy  to  the  inner  life.  Kant's  will,  without 
feeling,  is  simply  a  capacity  for  responding  to  duty 
and  inspiring  to  outward  action  by  demand  of  the 
reason,  without  involving  the  emotions.  The  re- 
sponses of  such  impulses  must  consequently  be 
colorless  and  cold.  Should  the  affections  glow  with 
saintly  or  seraphic  ardor,  with  self-sacrificing  benev- 
olence or  heroic  self-control,  so  far  as  the  devotee  of 
duty  finds  in  his  conscious  delight  in  the  exercise  of 


218  KANT^S   ETHICS. 

any,  even  the  highest  sensibilities,  an  aniniating 
impulse  or  a  ground  of  satisfaction,  as  contradistin- 
guished from  the  simple  imperative  of  the  moral 
law,  so  far,  according  to  Kant,  would  the  morality 
of  his  motives  be  weakened  and  dishonored,  and  the 
purity  of  his  affections  be  soiled  and  smirched. 
Moreover,  he  teaches  that  a  command  to  love,  or  to 
exercise  or  indulge  any  emotion,  is  absurd  in  the 
eye  of  reason,  which  could  issue  in  no  moral  result 
were  it  obeyed.  The  categorical  imperative,  he  tells 
us,  requires  acts,  not  feelings,  for  with  feelings  it 
disdains  to  concern  itself.  It  would  seem  when  love 
becomes  most  pure,  according  to  Kant's  own  theory, 
that  it  is  no  longer  an  activity  of  reluctant  duty, 
but  an  inspii'ation  of  aspiring  holiness,  but  at  that 
instant  it  ceases  to  have  any  properly  moral  quality, 
because  it  is  swallowed  up  in  an  afflatus  of  emo- 
tional sympathy.  So  far,  too,  as  its  subjective  as- 
pects are  concerned,  the  form  of  virtue  which  Kant 
would  sanction  and  cultivate  is  manifestly  apathetic 
and  unsympathizing.  It  is  stoical  rather  than  hu- 
mane, self-relying  rather  than  benevolent;  if  it  is 
self-governed  and  just,  it  is  cold  and  hard.  From 
what  we  learn  of  Kant's  personal  character  and  his 
domestic  education,  we  are  confirmed  in  the  conclu- 
sion which  would   be  suggested  by  his  speculative 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     219 

system,  that  bis  own  morale  was  chiefly  concerned 
with  acts  rather  than  with  feelings,  at  the  same  time 
that  it  was  severe  in  its  principles  and  uncompro- 
mising in  its  requirements.  His  speculative  and 
practical  views,  as  it  would  seem,  were  also  largely 
affected  by  his  antagonism  to  the  fanatical  emotion- 
alism of  Rousseau,  who  was  in  his  eyes  the  repre- 
sentative of  speculative  and  practical  sentimentalism, 
and  very  naturally  found  little  favor  with  the  ex- 
pounder of  the  categorical  imperative  and  the  practi- 
cal reason;  It  is  beyond  dispute  or  question  that  Kant 
was  the  expounder  and  representative  of  an  entirely 
different  practical  theory,  and  it  seems  equally  ob- 
vious that  the  reaction  which  he  represented  was 
equally  extreme  in  the  opposite  direction  from  Rous- 
seau. Nature,  however,  will  have  her  revenges,  and 
so  we  observe  that  Kant  does  not  always  succeed  in 
overlooking  or  eliminating  the  element  of  feeling. 
He  is  too  honest  and  logical  to  the  truth  of  human 
experience  entirely  to  overlook  the  AcJitiiiig,  or  es- 
teem for  the  law,  which  he  confesses  is  conspicuous 
in  human  experience,  although  he  strives  to  square 
it  with  his  theory  by  denying  that  it  is  properly  an 
emotion  at  all.  The  elevating  and  self-satisfied 
peace  of  a  good  man  he  was  too  true  to  nature  to 
deny  or  overlook,  and  yet  the  dominant  spirit  of  his 


220  kant's  ethics. 

system  was  sharply  and  strongly  antagonistic  to 
feeling  or  emotion  of  any  kind,  either  as  a  specula- 
tive or  practical  element. 

§  111.  We  notice  the  intellect nal  services  to  which 
Theinteiiec-  the  Kantian  Ethics  have  been  applied. 
tuaiAppii-       ^Yg  jj^^g  alreadv  adverted  to  the  impor- 

cation  of  .,1 

Kanfs  Ethics,  tance  which  Kant  ckimed  for  his  practi- 
cal as  a  supplement  to  the  speculative  reason.  We 
have  also  stated  the  course  of  thought  by  which  he 
made  it  to  command  the  soul  on  its  allegiance  to 
duty  to  accept  such  truths  as  the  existence  and  im- 
mortality of  the  soul  and  the  being  of  God.  Such 
positive  and  extraordinar}'  claims  for  experiences 
so  commanding  are  imposing  by  reason  of  the  con- 
fidence with  which  they  are  urged  and  the  impor- 
tance of  the  truths  which  they  are  supposed  to  make 
axiomatic.  That  the  demands  of  duty  extend  to  the 
nse  which  we  make  of  the  intellect  in  its  search  for 
truth  is  most  obvious,  and  that  the  fidelity  with 
which  we  respond  to  these  claims  often  determines 
the  results  cannot  be  denied.  But  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  occasion  for  the  interposition  of  the  so-called 
practical  reason  is  precisely  what  Kant  represents  it 
to  be,  or  that  the  method  by  which  it  supplies  the 
needs  of  the  speculative  reason  is  that  which  his 
theory  of  its  nature  supposes. 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT'S    ETHICAL   THEORY.     221 

§  112.  First  of  all  there  is,  we  conceive,  a  subtle 
but  fascinating  haziness  in  the  concep-  Authority 
tions  of  Kant  and  many  other  schools  in  °^  pj^^c'if"*^*^ 
respect  to  the  evidence,  authority,  and  Questions. 
trustworthiness  of  experience,  especially  in  our  ethi- 
cal activities.  That  is  a  simple  haziness  of  thought, 
if  it  be  not  sometimes  a  mystic  dogmatism,  which  con- 
ceives of  experimental  and  ethical  knowledge  as  in 
its  nature  more  positive  and  satisfying  simply  because 
it  is  unlike  the  ordinary  processes  of  the  intellect 
when  applied  to  other  than  matters  of  faith  and 
duty.  When  it  is  said  in  common  life  that  experience 
will  test  ethical  truth  as  nothing  else  besides,  or 
when  it  is  declared  that  the  honest  conscience  de- 
cides many  a  sophistical  doctrine  to  be  incredible, 
however  plausible  and  unanswerable  it  may  seem  to 
be;  when  it  is  said  by  Kant  that  it  is  in  order  that 
experience  may  be  possible  that  we  are  forced  to  ac- 
cept and  assert  as  a  priori  the  forms  of  sense,  the  cate- 
gories of  the  understanding,  and  the  ideas  of  the  rea- 
son, we  assume  that  the  knowledge  given  and  tested 
by  experience  must  be  trustworthy,  not  directly  be- 
cause of  its  practical  importance,  but  rather  because 
men  will  not  trust  the  interests  of  their  daily  and 
personal  life  to  any  other  than  to  such  satisfying  evi- 
dence as  is  sun-clear  and  sun-bright.     It  certainly 


222  kant's  ethics. 

cannot  be  good  logic  or  good  sense  to  reason  simply 
that  because  men  must  live,  or  gain  any  other  good, 
therefore  the  knowledge  which  they  must  accept  in 
order  to  live  must  always  be  reliable,  and  that  for 
this  reason  the  relations  of  time  and  space  and  the 
other  a  priori  conditions  of  experience  must  in  some 
sense  be  trustworthy.  And  yet  it  may  be  both  good 
logic  and  good  sense  to  reason  that  our  confidence  in 
any  knowledge  which  is  actually  tx'usted  in  ex- 
perience must  be  as  clear  and  as  self-evident  as  the 
light.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  true  that  to  the 
practical  appeal,  II  faut  vivre,  the  reply  is  sometimes 
pertinent,  Je  nen  vols  pas  la  necessite. 

Similarly,  it  sounds  very  satisfactory  to  say  that  the 
practical  reason  of  the  conscience  requires  that  we 
believe  in  freedom,  immortality,  and  God,  because 
the  moral  law  commands  us  so  to  believe,  and  to  rest 
on  the  acceptance  of  this  ignava  ratio,  that  we  must 
discern  facts  or  relations  to  be  true,  because  other- 
wise faith,  and  duty,  and  hope,  would  be  impossible. 
But  this  is  the  logic  of  Kant,  and  it  is  by  buttresses  of 
this  sort,  if  his  meaning  is  rightly  interpreted,  that 
he  would  support  what  he  thinks  to  be  the  tottering 
pillars  of  faith  and  conscience.  That  when  opposed 
to  the  analysis  of  speculation,  Kant's  ethical  fervor 
has  often  been  efl:ective,  when  re-cast  and  re-inter- 


SUMMAEY   OF   KANT's    ETHICAL  THEORY.     223 

preted  by  the  unreflecting  good  sense  of  many 
readers,  we  do  not  deny.  That  he  has  often  been  a 
most  effective  assertor  of  the  speculative  and  practi- 
cal authority  of  moral  truth  and  religious  verity, 
we  do  not  deny,  but  that  this  renders  any  the  more 
trustworthy  his  uncalled-for  concessions  of  the  limit- 
ations of  the  speculative  reason,  and  his  equally  un- 
authorized extension  of  the  functions  of  the  practical 
reason,  we  do  not  believe  to  be  true.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  fervor  of  his  assertions  of  the  authority  of 
ethical  and  his  occasionally  eloquent  expositions  of 
spiritual  truth,  it  may  be  seriously  questioned 
whether  the  honeycombed  scepticism  of  his  specu- 
lative theory  has  not  occasioned  unmeasurably 
greater  mischief  than  his  magniloquent  and  occa- 
sionally really  eloquent  utterances  for  freedom  and 
immortality  and  God  have  been  able  to  prevent  or 
to  cure. 

There  cannot  be  the  least  objection  to  the  trial  of 
every  system  of  philosophical  truth  by  ethical  tests, 
provided  these  tests  are  legitimately  applied,  but  to 
assume  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  evidence  which 
have  no  common  foundation  and  which  require  a  dif- 
ferent or  an  irreconcilable  logic,  the  so-called  logic  of 
the  intellect  and  the  logic  of  the  conscience,  is  to 
accept  a  fundamental  logic  which  will  be  found  to  be 


224  rant's  ethics. 

irreconcilable  with  either  science  or  faith.  In  the 
reasonings  which  we  have  emploj^ed  in  this  treatise, 
from  the  practical  features  and  tendencies  of  Kant's 
own  system,  to  its  speculative  weakness  or  truth,  we 
constantly  assume  that  what  is  speculatively  true 
will  commend  itself  as  such  to  the  unsophisticated 
common  sense  and  permanent  convictions  of  man- 
kind, especially  when  these  are  tested  by  the  trying 
exigencies  of  practical  life,  because  we  believe  that 
all  ethical  and  spiritual  convictions  stand  on  definite 
and  discernible  speculative  foundations. 

This  truth  may  suggest  the  last  topic  of  criticism, 
which  is  none  other  than  the  relations  of  Kant's 
ethical  and  speculative  system  to  the  Christian  ethics 
and  to  theistic  and  Christian  truth. 

§  113.  The  Christian  ethics  are  characteristically 
Kant's  Ethics  Severe,  uncompromising,  and  authorita- 
andthe  ^-^^^   ^^  ^j^^  ^^^  hand,  while   they  are 

Contrasted.  singularly  sympathetic  and  tolerant, 
charitable  and  humane,  on  the  other.  The  Kantian 
ethics  are  certainly  no  more  elevated  in  their  practi- 
cal ideals  than  are  the  Christian;  assuredly  the}^  are 
no  more  positive  in  asserting  the  authority  of  the 
moral  law.  We  may  perhaps  concede  that  the  two 
systems  in  spirit  and  requirements  are  equally  rigor- 
ous  and    uncompromising.     But   in   respect  to  the 


SUMMARY    OF    KANT's    ETHICAL   THEORY.     225 

gentler  and  the  more  sympathetic  affections,  they 
scarcely  belong  to  the  same  family.  Emotion  in  all 
its  forms  is  the  very  soul  of  the  Christian  system. 
Feeling  is  the  consummate  flower  of  Christian  virtue 
in  all  its  varied  hues  of  tenderness  and  sympathy. 
In  the  theory  of  Kant  sensibility  has  no  place,  except 
a  place  of  weakness  and  inferiority.  It  never  is 
recognized  as  capable  of  being  strengthened  and 
hai'dened  by  the  will,  while  in  the  Christian  system, 
if  emotion  be  wanting,  whether  in  its  severer  or  its 
gentler  forms,  its  absence  is  considered  a  sign  of 
special  defect.  The  tolerance  and  forgiveness  of 
Christian  virtue  is  scarcely  provided  for  by  Kant's 
speculative  theory  or  his  practical  rules.  Marcus 
Aurelius  is  immeasurably  more  Christian  in  the  char- 
acteristically Christian  emotions  than  is  the  unsympa- 
thizing  Kant,  who  is  always  stern,  though  sometimes 
sublime  in  his  rigid  severity.  So  far  as  he  relaxes  at 
all  from  the  rigor  of  his  ethical  tone,  he  is  either 
evaporated  into  an  imaginative  sentimentalism  which 
rises  above  the  range  of  human  sympathies,  or  is  crys- 
tallized into  a  rigid  stoicism  which  prides  itself  on 
its  formal  perfection.  For  any  practical  application 
to  the  affairs  of  common  life,  his  teachings  and  spirit 
are  singulai'ly  unfitted,  and  for  this  reason  his  ethics 
have  been  known  and  practised  chiefly  among  the 
15 


236  kant's  ethics. 

ranks  of  the  artificially  cultivated,  while  the  Chris- 
tian moralities  have  been  most  distinctl}^  recognized 
and  most  effectually  honored  and  most  consistently 
practised  in  the  homes  and  societies  of  practical  men, 
who  have  been  schooled  to  the  ethics  of  common 
sense,  by  the  trials  and  conflicts  of  ordinary  life. 

§  114.  The  relations  of  the  Kantian  ethics  to  the- 
Reiatioiisto  istic  and  Christian  truth  should  not  be 
The^stic  and    overlooked.     In  the  ethics  of  Kant,  God 

Christian  ' 

Truth.  is  a  scientific  necessity,  whose  presence  in 

the  moral  universe  is  required,  that  He  may  bestow 
upon  the  virtuous  the  reward  which  they  deserve  for 
their  obedience  to  the  moral  law.  Inasmuch  as  the 
practical  reason  not  only  commands  obedience,  but 
pronounces  that  the  obedient  will  deserves  to  be  made 
sensitively  happy,  some  agent  or  agency  is  required 
to  execute  its  behests,  and  therefore  God  is  demanded 
and  accepted  by  the  faith  of  men.  Inasmuch,  how- 
ever, as  the  good  which  He  bestows  is  sentient  good, 
and  this  in  the  Kantian  system  is  inferior  to  moral 
good,  the  relative  place  which  the  Supreme  holds  in 
His  own  universe  is  by  necessity  a  secondary  and 
inferior  one.  He  is  artificially  and  awkwardly  at- 
tached to  the  practical  reason,  as  a  marshal  or 
sheriff',  in  order  to  enforce  the  moral  law,  and  cannot 
but  suffer  in  the  respect  of  those  who  believe  in 


SUMMARY   OF   KANT's   ETHICAL  THEORY.    227 

Him,  by  reason  of  this  single  function,  for  which  alone 
He  is  made  necessary  to  their  faith.  His  entire 
administration  must  consequently  be  weakened  in 
its  acts  and  its  functions  by  the  circumstance  that  it 
addresses  the  hopes  and  fears  of  men.  in  place  of 
their  conscience  and  moral  will,  inasmuch  as  the 
Kantian  estimate  of  the  emotional  nature  places  it 
out  of  all  relation  to  the  conscience,  and  degrades 
the  motives  which  it  addresses  to  man's  sensibility  to 
a  confessedly  inferior  authority.  Hence  the  natural 
theism  of  Kant,  which  at  first  aspect  seems  to  be 
exalted  to  the  highest  supi'emacy  over  man,  even  to 
the  judgment  seat  of  the  conscience,  and  conse- 
quently to  stand  on  the  firmest  foundations,  is  prac- 
tically and  fatally  weakened  by  this  practical  antag- 
onism between  duty  and  sensibility.  The  same 
weakness  makes  itself  more  manifest  when  the 
Kantian  ethics  encounters  the  Christian  system  in 
its  supernatural  Personage,  with  His  miraculous 
doings  and  His  authoritative  commands,  with  His 
personal  affections,  His  promised  rewai'ds,  and  His 
threatened  displeasure.  While  Kant  affects  no  se- 
crecy, and  is  chargeable  with  no  affectation  in  the 
homage  which  he  renders  to  Christ  as  the  embodied 
ideal  of  moral  perfection,  as  both  the  example  and 
the  inspirer  of  the  ethical  life  of  Christendom,  he  at 


328  kant's  ethics. 

the  same  time  treats  His  claims  as  the  pei'sonal 
ruler  of  the  world's  life  as  did  Herod  of  old,  in- 
vesting the  rightful  Lord  of  the  moral  universe  with 
a  robe  of  mockery,  and  putting  into  his  hands  an 
idle  sceptre.  The  Christian  history  he  is  compelled  by 
the  stress  of  his  ethical  system  to  hold  to  be  impos- 
sible, or  needless,  or  unscientific.  While  as  a  sym- 
bol the  Christian  history  is  worthy  of  all  respect,  yet 
as  a  supernatural  fact  it  is  impossible,  needless,  or 
mercenary.  As  a  revelation  it  is  simply  impossible, 
because  the  ideas  and  truths  which  it  professes  to 
impart  cannot  be  communicated  unless  the  elements 
are  already  in  the  possession  of  those  to  whom  it 
claims  to  make  them  known.  If  these  elements  are 
already  present,  they  cannot  be  enforced  by  super- 
natural authority,  inasmuch  as  their  natural  and  in- 
dependent energy  cannot  be  increased  by  any  extra- 
neous additions.  The  axiomatically  ethical  and  spir- 
itual truth  which  is  slumbering  in  every  man's  con- 
science must  be  left  to  be  developed,  sooner  or  later, 
by  natural  agencies,  under  the  operation  of  existing 
laws.  This  revelation  is  also  useless.  If  adequate 
agencies  exist,  the  faith  in  the  moral  economy  which 
pervades  the  universe  forces  us  to  believe  that  no 
supernatural  interposition  will  be  furnished  when 
natural  appliances  suffice.     It  is  also  demoralizing 


SUMMARY    OF    KAXT's    ETHICAL   THP:OKY.    229 

when  contrasted  with  higher  and  purer  intluences.  All 
conceivable  supernatural  influences,  in  the  Kantian 
judgment,  address  the  personal  sensibility  and  appeal 
to  the  pathological  emotions.  Interesting  as  these 
may  be,  and  practically  effective  in  the  actual  affaii's 
of  men,  when  ethically  judged  they  must  be  relegated 
to  a  lower  plane  than  those  which  the  practical  reason 
presents  when  it  addresses  man's  autonomous  will. 
Indeed,  properly  speaking,  these  influences  have  no 
ethical  value,  but  are  simply  auxiliary  to  impressions 
that  have  no  place  within  the  moral  in  men.  If  not 
always  anti-ethical,  they  are  at  least  unethical.  The 
personal  character  of  the  Great  Exemplar,  though  it 
incarnated  the  ideal  of  human  excellence,  and  so  far 
is  transcendentally  elevating,  gains  nothing  in  purely 
ethical  force  by  being  real,  but  rather  loses,  inas- 
much as  it  blends  with  the  purely  ethical  the  per- 
sonal, which  appeals  to  the  affections  rather  than  to 
the  conscience,  and  moves  upon  the  self-centred  im- 
pulses rather  than  the  simple  sense  of  duty.  What- 
ever may  be  urged  in  support  of  tiie  supernatural 
power  of  the  supernatural  Christ  can  in  no  sense  be 
recognized  among  the  highest  influences,  but  must 
be  conceded  to  human  weakness,  and  to  the  tem- 
porary predominance  of  inferior  impulses. 

Kant  does  indeed  find  a  great  ethical  truth  in  the 


230  kant's  ethics. 

perversion  of  human  nature,  and  in  the  predom- 
inance and  persistence  of  those  lower  impulses  which 
inwardly  struggle  against  the  law  of  duty,  and  make 
the  sense  of  obligation  so  potent  and  so  fearful. 
But  he  holds  this  tenet  rather  as  a  myth  which  illus- 
trates what  he  conceives  to  be  a  subjective  ethical 
truth,  than  as  having  any  other  significance,  while 
the  sacred  history  of  redemption  from  this  moral 
depravity  is  to  him  only  a  mythic  parable,  made  up 
of  the  sensuous  drapery  of  those  great  moral  verities 
which  give  it  its  interest  and  its  power. 

No  fact  is  more  notorious,  and  none  more  sig- 
nificant, than  that  the  Kantian  Ethics  have  been  a 
significant  and  oftentimes  a  destructive  element, 
whether  confessed  or  unconscious,  in  the  many  philo- 
sophical and  historical  arguments  which  have  been 
urged  against  supernatural  Christianity.  It  may  be 
added  that  the  theory  of  ethics  which  does  not  need 
a  personal  Deity  to  enforce  the  law  of  duty,  because 
the  law  of  duty  is  self-sufficing,  or  which  rejects  Him 
because,  forsooth.  His  efficient  authority  must  address 
man's  sensibility  to  the  personal  favor  or  displeasure 
of  his  moral  ruler,  cannot  but  labor  under  a  heavy 
burden  of  disadvantage  when  it  aspires  to  a  faith  in 
a  personal  Father  in  Heaven,  or  the  supernatural 
Christ,  by  whom  God  is  manifested  to  man  through 


SUMMARY    OF    KAXT^S    ETHICAL   THEORY.     231 

human  aftections  and  human  sympathies,  in  order  to 
lift  him  to  that  moral  perfection  which  reveals  itself 
as  the  ideal  of  every  human  soul  that  finds  in  the 
end  of  its  being  the  law  of  duty,  and  in  its  adjusted 
and  purified  sensibilities  the  realization  of  that 
blessedness  which  is  the  true  spiritual  life. 


CHAPTER  V. 

BRIEF  NOTICES  FROM  EMINENT  GERMAN 
CRITICS. 

§  116.  It  does  not  fall  within  tbe  plan  of  this 
essay  to  trace  the  fortunes  of  Kant's  eth-  introductory, 
ical  theory  in  Germany,  or  to  exhibit  the  criticisms 
which  it  has  received  from  the  several  schools  in 
philosophy  which  in  that  country  have  succeeded  one 
another  so  rapidly  during  the  present  century. 
Each  one  of  these  schools  has  given  more  or  less 
attention  to  ethics,  but  no  one  of  them  has  given 
such  prominence  to  ethical  relations  as  has  Kant. 
Certainly  no  one  has  sought  as  he  did  to  make  ethical 
truth  the  foundation  of  speculative  philosophy.  On 
the  other  hand,  each  one  of  these  eminent  leaders  of 
philosophical  opinion  made  ethics  subservient  to  his 
special  philosophy,  making  the  pi-actical  to  sit  at  the 
feet  of  the  speculative  reason.  While  ethics  has 
been  held  in  unfeigned  honor  in  all  the  modern 
schools,  she  has  never  ventured  to  speak  with  such 
positive  authority  through  the  categorical  impera- 
tive, or  to  stand  as  sponsor  for  every  species  of  phi- 

232 


BRIEF    NOTICES    FROM    GKUMAX    CRITICS.     '-iSS 

losophical  truth  as  she  has  done  in  the  school  of 
Kant.  It  was  not  without  an  occasional  earnest 
pi'otest  to  the  contrary  that  this  was  done  in  Kant's 
own  time.  We  give  the  impassioned  language  of 
Schiller  as  an  example  of  the  response  which  Kant's 
extreme  onesidedness  called  forth  from  one  of  his 
earnest  admirers,  and  also  as  explaining  the  mis- 
chievous practical  reaction  which  was  occasioned  by 
Kant's  dogmatic  extremes: 

§  117.     "  In  Kant's  moral  philosophy  the  idea  of 
duty   is    represented    with    a    harshness 

Schiller's 

which   frightened   away  all   the  gentler  comments  on 

p    Tx*  J         •    1  J-  -1       i.  i.  Kant's  Ethics. 

graces  ot  hie,  and  might  easily  tempt 
a  weak  understanding  to  seek  for  moral  perfection 
in  the  way  of  a  gloomy  and  monkish  asceticism. 
However  earnestly  the  great  philosopher  may  have 
sought  to  guard  himself  against  such  a  misrepre- 
sentation, which  to  his  free  and  noble  spirit  must 
have  been  most  offensive,  he  has  yet  given  occasion 
for  it  by  the  forcible  and  striking  contrast  between 
the  antagonistic  principles,  which  he  represents  as 
contending  for  the  mastery  of  the  human  will.  In 
respect  to  the  truth  of  his  theory  there  can  be  no 
question  among  thinking  men  after  the  arguments 
which  he  has  urged,  and  I  scarcely  know  how  one 
would  not  sooner  give  up  his  manhood  than  adopt 


334  K  A  NT's    ETHICS. 

any  other  conclusion  than  his.  And  yet,  purely  as 
he  proceeded  to  his  task  as  an  inquiry  for  the  truth, 
and  satisfactorily  as  he  conducted  his  argument 
upon  objective  grounds,  he  still  appears  to  me  to 
have  been  influenced  by  certain  subjective  reasons, 
which,  as  I  think,  are  easily  explained  by  the  cir- 
cumstances of  his  times. 

"The  morality  of  his  times  as  he  found  it,  in  both 
theory  and  practice,  must  have  outraged  him,  on  the 
one  hand,  by  the  gross  sensualism  of  its  practices, 
and  by  the  unworthy  readiness  of  its  philosophers  to 
sanction  this  corruption  by  their  lax  theories.  On 
the  other  hand,  a  scarcely  less  objectionable  principle 
of  perfectibility  aroused  his  opposition,  which,  in  order 
to  realize  an  abstract  idea  of  universal  perfection, 
was  by  no  means  sci'upulous  in  the  selection  of  the 
means.  For  these  reasons  he  directed  the  most 
cogent  of  his  arguments  toward  the  points  where 
the  danger  was  most  imminent  and  the  reform  was 
most  needed,  and  made  it  at  once  a  solemn  obligation 
to  attack  sensuality,  as  well  when  with  brazen  front 
it  outraged  all  moral  feeling  as  when  it  assumed 
that  imposing  garb  of  high  moral  aims  in  which  a 
certain  enthusiastic  party  spirit  knew  how  to  array 
it.  For  it  should  be  remembered  that  he  had  not 
ignorance  to  instruct,  but  perverseness  to  reprove 


BRIEF    NOTICES    FROM    GERMAN    CRITICS.     235 

and  reclaim.  The  cure  demanded  rebuke,  not  flat- 
tery or  persuasion,  and  the  more  striking  was  the  con- 
trast which  the  truth  presented  to  current  maxims, 
the  more  could  he  hope  to  arouse  his  age  to  reflec- 
tion. He  became  the  Draco  of  his  time,  because  his 
time  was  not  worthy  of  a  Solon,  or  capable  of 
receiving  him.  From  the  sanctuary  of  pure  reason 
he  brought  forth  the  moral  law  at  once  so  little 
known  and  yet  so  well  known,  held  it  up  in  its 
austere  sanctity  before  a  degraded  generation,  and 
cared  not  to  ask  whether  it  had  eyes  which  could  not 
endure  the  brightness  of  its  purity. 

"But  in  what  had  the  children  of  the  household 
offended  so  grievously  that  Kant  cared  only  for  the 
servants?  Because  impure  inclinations  had  usurped 
the  name  of  virtue,  must  the  most  disinterested 
affections  in  the  noblest  hearts  be  brought  under 
suspicion?  Because  the  moral  weakling  would  in- 
terpret the  law  of  reason  with  a  laxness  which 
makes  it  a  plaything  at  his  convenience,  ought  it  for 
this  reason  to  be  invested  with  a  rigidity  so  extreme 
as  would  only  change  the  vigorous  expression  of 
moral  freedom  into  a  more  honorable  form  of  bond- 
age? Has  not  the  truly  moral  man  a  freer  choice 
between  self-esteem  and  self-contempt  than  the  slave 
of  sense  has  between  pleasure  and  pain?    Is  there  in 


236  rant's  ethics. 

the  one  case  any  less  constraint  for  the  pure  will 
than  in  the  other  for  the  will  that  is  corrupt? 
Must  humanity  itself  be  indicted  and  degraded  by 
the  imperative  form  of  the  moral  law,  and  must 
the  noblest  assertion  of  its  greatness  become  the 
most  abject  confession  of  its  weakness?  Should  not 
this  form  of  command  have  precluded  the  impression 
that  the  obligation  which  man  imposes  on  himself  as 
a  rational  being,  and  which  for  this  very  reason 
alone  is  binding  on  himself,  is  reconcilable  with  his 
feeling  of  freedom,  and  for  this  reason  should  it  not 
have  avoided  the  appearance  of  a  foreign  and  posi- 
tive command,  an  appearance  which  by  the  radical 
inclination  to  act  against  the  same,  that  is  charged 
upon  man,  could  with  difficulty  be  set  aside  ?  *    *   * 

"  Human  nature  is,  in  fact,  a  more  closel}'^  com- 
pacted whole  than  it  is  permitted  to  philosophei's 
to  allow  it  to  appear,  who  seem  to  be  unable  to 
accomplish  anything  except  by  the  process  of  dissec- 
tion. Never  again  can  the  reason  reject,  as  un- 
worthy of  itself,  those  affections  which  the  heart 
confesses  with  joy,  and  which  every  man  cannot  but 
exalt  in  his  own  esteem,  even  when  he  is  himself 
morally  degraded.  Were  the  emotional  nature  uni- 
formly the  depressed  and  never  the  cooperative 
agency,  how  could  it  bring  the  lire  of  its  own  emo- 


BKIEF   NOTICES   FEOM   GERMAN"   CRITICS.     337 

tions  even  to  that  triumph  which  is  celebrated  over 
itself  ■?  How  could  it  be  so  active  a  participant  in 
the  conscious  experience  of  the  pure  spirit  if  it  were 
not  so  intimately  interwoven  with  the  same  that 
even  the  analytical  understanding  cannot,  without 
violence,  sunder  the  two?  The  will,  moreover,  has 
a  more  immediate  connection  with  the  capacity  for 
emotion  than  with  that  for  knowledge,  and  it  were 
often  most  unfortunate  if  in  every  case  it  must  first 
adjust  itself  to  the  pure  reason." — Veber  Anmuth 
und  Wfirde* 

We  have  given  these  extracts  from  Schiller  because 
they  furnish  a  vivid  and  a  truthful  representation  of 
the  impression  which  Kant's  theory  made  upon  an  ar- 

*0f  this  criticism  of  Schiller,  Julius  Miiller  pertinently  remarks: 
"  It  will  in  any  event  remain  as  an  example  of  a  memorable  error  of  a 
noble  mind  that  Kant  could  maintain  that  true  virtue  has  nothing  to 
do  with  sympathizing  benevolence  toward  man,  or  with  the  interest  of 
the  feelings  in  man's  welfare,  and  can  only  manifest  itself  in  its 
purity  when  it  is  attended  by  no  pleasure  in  the  object  of  our  will. 
And  yet  these  consequences  cannot  be  avoided  if  the  essence  of 
morality  is  derived  only  from  esteem  for  the  moral  law,  and  for  the 
reason  that  this  law  bears  the  formal  characteristic  of  universal  valid- 
ity. Schiller's  treatise,  Ueber  Anmuth  und  Wiirde,  so  far  as  it  protests 
against  this  rigor  which  petrifies  the  moral  life,  gives  expression  to  the 
aspirations  of  Christian  truth;  but  in  so  far  as  it  will  not  give  up  the 
general  principles  of  the  Kantian  moral  law  it  is  incapable  of  holding 
fast  to  those  truths,  or  of  escaping  a  conflict  with  itself.  An  example 
of  this  is  furnished  in  its  singular  complaint  against  Kanfs  morality, 
that  by  the  imperative  form  of  the  moral  law  (for  the  very  reason 
that  it  is  a  law  asserting  authority  over  freedom)  humanity  itself  is 
held  to  be  degraded."— /Jie  Christ liche  Lehre  von  der  SOnde,  Ersfes 
Buck,  Erste  Abfheilung,  Zweifes  Kajntel.  _ 


338  rant's  ethics. 

dent  admirer,  who  was  yet  an  independent  critic. 
While  Schiller  did  not  attempt  to  refute  Kant's  meta- 
physical analyses,  he  was  convinced  there  was  some 
error  in  his  practical  conclusions,  and  indeed  in  the 
actual  working  of  his  entire  ethical  theory.  The  re- 
volt of  his  feelings  against  this  theory  was  shared  by 
a  very  large  proportion  of  the  brilliant  writers  who 
followed  one  another  so  rapidly,  among  whom  Goethe 
was  as  conspicuous  for  his  philosophical  insight  as 
for  his  wondrous  imagination.  That  Kant  should 
have  failed  to  convince  this  brilliant  galaxy  of  ima- 
ginative writers,  who,  while  they  were  overpowered 
by  the  acuteness  and  strength  of  his  logic,  and 
dared  not  venture  to  meet  him  in  the  arena  of 
metaphysics,  were  yet  confident  that  his  analyses 
must  be  either  defective  or  false,  goes  very  far  to 
prove  that  his  ethics,  though  practically  his  strong- 
est point,  was  in  some  particulars  seriously  defec- 
tive, and  especially  for  its  stoical  contempt  of  the 
sensibilities.  That  Kant  was  animated  by  the 
noblest  purposes  in  his  ethical  teachings  was  freely 
confessed  by  those  who,  like  Schiller,  were  at  once 
his  critics  and  admirers.  That  the  extremest  of  his 
one-sided  paradoxes  may  admit  of  a  qualified  inter- 
pretation whicli  exalts  them  into  important  practical 
truths  may  be  acknowledged  without  hesitation  by 


BRIEF   NOTICES   FKOM    GERMAN    CRITICS.     239 

those  who  reject  them  the  more  positively  because 
they  see  in  them  an  incongruous  alternation  of  im- 
aginative flights  into  the  empyrean  of  inspiring 
truth  and  of  patient  mining  along  the  dark  and  wind- 
ing passages  of  bewildering  metaphysics. 

§  117.  The  fact  has  already  been  adverted  to, 
that,  with  one  or  two  important  excep-  schieiennacii- 
tions,  the  theory  of  ethics  has  attracted  ^^  ^^i  Lotze. 
much  less  attention  since  the  days  of  Kant,  as  a  part 
of  speculative  philosophy,  and  least  of  all  has  it 
been  recognized,  as  it  was  by  Kant,  as  furnishing  to 
speculative  truth  its  sole  and  solid  foundation.  While 
each  of  the  great  systems,  as  of  J.  G.  Fichte,  Schel- 
ling,  Herbart,  and  Hegel,  has  found  as  ample  a  place 
for  ethics  in  terms  of  reason  or  thought,  as  did 
Kant,  no  one  of  these  writers  like  him  has  made  it 
the  cornerstone  of  our  confidence  in  speculative 
truth,  or  invested  its  dicta  with  supreme  author- 
ity. To  Schleiermacher  belongs  the  distinction  of 
producing  an  original  system,  which  was  derived 
from  or  adjusted  to  the  characteristic  philosophy  or 
dialectic  which  was  peculiar  to  himself.  This  dia- 
lectic we  have  no  space  to  describe,  nor  would  it  be 
easy  to  do  so.  We  speak  of  his  ethics  only  as 
dissenting  from  the  ethics  of  Kant,  in  that  it  does 
not  limit  its  sphere  to  the  imperative  of  duty  as 


240  rant's  ethics. 

such,  but  divides  it  into  three  distinct  departments, 
the  doctrine  of  duties,  or  obligatory  acts;  of  virtues, 
or  of  ethical  dispositions ;  and  of  habits,  or  confirmed 
character.  That  this  classification  must  rest  on  a 
broader  psychological  and  philosophical  basis  than 
Kant's  practical  reason,  with  its  categorical  impera- 
tive and  its  autonomous  will,  is  too  obvious  to 
req.uire  any  illustration.  Both  Schleiermacher  and 
Herbart  notoriously  differ  from  Kant  in  their  recog- 
nition of  the  sensibilities  as  a  prime  factor  in  the 
ethical  experiences  and  judgments  of  man. 

Hermann  Lotze  is  another  example  of  a  writer 
of  competent  knowledge,  profound  insight,  and  im- 
partial judgment,  from  whose  Microcosmus,  B.  V., 
Chap,  v.,  §  3,  we  give  the  following,  observing  that 
in  this  connection  he  also  notices  one  or  two  con- 
spicuous features  of  the  later  ethical  systems: 

"  *  *  *  There  is  no  doubt  something  to  praise  in 
the  austerity  with  which  pi'actical  philosophy  has 
sought  to  free  moral  precepts  from  an  indirect 
reference  to  the  personal  interest  of  the  agent;  but 
this  austerity  was  wrong  in  seeking  to  undo  the 
plain  and  indissoluble  connection  between  the  notion 
of  pleasure  —  despised,  and  in  most  of  its  applica- 
tions despicable  —  and  the  notion  of  worth  in  gen- 
eral.    When  Kant   believed   that   he  had    found  a 


BRIEF   NOTICES   FROM    GERMAN   CRITICS.     241 

universal  formula  for  moral  action,  in  opposition  to 
the  aims  of  self-interest,  he  was  candid  enough  to 
admit  that  he  had  not  discovered  in  it  the  precise 
ground  of  its  binding  authority  over  us.  And  why, 
in  fact,  do  we  consider  it  as  a  matter  of  course  that 
the  maxims  of  our  action  must  fit  into  a  general  sys- 
tem of  law?  And  which  are  the  maxims  which  do 
not  thus  fit  in?  Plainly  those  which,  if  generally 
followed,  would  produce  general  disorder  and  the 
frustration  of  all  effort.  But  what  is  this  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  importance  of  order,  and  of  the  possi- 
bility of  carrying  out  our  intention,  if  it  is  not  either 

(1)  a  grand  and  comprehensive  utilitarian  principle 
taking  the  place  of  special  and  narrower  ones,  or 

(2)  the  confession  that  maxims  different  from  those 
demanded  would  lead  to  general  misery,  and  are, 
therefore,  to  be  rejected?  Other  systems,  while 
eschewing  all  pleasure,  assure  us  that  the  moral  law 
is  the  one  important  thing;  that  the  relation  of  a 
finite  being  to  the  absolute,  like  that  of  any  point  of 
the  periphery  to  its  centre,  is  a  relation  of  subordin- 
ation; that  human  will  runs  parallel  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  infinite  idea,  and  works  for  it.  But 
how  if  the  absolute  should  not  desire  such  a  relation? 
If  the  submission  of  the  periphery  caused  only  vex- 
ation to  the  centre,  could  it  be  still  maintained  that 

16 


242  kant's  ethics. 

this  relation  was,  notwithstanding,  to  be  maintained 
as  unconditionally  worthy  in  itself? 

"  This  question  should  remind  us  that  the  sacred- 
ness  of  the  command  depends  upon  the  will  of  the 
Supreme  Being,  upon  His  capacity  of  receiving 
pleasure  or  pain  from  our  obedience  or  disobedience, 
and  upon  that  relation  of  ourselves  to  Him,  in  virtue 
of  which  we  find  our  own  blessedness  in  His  pleasure. 
If  we  eliminate  from  our  conception  of  the  Supreme 
Being  every  trace  of  feeling,  and  transform  our 
conception  into  that  of  inflexible  physical  force,  a 
power  which,  though  intelligent,  is  devoid  of  feeling, 
we  see  at  once  that  the  subordination  above  referred 
to  is  altogether  without  worth.    *    *    * 

"  What  is  the  meaning  of  saying  that  there  may 
be  certain  relations  between  diiferent  wills,  which 
merit  unconditional  approbation?  Is  such  a  relation 
to  be  found  anywhere  in  the  world?  Are  there  any- 
where wills  which,  apart  from  all  feeling,  actually 
exist,  and  can  enter  into  relation  with  one  another? 
And  if  it  were  so  —  if  the  world  consisted  of  beings 
that  were  m.erely  intellectual  and  volitional,  and  of 
which  none,  whether  finite  or  infinite,  could  anyhow 
or  at  any  time  be  capable  of  feeling  pain  or  pleasure, 
in  such  a  case  what  could  be  the  significance  of 
those  ideals  of  action  which  then  would  have  no  one 


BftlEP   NOTICES   FROM   GERMAN   CRITICS.     243 

Ity  whom  they  could  be  approved?  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  would  it  be  an  absolute  moral  requirement  that 
one  existing  condition,  which  caused  neither  pain  nor 
pleasure  to  anyone,  should  be  replaced  by  another 
condition  which  would  likewise  produce  no  increase 
of  well-being  to  anyone  in  the  world?  Must  we 
believe  that  the  universe  is  so  taken  up  with  cere- 
mony that  it  is  concerned  with  nothing  but  the  real- 
ization of  formal  conditions?  The  too  stern  morality 
to  which  we  have  referred  may  easily  conceal  from 
itself  these  final  results,  the  transformation  of  all 
moral  action  into,  as  it  were,  a  mere  mechanical 
putting  together;  for  certainly  no  one  is  likely  to 
set  up  individual  moral  laws  in  which  there  does 
not  lurk  some  hidden  reference  to  the  pleasure 
which  is  so  much  despised;  in  other  departments  of 
life  these  extreme  consequences  do  occasionally 
appear." 

§  118.     One  of  the  most  significant  criticisms  of 
Kant's  theory  from  a  philosopher  of  a  Trendeien- 
modern   German   school   has   been   fur-  (^"/ig^jj^es 
nished  by  the  late  eminent  Adolf  Tren-  »"  Kant. 
delenburg,  of  Berlin.     It  may  be  found  in  bis  His- 
torische  Beitrtige  zur  Philosophic,  Dritter  Band,  Bei*- 
lin,  1867.     The  title  of  the  essay  is,  Der  Widerstreit 
zwischen  Kant  und  Aristoteles  in  der  Ethik. 


244  Kant's  ethics. 

The  first  point  which  the  author  makes  is,  that 
while  Kant  urges  acute  objections  against  those 
philosophers  who  would  derive  the  principles  of 
ethics  from  an  anal3'sis  of  human  nature,  he  alto- 
gether omits  the  peculiar  form  in  which  this  analy- 
sis is  applied  by  Aristotle.  Whereas  Aristotle  has 
recognized  the  inner  purpose  or  end  which  controls 
and  explains  the  constitution  of  man  and  the  activi- 
ties to  which  it  is  destined  as  its  highest  and  best 
use,  Kant  only  conceives  of  this  as  some  external 
result  or  achievement,  activity,  or  skill,  to  which  it 
may  be  trained.  Trendelenburg  notices  in  passing 
that  in  order  to  discover  this  supreme  aim  or  pur- 
pose of  man's  being  or  constitution,  Aristotle  would 
have  us  resort  to  psychology,  which  Kant  would 
reject  as  involving  the  study  of  matter  as  distin- 
guished from  form,  the  accidental  rather  than  the 
essential,  and  therefore  as  unscientific. 

Next,  Kant  insists  that  all  material  practical 
principles  must  carry  us  over  to  the  doctrine  of 
self-love  or  separate,  i.e.,  individual,  happiness.  This 
general  assertion  is  met  by  Trendelenburg  with  the 
general  denial,  that  to  found  our  principle  in  the  mat- 
ter or  constitution  of  man  does  not  necessarily  involve 
the  founding  it  in  separate  happiness  or  the  so-called 
principle  of  self-love.     It  is  the  necessary  relation 


BRIEF   NOTICES    FROM    GEK.MAX    CRITICS.     245 

of  a  morally  good  or  right  action  to  the  realization 
of  the  end  of  our  being  which  enables  us  to  exalt 
this  ideal  into  a  principle  which  becomes  controlling 
and  supreme.  That  its  relations  to  the  highest 
happiness  may  be  the  medium  by  which  we  discern 
the  activity  for  which  we  are  destined  he  concedes, 
but  that  happiness  is  properl}'  the  end,  he  denies,  but 
would  say  the  action  indicated  by  the  relative  hap- 
piness which  it  gives  is  such  an  end  and  becomes  a 
law.  In  brief,  he  dissents  from  Kant  in  his  inter- 
pretation of  Aristotle,  as  to  his  estimate  of  the 
psychological  study  of  man's  nature  as  the  ground 
of  an  ethical  system,  as  to  his  judgment  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  formal  to  the  real,  and  as  to  his  recogni- 
tion of  purpose  and  design  as  essential  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  nature  of  man,  and  of  man's  highest 
or  true  happiness  as  the  indication  of  the  highest 
and  best  activity,  and  as,  consequently,  the  revealer 
and  enforcer  of  the  moral  law. 

These  principles  are  more  distinctly  and  fully 
developed  in  the  second  part  of  the  essay,  from 
which  we  give  the  following: 

Fii'st  of  all,  the  author  notices  that,  inasmuch  as 
pleasure  {die  Lust),  being  the  spring  of  the  indi- 
vidual life,  tends  to  selfishness,  while  the  good,  the 
bond  of  the  common  life,  seeks  the  general  well- 


;i46  kant's  ethics. 

being,  subordinating  to  it  the  individual  interest, 
the  mutual  relation  of  the  two  necessarily  becomes 
of  the  utmost  ethical  importance. 

After  sundry  historical  and  critical  notices,  he 
adds  that  pleasure,  ever  varied  and  changeable,  can- 
not for  this  reason  be  a  guide  in  action  and  in  life. 
Neither  the  highest  scale  of  mere  enjoyment,  as 
such,  nor  any  separate  good,  can  serve  as  a  guide  or 
impulse  to  the  general  good.  Consequently  the  good 
will  must  renounce  all  separate  or  selfish  good  as  its 
end  or  rule.  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that 
the  good  will  has  no  pleasure.  Rather,  over  against 
selfish  good  is  set  its  esteem  for  the  law,  as  that  which 
opposes  selfish  good,  its  pleasure  being  intellectual 
in  its  occasion.  Moreover,  this  esteem  for  the  law 
being  general,  and  not  individual  in  its  occasion,  is 
not  a  transient  feeling,  but  permanent  in  its  expe- 
rience, a  disposition  which  cannot  be  content  with 
single  actions,  but  is  a  permanent  state  of  the  will. 

It  also  involves  a  superior  object  of  love;  for  the 
disposition  and  will  are  not  cold  abstractions,  but 
living  activities,  which  are  fixed  on  commanding 
objects  of  good.  In  such  a  condition  of  the  soul, 
impulse  and  end,  a  good  will  and  good  actions,  cor- 
respond; pure  pleasure  in  the  good  becomes  the 
constant    characteristic    of    the    good    disposition. 


BRIEF   NOTICES    FROM    GERMAN    CRITICS.     247 
The  crood  man  delicrhts  in  the  law  of  God  after  the 

n  o 

inward  man.  In  the  good  disposition  character  con- 
sists; and  if  character  is  energetic,  it  will  have 
pleasure  in  its  principle. 

It  follows  from  this  analysis  that  pleasure  is  at 
once  repelled  and  embraced;  repelled  as  a  ground, 
and  yet  retained  as  a  characteristic  of  virtue.  We 
cannot  reconcile  the  difficulty  by  making,  the  good 
man  selfish  in  his  virtiious  joys.  We  rather  resort 
to  the  organic  conception  of  nature  and  man,  after 
which  one  result  or  aim  serves  an  end  or  aim  still 
higher  than  itself,  and  so  on,  the  highest  of  all 
giving  law  to  all  which  is  below.  In  the  highest  of 
all  we  find  the  categorical  shall,  which  at  last  is 
found  to  proceed  from  a  will,  i.e.,  if  one  follows  on 
from  the  conditioned  to  the  unconditioned,  and  at 
last  encounters  a  person.  Here  we  meet  the  highest 
for  man  in  the  universe  of  thought  and  will  —  the 
man  asserting  I  ought,  the  man  responding  I  icill. 

When  we  come  back  to  the  relations  of  pleasure 
or  happiness  to  these  experiences,  and  ask  for  the 
place  which  it  holds,  we  find  that  it  is  a  generic 
term,  and  covers  or  includes  a  great  variety  of  very 
iinlike  experiences,  so  unlike  as  to  accept  or  endure 
with  difficulty  any  common  appellation,  yet  all  hav- 
ing in  common,  a  tendency  to  some  special  activity, 


248  kant's  ethics. 

which  tends  in  some  way  to  the  development  or 
upholding  of  man.  In  the  two  forms  of  pleasure 
and  pain  are  indicated  the  furtherance  or  hindrance 
of  the  individual  life.  So  far  as  pleasure  and  pain 
look  beyond,  to  their  respective  ends,  these  expe- 
riences are  secondary  and  the  accomplishment  of  the 
end  is  primary.  In  animals  they  are  limited  to  the 
individual  well-being.  But  in  ethics  and  with  man 
we  go  farther;  we  widen  our  conceptions  so  as  to 
include  the  common  life.  Personality  and  the  state 
are  recognized,  also  the  higher  pleasures  of  art  and 
science  and  the  divine  in  man. 

The  moral  training  of  the  will  consists  in  learning 
to  find  pleasure  and  pain  in  those  activities  and 
objects  which  are  befitting.  Let  no  man  think  that 
such  a  discipline  can  be  achieved  by  the  exclusion  of 
pleasure.  The  springs  of  action  are  wanting  to  the 
will  if  the  man  does  not  embark  in  it  his  inmost 
life,  and  does  not  find  his  pleasures  from  moral 
living;  not  that  he  should  be  active  for  the  sake  of 
pleasure,  but  should  embark  his  inmost  self,  without 
ceasing,  in  the  good. 

"  These  extracts  from  writers  who  are  no  longer 
living  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purpose.  The  num- 
ber   of  able    critics    in  Germany    who  continue   to 


BKIEF   KOTICES   FUOM    GERMAN   CRITICS.     'HO 

discuss  Kant's  ethical  theory  seems  likely  to  increase 
rather  than  to  be  diminished.  The  fascination 
which  brings  each  new  generation  to  his  feet  to 
listen  to  his  teachings  —  either  to  accept  or  reject 
them  —  seems  of  late  to  be  intensified  rather  than  to 
be  weakened.  In  one  way  or  other,  Kant  seems  likely 
to  continue  to  stimulate  and  to  instruct  the  ablest 
thinkers  of  the  present  day.  The  author  of  this 
critical  examination  of  his  ethical  system  yields  to 
no  one  in  his  estimate  of  Kant's  superior  genius  and 
his  quickening  power.  At  the  same  time  he  is 
profoundly  of  the  opinion  that  the  critical  philoso- 
phy, in  order  to  exert  its  best  influence,  needs  to 
be  thoroughly  interpreted,  and  critically  discerned. 


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